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The Construction of the Westwall, 1938: An Exemplar for National Socialist Policymaking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

John D. Heyl
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Extract

On February 12, 1942, Adolf Hitler, eulogizing his renowned highway builder Fritz Todt, proclaimed that the Westwall, Todt's Wunderwerk, would protect the Reich's western borders “under any circumstances” and “against any attack.” “No power on earth,” the Führer contended, would be able to break through “this most gigantic fortified zone of all time.” Like many of Hitler's declarations of confidence in military technology, this was a mixture of propaganda, intimidation, and obsolete information. Conveniently obscured, for example, was the neglect of the Westwall since the defeat of France in 1940. In fact, the vaunted line was to be no match for enemy forces superior in numbers and matériel. In the fall of 1944 American troops penetrated the Westwall south of Aachen and captured this westernmost city in the fortified line. Further advance was halted by the surprise Ardennes counterattack in December (Battle of the Bulge), but by February 1945 breakthroughs in the Eiffel mountains initiated the drive to the Rhine and the final defeat of Germany.

Type
Research Article
Information
Central European History , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 1981 , pp. 63 - 78
Copyright
Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1981

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References

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Duquesne History Forum, Pittsburgh, on October 18,1978. I am grateful for suggestions made at that time by Peter W. Becker, University of South Carolina, and C. Richard Wardian, Fairmont State College, West Virginia. Also helpful were comments made on an advanced draft by Tim Mason, St. Peter's College, Oxford, and by Gerhard L. Weinberg, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

1. Domarus, Max, ed., Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945 (Neustadt a. d. Aisch, 1963), 2: 1838Google Scholar. Todt, one of Hitler's most talented and respected followers, died in a plane crash on Feb. 8,1942, while departing Hitler's East Prussian headquarters at Rastenburg. The cause of the crash was never determined. Outside Germany, the Westwall was usually referred to as the “Siegfried Line,” the code name for the German defensive positions in the west during the final years of World War I. Inside Germany, the new construction after 1936 was referred to as the West-Bauten, then Westwall, after Hitler's decree of May 28,1938, ordering expansion of the fortification line. See Renn, Walter F., “Hitler's West Wall: Strategy in Concrete and Steel 1938–1945” (Ph.D. diss., Florida State Univ., 1970), p. 30.Google Scholar

2. On the Ardennes counterattack, see Cole, Hugh M., The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, The United States Army in World War II, ser. 5, vol. 6 (Washington, D.C., 1965)Google Scholar. Renewed assaults on the Westwall are described in MacDonald, Charles B., The Last Offensive: The Rhineland and Central Germany, The United States Army in World War II, ser. 5, vol. 7 (Washington, D.C., 1974), esp. pp. 86–91Google Scholar. OKW progress reports on the final efforts to hold the Westwall may be found in Schramm, Percy Ernst, ed., Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, vol. 4, pt. 2 (Frankfurt a.M., 1961), pp. 1061–1101.Google Scholar

3. For a sketch of these debates, see Förster, Otto-Wilhelm, Das Befestigungswesen: Rückblick und Ausschau (Neckargemünd, 1960), pp. 35–43.Google Scholar

4. Ibid., pp. 43–44.

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6. Documentary sources on the May crisis include: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, 3rd ser. vol. 1 (London, 1949), chap. 4, pp. 317–416Google Scholar; Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945, ser. D, vol. 2 (Washington, 1949), chap. 3, pp. 294–372Google Scholar; and Documents Diplomatiques Français 1932–1939, 2nd ser., vol. 9 (Paris, 1974), chap. 2, esp. pp. 796–1019Google Scholar. A retrospective account by the chief of Czech military intelligence is presented in Moravec, František, Master of Spies (Garden City, N.Y., 1975), pp. 108–12Google Scholar. See also the balanced discussion by Taylor, Telford, Munich: The Price of Peace (Garden City, N.Y., 1979), pp. 390–95Google Scholar.

The scholarly debate on the significance of the May crisis may be followed in Wallace, W. V., “The Making of the May Crisis of 1938,” Slavonic and East European Review 41 (06 1963); 368–90Google Scholar; an exchange between Wallace and D. C. Watt, ibid. 44 (July 1966): 475–86; and Watt, , “Hitler's Visit to Rome and the May Weekend Crisis: A Study in Hitler's Response to External Stimuli,” Journal of Contemporary History 9 (01 1974): 23–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A critique of Watt emphasizing the continuity in Hitler's strategy against Czechoslovakia is offered by Weinberg, Gerhard L., The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II, 1937–1939 (Chicago, 1981), pp. 365–72.Google Scholar

7. British and French relief that the crisis resulted in an apparent setback for Hitler was accompanied by panic that the Czech issue might soon involve both countries in war with Germany. The Czechs were thus given to understand that the appeasement of Hitler was the only course that promised British and French support. See Moravec, , Master of Spies, pp. 112–13Google Scholar, and Adamthwaite, Anthony, France and the Coming of the Second World War 1936–1939 (London, 1977), pp. 190–94.Google Scholar

8. On the Winterhilfe, see de Witt, Thomas E., “‘The Struggle against Hunger and Cold’: Winter Relief in Nazi Germany, 1933–1939,” Canadian Journal of History 12 (02 1978): 361–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Hitler's, orders to his generals in May may be found in Trial of the Major War Criminals (Nuremberg, 1947), vol. 25, pp. 422–39Google Scholar (Doc. 388–PS). For a propagandistic treatment of the interplay between the Czech “mobilization” and Hitler's decision to build the Westwall, see Pöchlinger, Josef, Das Buck vom Westwall (Berlin, 1940), pp. 51–58.Google Scholar

9. See Taylor, , Munich, pp. 394–95.Google Scholar

10. The story of the 1948 completion date is provided by Westphal, Siegfried, Heer in Fesseln: Aus den Papieren des Stabchefs von Rommel, Kesselring und Rundstedt (Bonn, 1950), pp. 72–73.Google Scholar

11. A full-scale biography of Todt is still lacking, but for sketches see Ludwig, Karl-Heinz, Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf, 1974), p. 307Google Scholar, and Kehrl, Hans, Krisenmanager im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf, 1973), pp. 212–19Google Scholar, who calls Todt “the man who should have been governing Germany.” Both Irving, , The War Path, pp. 118–21Google Scholar, and Renn, , “Hitler's West Wall,” esp. chap. 2Google Scholar, have made use of the Todt papers currently in private hands.

12. On June 22, Göring issued a “Decree on the Guaranteeing of Manpower for Tasks of Special Political Importance,” Reichsgesetzblatt 1938 I, p. 652Google Scholar. For the text in English see Noakes, Jeremy and Pridham, Geoffrey, eds., Documents on Nazism, 1919–1945 (New York, 1975), p. 459Google Scholar. The priority in the transport area, to be sure, had effect only from Sept. 1 to 17, 1938. See Renn, , “Hitler's West Wall,” p. 338.Google Scholar

13. In an interview in May, Hitler “utterly destroyed” the then head of the Fortifications Inspectorate, General der Pioniere Otto-Wilhelm Förster. See Heiber, Helmut, ed., Hitler's Lagebesprechungen: Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942–1945 (Stuttgart, 1962), p. 774, n. 2Google Scholar. Förster's, version is in Befestigungswesen, pp. 45–50.Google Scholar

14. The memorandum may be found in Förster, , Betestigungswesen, pp. 123–48Google Scholar. See also Weinberg, , Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany, p. 318, n. 15.Google Scholar

15. Förster, , Befestigungswesen, pp. 147–48.Google Scholar

16. Hitler's first public mention of such figures was to the Nuremberg Rally on Sept. 12, 1938; see Domarus, , Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen (Neustadt a. d. Aisch, 1962), 1: 904Google Scholar. See also Warlimont, Walter, Inside Hitler's Headquarters 1939–1945, trans. Barry, R. H. (New York, 1964), p. 431.Google Scholar

17. The following figures are drawn from Pöchlinger, Josef, Das Buch vom Westwall, pp. 60–62Google Scholar (a propaganda piece), and Sangiorgio, Camillo, ed., Unbezwinglicher Westwall (Wiesbaden, 1940), pp. 34–36Google Scholar (a bit more objective). See also Förster, , Befestigungswesen, p. 49Google Scholar. There was an official attempt to manipulate the figures associated with Westwall construction to conform to official versions; see Sywottek, Jutta, Mobilmachung für den totalen Krieg: Die propagandistische Vorbereitung der deutschen Bevölkerung auf den Ziveiten Weltkrieg (Opladen, 1976), p. 174CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The official versions are, in fact, believable if one takes into account the tendency to employ cumulative totals. The gravest misrepresentation was probably not in terms of figures but rather in terms of the actual military effectiveness of the fortifications as of fall 1938, when, for example, the number of completed bunkers fell far short of the 5,000 demanded by Hitler and the so-called “air defense zone” had not even been begun. On this important point, see Renn, , “Hitler's West Wall,” pp. 183–91.Google Scholar

18. Domarus, , Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 1: 904Google Scholar. This contention was overdrawn on both accounts: (1) Only a month earlier his generals cast doubt on the defensive strength of the initial Westwall barriers; see, ibid., p. 880. (2) The German people were not responding positively to the war propaganda of the previous months and years.

19. Ibid., p. 904.

20. Ibid., p. 995.

21. Sywottek, , Mobilmachung, p. 174.Google Scholar

22. Ibid., p. 175.

23. Flack, , Wir Bauen am Westwall (Oldenburg i. Oldenburg and Berlin, 1939)Google Scholar. Somewhat more technical treatments of the Westwall construction, aimed mainly at those interested in (and impressed by) military detail, were the following: Sangiorgio, Unbezwinglicher Westwall, and (Major) Kühne, Rudolf Theodor, Der Westwall: Unbezwingbare Abwehrzone von Stahl und Beton an Deutschlands Westgrenze (Berlin and Munich, 1939).Google Scholar

24. Zemke, Georg, “Der Frontingenieur,” in Bauen und Kämpfen: Gedichte und Bilder vom Einsatz der Frontarbeiter (Munich, [1942]), p. 41Google Scholar:

He lives and breathes numbers and things, ’Til his most ingenious plans succeed.

His will is tougher than steel, And all he does serves the enemy's defeat.

25. See, for example, French Chief of Staff General Maurice Gamelin's views quoted in “Französische Anschauungen über Angriff und Verteidigung an Festungsfronten,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 4 (1939): 703Google Scholar, written during the “Phony War” in fall 1939. For Gamelin's shifting pronouncements on the military value of the Westwall during 1938–39, see Adamthwaite, , France and the Coming of the Second World War, pp. 234, 251–52, and 322Google Scholar. See also Gamelin, , Servir, 2 (Paris, 1946): 350–52, and 414–16.Google Scholar Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet's deepening fear of the role the Westwall would play in time of war is reflected in Bonnet, , De Munich à la Guerre: Defense de la Paix, rev. ed. (Paris, 1967), pp. 92–94.Google Scholar For a discussion emphasizing faulty French intelligence on the inadequacies of German defenses, see Kimche, Jon, The Unfought Battle (New York, 1968)Google Scholar. A similar conclusion is reached by Bernhardt, Walter, Die deutsche Aufrüstung 1934–1939: Militärische und politische Konzeptionen und ihre Einschätzung durch die Allierten (Frankfurt a.M., 1969), pp. 159ff.Google Scholar See also Renn, , “Hitler's West Wall,” chap. 6.Google Scholar

26. On this theme, see Heyl, John D., “Hitler's Economic Thought: A Reappraisal,” Central European History 6 (03 1973): 83–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Kehrl, , Krisenmanager, chap. 2 and pp. 508–9.Google Scholar

27. See Mason, Timothy W., Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft: Dokumente und Materialien zur deutschen Arbeiterpolitik 1936–1939 (Opladen, 1975), pp. 106–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar As will be apparent below, I have relied heavily on Mason's massive compendium for documentation of the social and economic impact of the Westwall construction. For a wider consideration of his important work, see my review of Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft in Journal of Social History 11 (March 1978): 444–47.

28. Convenient figures (including June 1938 data) are to be found in Mason, , Arbeiterklasse, p. 1247.Google Scholar

29. Renn's indication that the Westwall project claimed 8 percent of the “total German construction capacity” (Todt's figure) in late 1938 is consistent with the impact suggested here on construction workers in any given area. See Renn, , “Hitler's West Wall,” pp. 208, 221.Google Scholar

30. Of course, the first to be “recruited” were the residual unemployed in the large cities. The case of Düsseldorf is instructive: unemployment in December 1937 was 10,189; by December 1938 it had fallen to a negligible 3,299. Observers attributed this development directly to the Westwall project. See the annual report (1938) of the Düsseldorf Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Depositum Görgen (microfilm) 9484, Stadtarchiv Düsseldorf.

31. On the Dienstpflicht decrees, see Mason, , Arbeiterklasse, chap. 13, esp. p. 667 and docs. 110–20.Google Scholar

32. As an example, see the monthly reports by the Düsseldorf Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Depositum Görgen (microfilm) 9484, Stadtarchiv Düsseldorf. For Berlin, see Mason, , Arbeiterklasse, pp. 893–97 and 903–6.Google Scholar

33. The latter group had been “volunteered” by Himmler for work at the Westwall; the Army appears to have opposed the use of convict or concentration camp labor. See von Kotze, Hildegard, ed., Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943: Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel (Stuttgart, 1974), p. 33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34. Mason, , Arbeiterklasse, p. 863.Google Scholar

35. Ibid., p. 886.

36. Ibid., p. 872.

37. Hüttenberger, Peter, “Nationalsozialistische Polykratie,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 2 (1976): 417–42.Google Scholar

38. Leader of the SD unit in Aachen to District President Vogelsang, Aachen, Sept. 5, 1938. Papers relating to the Aachen district during this period are found in the Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf (Kalkum Branch), Abteilung II. Reports on the Westwall are in vol. 16829.

39. On the neglect of the western border area under the Nazis, see the report by the President of the Rhine Province (Terboven) to the Economics Ministry (and Schacht's supportive response) of Feb. 5,1936.1 am indebted to Tim Mason for bringing this document to my attention in Abeiterklasse, p. 74, n. 109, and to Robert Wolfe of the National Archives, Washington, for supplying me with a photocopy based on the microfilm publication T-77, roll 268, frames 1091281–96 (Wi/IF5.1282). It is ironic that precisely such projects as the Westwall, whose immediate effects were much criticized on the local level, had been so actively sought by officials in the region only two years earlier.

40. Entire villages were apparently left without water on various occasions when the Army tapped into the local waterlines. The danger of insufficient water pressure for firefighting emergencies placed many in constant fear throughout the summer.

41. These figures, and those for other towns in the district, are included in the collection cited in note 38 above. A complaint that caused considerable controversy was the allegation that drivers were carrying partial loads in order to make better time. (They were paid by kilometers driven, not by quantities delivered!) This, of course, meant higher speeds through the narrow streets of small towns and villages and more danger for local residents. This claim was refuted by one of Todt's representatives in the area, who indicated that such practices had been halted by weighing loads on a selective basis. He labeled the complaint “tendentious” and self-serving of the interests of local gravel firms, but by his response admitted that the specific complaint was indeed justified. For this dispute, see the materials in Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf (Kalkum Branch) Abteilung II, vol. 18039: Landrat in Geilenkirchen to Gestapo in Aachen, Aug. 29, 1938, and the response by the chief of the Todt Organization's Jülich office to the District President in Aachen, Sept. 9, 1938.

42. Landrat in Düren to District President in Aachen, Sept. 27, 1938. Hauptstaatsarchiv Düsseldorf (Kalkum Branch), Abteilung II (Aachen), vol. 16829.

43. See Sywottek, , Mobilmachung, p. 175.Google Scholar

44. Förster, , Befestigungswesen, p. 50Google Scholar. To be sure, the defensive capability of the Westwall in September 1939 was considerably greater than it had been a year earlier. See Renn, , “Hitler's West Wall,” pp. 287–88.Google Scholar

45. I am indebted to Peter Becker for this insight. See also Ludwig, , Technik und Ingenieure, pp. 208–10Google Scholar, and Renn, , “Hitler's West Wall,” chap. 2.Google Scholar

46. See Steinert, Marlis G., Hitler's Krieg und die Deutschen (Düsseldorf, 1970), pp. 503–5.Google Scholar The observation quoted here is not included in the shortened English translation, Hitler's War and the Germans: Public Mood and Attitude during the Second World War, ed. and trans. de Witt, Thomas E. J. (Athens, Ohio, 1977)Google Scholar, but see p. 279 for a summary of disenchantment in Düsseldorf.