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Bismarck and the Great Game: Germany and Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1871–1890

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 June 2015

James Stone
James Stone*
Affiliation:
Independent Scholar (Toronto, Ontario)
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Abstract

Otto von Bismarck, the first chancellor of a unified Germany, was an active participant in the Anglo-Russian rivalry for control of Central Asia. Even though Germany had no direct interests there and was never involved on the ground during the two decades of his chancellorship, Bismarck invested considerable resources in working to shape the course of events in that part of the world, stoking the flames of conflict whenever it suited the dictates of Realpolitik. Over a twenty-year period, he actively pursued a consistent strategy that focused on tying down Russian troops in the remote Asian steppes, i.e., as far away from Central Europe as possible. At the same time, he manipulated Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia to achieve various foreign policy goals that would further German interests. This article explores in detail all of these objectives, as well as their interrelationship. In particular, it unravels the perplexing mystery of how Bismarck was able to influence the politics of Central Asia from his distant headquarters in Berlin.

Der erste Kanzler des geeinten Deutschland, Otto von Bismarck, spielte eine aktive Rolle in der britisch-russischen Rivalität um die Herrschaft über Zentralasien. Obwohl Deutschland dort während Bismarcks zwei Jahrzehnte dauernder Kanzlerschaft keine unmittelbaren Interessen hatte und niemals direkt vor Ort involviert war, investierte der Kanzler erhebliche Mittel, um den dortigen Verlauf der Ereignisse zu beeinflussen und den Konflikt am Leben zu halten, solange es dem Diktat seiner Realpolitik entsprach. So verfolgte er zwanzig Jahre lang bewusst eine kontinuierliche Strategie, die darauf bedacht war, die russischen Truppen in der entlegenen asiatischen Steppe zu binden und damit gleichzeitig so weit wie möglich von Zentraleuropa fernzuhalten. Währenddessen manipulierte er die britisch-russische Rivalität in Asien zu Gunsten deutscher Interessen. All dies wird im Folgenden im Detail beleuchtet – mit einem besonderen Augenmerk auf Bismarcks verblüffendes Talent, seinen Einfluss aus dem entfernten Berlin sogar auf die Politik in Zentralasien geltend zu machen.

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Articles
Information
Central European History , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , June 2015 , pp. 151 - 175
Copyright
Copyright © Central European History Society of the American Historical Association 2015 

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References

1 Recent examples of this enduring genre include Meyer, Karl E. and Brysac, Shareen Blair, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia (Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 1999)Google Scholar; Hopkirk, Peter, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New York: Kodansha International, 1992)Google Scholar. Both books have a combined length of 1,200 pages: Bismarck's name only appears twice.

2 On the current state of research, see Canis, Konrad, Bismarcks Außenpolitik 1870–1890. Aufstieg und Gefährdung (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004)Google Scholar. One of the most detailed, archivally based studies of the period of greatest German involvement in Central Asia contains little on this subject; see Windelband, Wolfgang, Bismarck und die europäischen Großmächte 1879–1885 (Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1940)Google Scholar. The best English-language treatment of the diplomatic aspects of the Bismarck era also lacks a section on this conflict; see Langer, William, European Alliances and Alignments, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1956)Google Scholar. Political biographies of the German chancellor also fail to explore this aspect of his foreign policy in any detail. See, e.g., Steinberg, Jonathan, Bismarck: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)Google Scholar.

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6 This was apparently a prevalent view in most European countries. See, e.g., Wemyss, Victoria, Memoirs and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Robert Morier, vol. 2 (London: Arnold, 1911)Google Scholar, 359; Greaves, Rose L., Persia and the Defence of India, 1884–1892 (London: Athlone Press, 1959)Google Scholar, 81 (for Great Britain); Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PA-AA), R17530, report from Hohenlohe to Bismarck, no. 116, May 1, 1885 (France); PA-AA, R17525, report from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 59, Feb. 20, 1885 (Russia).

7 Lepsius, Johannes S., Bartholdy, Albrecht Mendelssohn, and Thimme, Friedrich, eds., Die große Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes (GP), vols. 1–6 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1924)Google Scholar. Only a handful of documents relating to the Anglo-Russian war scare of April/May 1885 were published, all in GP, vol. 4. Yet, for the period 1871–90 alone, there are thirty-six volumes of documents in the archives of the German Foreign Office pertaining to Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia. The main file series devoted to this issue is “I B 10 Asien” and is titled “Acta betreffend die Interessen Englands und Rußlands in Central-Asien.” For the Bismarck era, the following volumes from this series are particularly relevant and form the basis of this article: PA-AA, R17507–R17541. For details on each volume, see Ehrmann, Howard M. and Stambrook, F. G., eds., A Catalogue of Files and Microfilms of the German Foreign Ministry Archives, 1867–1920 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), 813–15Google Scholar.

8 See the memorandum from Bismarck to Wilhelm I, May 27, 1885, in GP, 4:124–46.

9 The new methodological approach to analyzing German diplomatic correspondence employed in this article is described in more detail in James Stone, “Cracking the Bismarck Code: A New Perspective on German Diplomatic Documents, 1871–1890,” Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft 25 (2012): 175–207.

10 For a general overview, see Schöllgen, Gregor, Imperialismus und Gleichgewicht. Deutschland, England und die orientalische Frage 1871–1914 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1984)Google Scholar.

11 See Morgan, Gerald, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia: 1810–1895 (London: F. Cass, 1981)Google Scholar.

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13 Wemyss, Morier, 2:360.

14 PA-AA, R17507, report from Schweinitz to Wilhelm I, Dec. 20, 1865.

15 PA-AA, R17517, report from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 31, Feb. 1, 1881.

16 WAJG, 277, Reuss Papers, letter from Schweinitz to Reuss, May 18, 1885. The reference here is to the French military intervention in Mexico, which lasted from 1862 until 1866 and resulted in the defeat of Napoleon III's army by Mexican nationalist forces under Benito Juarez.

17 See Cunningham, Michele, Mexico and the Foreign Policy of Napoleon III (New York: Palgrave, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 PA-AA, R17508, memorandum from Stumm to the Foreign Office (F.O.), Jan. 22, 1874.

19 PA-AA, R9863, report from Reuss to Thile, no. 109, July 12, 1872; see Bismarck's marginalia in the  report from O. Bülow to Bülow, no. 2, Sept. 7, 1879, in GP, 3:51.

20 PA-AA, R17532, memorandum from Bismarck to Wilhelm I, May 27, 1885. Preference is given to the draft version because it contains important corrections by Bismarck, as well as the critical workflow notations. The final text of this document is available in GP, 4:124–26; von Bismarck, Otto, Gesammelte Werke. Neue Friedrichsruher Ausgabe (NFA), vol. 6, Schriften: 1884–1885, ed. Afflerbach, Holger, Gall, Lothar, Hildebrand, Klaus, Kolb, Eberhard, and Canis, Konrad (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2011), 598–600Google Scholar.

21 Paddock, Troy R. E., Creating the Russian Peril: Education, the Public Sphere, and National Identity in Imperial Germany, 1890–1914 (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2010)Google Scholar; Koenen, Gerd, Der Russland-Komplex. Die Deutschen und der Osten 1900–1945 (Munich: Beck, 2005)Google Scholar. In July 1914, Bethmann Hollweg repeatedly expressed his fear of Russia's growing military power. See the diary entry of July 20, 1914, in Riezler, Kurt, Tagebücher, Aufsätze, Dokumente, ed. Erdmann, Karl D. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 187Google Scholar.

22 On the question of the role of a British alliance in Bismarck's thinking, see Femers, Jörg, Deutsch-Britische Optionen. Untersuchungen zur internationalen Politik in der späten Bismarck-Ära (1879–1890) (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2006)Google Scholar.

23 On this aspect of British foreign policy as it relates specifically to Germany, see Klaus Hildebrand, No Intervention. Die Pax Britannica und Preußen 1865/66-1869/70. Eine Untersuchung zur englischen Weltpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997)Google Scholar.

24 Wemyss, Morier, 2:361.

25 PA-AA, R17514, report from Schweinitz to Bülow, no. 75, March 19, 1879.

26 Another example of this behavior is documented in Stone, James, The War Scare of 1875: Bismarck and Europe in the Mid-1870s (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2010), 134Google Scholar.

27 See the report from Currie to Salisbury, Aug. 4, 1885 (shown to Count Herbert Bismarck at Königstein, Aug. 3, 1885), in Greaves, Persia, 240–41.

28 See the report from Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, Dec. 5, 1885, in GP, 4:139; also see the letter from Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, Dec. 9, 1885, in GP, 4:141. Bismarck called the British claim of an alliance offer an “invention.”

29 See Canis, Bismarcks Außenpolitik, which accurately reflects the current literature's neglect of this aspect of Bismarck's foreign policy. Studies that have emphasized the importance of the role of this factor include Stone, “The War Scare of 1875”;  Idem, “Bismarck versus Gladstone: Regime Change and German Foreign Policy, 1880–1885,” Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft 23 (2010): 167–200Google Scholar; Idem, “Bismarck Ante Portas! Germany and the Seize Mai Crisis of 1877,” in Diplomacy and Statecraft 23 (2012): 209–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 PA-AA, R12148, report from Reuss to Bismarck, no. 53, Feb. 11, 1874.

31 PA-AA, R9877, report from Reuss to Bismarck, no. 191, July 17, 1874.

32 PA-AA, R17507, dispatch from Bismarck to Reuss, no. 313, Dec. 28, 1872.

33 PA-AA, R17509, dispatch from Bülow to Reuss, no. 203, March 20, 1875.

34 PA-AA, R17509, reports from Reuss to Bismarck, no. 80, March 22, 1875 , and no. 85, March 30, 1875.

35 Liverpool Record Office, Derby Papers, 920 DER, letter from Russell to Derby, March 9, 1875.

36 PA-AA, R17509, report from Reuss to Bismarck, no. 85, March 30, 1875.

37 PA-AA, R17510, report from Münster to Bismarck, no. 45, March 14, 1876, and dispatch from Bülow to Münster, no. 179, March 19, 1876; PA-AA, R17511, dispatch from Bülow to Schweinitz, no. 213, April 10, 1876.

38 Seton-Watson, R.W., Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question (London: MacMillan, 1935), 464Google Scholar. See also Stone, James, “Bismarck and Blowitz at the Congress of Berlin,” Canadian Journal of History 48 (2013): 253–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 PA-AA, R17516, report from Reuss to Bismarck, no. 180, April 17, 1880.

40 For more background on this question, see Stone, James, “Bismarck versus Gladstone: Regime Change and German Foreign Policy, 1880–1885,” Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft 23 (2010): 167–200Google Scholar. For the impact of the summit meeting in Copenhagen, see the letter from Currie to Salisbury, Sept. 28, 1885, in Greaves, Persia, 250.

41 PA-AA, R17519, report from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 36, Jan. 29, 1882.

42 PA-AA, R17520, reports from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 40, Feb. 18, 1884, and no. 44, Feb. 22, 1884.

43 PA-AA, R17520, dispatch from Bismarck to Schweinitz, no. 124, Feb. 26, 1884 (text also in NFA, 6:75–77).

44 Rauscher, Walter, Zwischen Berlin und St. Petersburg. Die österreichisch-ungarische Außenpolitik unter Gustav Graf Kálnoky, 1881–1895 (Vienna: Böhlau, 1993), 51Google Scholar.

45 See the letter from Bülow to H. Bismarck, Oct. 17, 1884, in Bussmann, Walter, ed., Staatssekretär Graf Herbert von Bismarck: Aus seiner politischen Privatkorrespondenz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), 266Google Scholar; PA-AA, R17525, report from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 74, March 6, 1885.

46 PA-AA, R17525, report from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 64, Feb. 25, 1885 (in particular Bismarck's instruction “+” ordering a response in the semiofficial press).

47 PA-AA, R17529, reports from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 131, April 21, 1885, and Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 139, April 24, 1885.

48 Bereton, “The Panjdeh Crisis, 1885”.

49 When Gladstone misrepresented Anglo-Russian negotiations in parliament, for example, Giers saved him considerable embarrassment by furnishing the prime minister with a telegram that he then read in the House of Commons in order to show that he had not lied to parliament. See PA-AA, R17526, report from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 89, March 21, 1885.

50 See the diary entry of April 2, 1885, in Vincent, John Russell, ed., The Diaries of Edward Henry Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1826–93) between 1878 and 1893: A Selection (Oxford: Leopard's Head Press, 2003), 769Google Scholar.

51 Wemyss, Morier, 2:360. Emphasis in original.

52 Stone, The War Scare of 1875,116–42.

53 Bismarck was delighted at the return of the Conservatives to power in 1885. With respect to Central Asia, he noted on the margin of a report, “If the Tories want to stay in power, they must not base their support on the Irish but rather on jingo (sic)!” See PA-AA, R17534, Bismarck's marginalia in the letter from Münster to Bismarck, no. 309, July 14, 1885.

54 PA-AA, R17538, note from Bismarck to H. Bismarck, no. 1, May 21, 1887.

55 PA-AA, R17539, note from H. Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, no. 545, June 16, 1887. Emphasis in original.

56 Between February and December 1887, notes were exchanged among leaders in Italy, Great Britain, and Austria-Hungary, the intent of which was to preserve the status quo in the Ottoman Empire and oppose French expansion in North Africa. See Medlicott, W. N., “The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887,” The Slavonic Review 5 (1926): 66–88Google Scholar.

57 PA-AA, R17539, dispatches from H. Bismarck to Reuss, no. 556, and from H. Bismarck to Solms, no. 264, both Oct. 23, 1887.

58 PA-AA, R17508, report from Münster to Bismarck, no. 122, June 27, 1874.

59 PA-AA, R17517, report from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 31, Feb. 1, 1881.

60 A study based on Russian archival material suggests that Bismarck may have generally overestimated the importance of these dynastic ties; see Burgaud, Stéphanie, La politique russe de Bismarck et l'unification allemande. Mythe fondateur et réalités politiques (Strasbourg: Presses universitaires de Strasbourg, 2010)Google Scholar.

61 PA-AA, R17527, report from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 106, April 8, 1885; PA-AA, R17529, reports from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 131, April 21, 1885, and no. 149, May 2, 1885; PA-AA, R17530, report from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 153, May 5, 1885.

62 Alexander II described his sentiments in this way: “J'aime mon oncle, mais Bismarck est une affreuse canaille.” See Frauendienst, Werner, Rich, Norman, and Fisher, M. H., eds., Die geheimen Papiere Friedrich von Holsteins, vol. 1 (Göttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1956), 123Google Scholar. Also see similar descriptions in PA-AA, R9863, letter from Reuss to Thile, July 1, 1872; WAJG, Reuss Papers, 284, letter from Reuss to Heinrich XIII Prince Reuss, Nov. 10, 1891.

63 PA-AA, R17517, report from Werder to Wilhelm I, no. 4, Feb. 2, 1881.

64 For the wider context of this confrontation, see von Nostitz, Herbert, Bismarcks unbotmäßiger Botschafter: Fürst Münster von Derneburg (1820–1902) (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968)Google Scholar.

65 PA-AA, R17514, report from Münster to Bülow, no. 172, Dec. 14, 1878.

66 PA-AA, R17514, dispatch from Bülow to Münster, no. 659, Dec. 24, 1878.

67 PA-AA, R17514, dispatch  from Bülow to Münster, no. 660, Dec. 24, 1878.

68 PA-AA, R9884, telegram from Wilhelm I to Alexander II, Dec. 8, 1876. To underline the political sensitivity of this personal communication, the text of the telegram was classified by the Foreign Office as “top secret.”

69 PA-AA, R17525, telegram from Münster to F.O., no. 66, March 5, 1885, and report from Münster to Bismarck, no. 66, March 8, 1885; PA-AA, R17526, report from Münster to Bismarck, no. 90, March 25, 1885; PA-AA, R17527, report from Münster to Bismarck, no. 93, March 31, 1885.

70 PA-AA, R17526, dispatch from Bismarck to Münster, no. 94, March 17, 1885.

71 PA-AA, R17527, dispatch from Bismarck to Münster, no. 109, March 31, 1885 (text also in NFA, 6:541–44).

72 PA-AA, R17528, letter from Münster to H. Bismarck, April 13, 1885. On the general subject of censoring communications to the emperor, see Stone, “Cracking the Bismarck Code.”

73 See Stone, “Cracking the Bismarck Code.”

74 PA-AA, R17527, telegram from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 56, April 6, 1885.

75 PA-AA, R17531, letter from Thielau to H. Bismarck, May 15, 1885.

76 PA-AA, R17531, report from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 177, May 21, 1885.

77 PA-AA, R17531, report from Hatzfeldt to Schweinitz, no. 312, May 17, 1885, and report from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 177, May 21, 1885.

78 PA-AA, R17532, memorandum from Bismarck to Wilhelm I, May 27, 1885. The direct link between the incident with the grand duke and this memorandum is documented in the workflow notations contained in the memo's draft. It clearly refers to Schweinitz's report no. 177 (see n. 76) as the basis for the kaiser's briefing.

79 See Kollander, Patricia, “Constitutionalism or Staatsstreich? Bismarck, Crown Prince Frederick William, and the Succession Crisis of 1880–1885,” European Review of History 8 (2001): 187–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

80 See the letter from Prince Wilhelm to H. Bismarck, May 7, 1885, in Bussmann, Staatssekretär, 278.

81 See the diary entry of May 8, 1885, in Baumgart, Winfried, ed., Kaiser Friedrich III. Tagebücher 1866-1888 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2012), 191Google Scholar.

82 See the letter from Schwenitz to Bismarck, Dec. 9, 1886, in GP, 5:93.

83 See the diary entry of Sept. 19, 1884, in Frauendienst, Rich, and Fisher, Die geheimen Papiere, 2:174.

84 The most extensive works arguing in favor of this hypothesis include Riehl, Alex, Der “Tanz um den Äquator”. Bismarcks antienglische Kolonialpolitik und die Erwartung des Thronwechsels in Deutschland 1883 bis 1885 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993)Google Scholar; Baumgart, Winfried, ed., Bismarck und der deutsche Kolonialerwerb 1883–1885. Eine Quellensammlung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For another perspective on the motives for German colonial expansion, cf. Stone, “Bismarck versus Gladstone.”

85 See the diary entry of April 18, 1885, in Meisner, Heinrich, ed., Denkwürdigkeiten des Generalfeldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1925), 256Google Scholar. See the letter from Salisbury to Dufferin, Aug. 7, 1885, in Greaves, Persia, 81.

86 See the diary entry of May 6, 1885, in Frauendienst, Rich, and Fisher, Die geheimen Papiere, 2:209.

87 Ibid.

88 PA-AA, R17525, memorandum from Bismarck to Wilhelm I, March 7, 1885.

89 PA-AA, R17526, memorandum by Bucher (for Wilhelm I), March 26, 1885, and memorandum from Bismarck to Wilhelm I, March 29, 1885.

90 Prince Wilhelm received secret military reports on Central Asia that were typically reserved only for the kaiser. See Bismarck's handwritten directive on the following report: PA-AA, R17527, report from Oldekop to the Minister of War, no. 130, April 11, 1885.

91 See the letter from Prince Wilhelm to H. Bismarck, May 8, 1885, in Bussmann, Staatssekretär, 278–79. Also see Röhl, John C. G., Wilhelm II, vol. 1 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1993), 451–60Google Scholar.

92 On Bleichröder's relationship with Bismarck more generally, see Stern, Fritz, Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder and the Building of the German Empire (New York: Knopf, 1977)Google Scholar.

93 See the letter from Malet to Granville, April 25, 1885, in Knaplund, Paul, ed., Letters from the Berlin Embassy: 1871–1874, 1880–1885 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print Office, 1944), 399Google Scholar.

94 See the letter from Swaine to Granville, April 11, 1885, in Knaplund, Letters from the Berlin Embassy, 3:399.

95 PA-AA, R17519, report from Huene to Ministry of War, no. 133, Sept. 14, 1882.

96 Ibid., letter from Rantzau to F.O., Sept. 18, 1882.

97 See the letter from Swaine to Granville, March 14, 1885, in Knaplund, Letters from the Berlin Embassy, 3:335.

98 The Morning Post (London), June 24, 1884.

99 PA-AA, R17525, memorandum by Bucher, March 7, 1885.

100 PA-AA, R17530, report from Hohenlohe to Bismarck, no. 116, May 1, 1885. See especially Bismarck's directive to meet with him for instructions on how to respond to attacks by foreign journalists in the German press—“V +” is the actual notation. For its meaning, see Stone, “Cracking the Bismarck Code.”

101 PA-AA, R17509, H. Bismarck to Radowitz, June 20, 1875 (text also in Holborn, Hajo, “Bismarck und Schuwalow im Jahr 1875,” Historische Zeitschrift 130 [1924]: 256–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

102 See the report from Scott to Granville, April 4, 1885, in Knaplund, Letters from the Berlin Embassy, 3: 394–95.

103 On the meaning of these workflow notations, see Stone, “Cracking the Bismarck Code.”

104 See the diary entry of May 7, 1885, in Meisner, Denkwürdigkeiten, 1:259.

105 See the letter from Salisbury to Dufferin, Aug. 7, 1885, in Greaves, Persia, 81.

106 PA-AA, R17527, report from Reuss to Bismarck, no. 95, April 7, 1885.

107 PA-AA, R17520, letter from Rantzau to F.O., Feb. 12, 1884.

108 See the letter from Scott to Sanderson, March 14, 1885, in Knaplund, Letters from the Berlin Embassy, 3:391.

109 PA-AA, R17535, report from Braunschweig to Bismarck, no. 6, March 17, 1886.

110 PA-AA, R17523, letter from W. Bismarck to F.O., Aug. 4, 1884, and report from Hatzfeldt to Reuss, no. 532, Aug. 6, 1884.

111 PA-AA, R17524, report from Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 19, Jan. 15, 1885.

112 PA-AA, R17536, letter from Rantzau to F.O., June 3, 1886.

113 Austria and Germany were also bound by Article III of the Three Emperors’ Alliance to help enforce this stipulation of the Treaty of Berlin; see GP, 3:177.

114 See the telegrams from Bismarck to Schweinitz, no. 64, and from Bismarck to Reuss, no. 60, both April 9, 1885, in GP, 4:113; also see the telegram from Radowitz to F.O., no. 53, April 23, 1885, in GP, 4:121–22.

115 See the telegram from Courcel to Freycinet, April 11, 1885, in Commission de publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre de 1914, ed., Documents Diplomatiques français (1871–1914), vol. 6 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1934), 6–7Google Scholar.

116 See the letter from Currie to Salisbury, Sept. 28, 1885, in Greaves, Persia, 248.

117 PA-AA, R17532, dispatches from Bismarck to Schweinitz, no. 328 (text also in NFA, 6:603-5), and from Bismarck to Münster, no. 174, both May 31, 1885; PA-AA, R17530, dispatch from Bismarck to Schweinitz, no. 310, May 15, 1885 (draft from May 14, 1885; final text also in NFA, 6:584–85).

118 PA-AA, R17528, report from Hatzfeldt to Münster, no. 89, April 17, 1885.

119 PA-AA, R17508, report from Münster to Bismarck, no. 12, Jan. 22, 1874, and dispatch from Bismarck to Reuss, no. 53, Jan. 27, 1874 (text of the latter also in NFA, 2:52–54).

120 Anglophone literature has long viewed this underlying objective as a given. See, e.g., Lowe, Cedric J., The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy, 1878–1902 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 89–92Google Scholar.

121 Cf. Japikse, Nicolaas, Europa und Bismarcks Friedenspolitik. Die internationalen Beziehungen von 1871 bis 1890 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1927)Google Scholar; Noack, Ulrich, Bismarcks Friedenspolitik und das Problem des deutschen Machtverfalls (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1928)Google Scholar.

122 Cf. Krausnick, Helmut, Holsteins Geheimpolitik in der Ära Bismarck 1886–1890 (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1942)Google Scholar.

123 The debate about Germany's “halb-hegemonial” position in Europe has raged among German historians for decades. The term was coined by Ludwig Dehio, but Klaus Hildebrand popularized its use to describe Germany's role in Europe before 1914. See Dehio, Ludwig, Deutschland und die Weltpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1955), 123–41Google Scholar; Hildebrand, Klaus, Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler 1871–1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1995), 13–33Google Scholar.

124 Lappenküper, Ulrich, Die Mission Radowitz. Untersuchungen zur Russlandpolitik Otto von Bismarcks, 1871-1875 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990)Google Scholar; Hillgruber, Andreas, “Die ‘Krieg-in-Sicht’-Krise 1875. Wegscheide der Politik der europäischen Großmächte in der späten Bismarckzeit,” in Gedenkschrift für Martin Göhring. Studien zur europäischen Geschichte, ed. Schulin, Ernst (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1968), 239–53Google Scholar. For a contrary hypothesis, see Stone, James, “May 1875: A Turning Point in Bismarck's Foreign Policy?,” Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte 21 (2011): 73–100CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Janorschke, Johannes, Bismarck, Europa und die ‘Krieg-in-Sicht’-Krise von 1875 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2010)Google Scholar.

125 Efforts to link the “old” and “new” Great Game have facilitated this multilateral view. See, e.g., Meyer and Brysac, Tournament of Shadows. For an example of a work that focuses on the role of indigenous peoples, see Yetįşgįn, Memet, “The Anglo-Russian Rivalry, Russia's Annexation of Merv and the Consequences of the Annexation of Turkmens,” bilig, 40 (2007): 141–67Google Scholar.

126 Tacitus, Agricola 30: “… solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant (They create a wasteland and call it peace).”