Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2brh9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-30T15:54:03.978Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

War Premeditated? German Intelligence Operations in July 1914

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Ulrich Trumpener
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Because of the politically sensitive and often quite unsavory aspects of their work, but also because they wish to protect their former agents, secret services usually do not like to say very much about their past activities and try to keep their records out of the hands of historians and other outsiders for as long as possible. The army intelligence service of Imperial Germany—officially known as the Geheime Nachrichtendienst des Heeres or, more simply, as the “N.D.”—was no exception to this rule. While the last chief of that organization, Walter Nicolai, and some of his former subordinates wrote a number of books and articles after 1918 in which they described the functions of the N.D. and some of its accomplishments, they remained studiously vague on many issues, particularly with regard to the espionage operations which had been conducted in the Entente countries in the years prior to the Great War. As might be expected, various other German publications on the background of the war which appeared in the 1920s and 1930s, including Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette and other such editions of government documents, similarly maintained a discreet silence on this subject.

Type
Articles
Information
Central European History , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 1976 , pp. 58 - 85
Copyright
Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1976

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

The preparation of this paper was greatly facilitated by financial assistance from the Canada Council. I am also indebted to many officials in West German archives and libraries and at the National Archives of the United States for their help and advice in locating relevant sources.

1. Major Nicolai (promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1917) was in charge of the N.D. from Apr. 1913 until the end of World War I. His official title was chief of Sektion (later Abteilung) Illb in the (Prussian) General Staff. He had been preceded in that post by Maj. Wilhelm Heye, who eventually became a four-star general and Chef der Heeresleitung in the Weimar Republic. On Nicolai's own career after 1918 and his disappearance from Soviet-occupied Thuringia, see especially Heiber, Helmut, Walter Frank und sein Reichsinstitut für Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands (Stuttgart, 1966), passim.Google Scholar

2. Nicolai's postwar publications include two books—Nachrichtendienst, Presse und Volksstimmung im Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1920)Google Scholar and Geheime Mächte: Internationale Spionage und ihre Bekämpfung im Weltkrieg und heute, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1924)Google Scholar —and several smaller pieces, among them “Nachrichtendienst und Aufklärung,” in Der Weltkampf um Ehre und Recht, ed. Schwarte, Max, 10 vols. (Leipzig, 1921–33), 6: 475–517;Google Scholar and “Einblicke in den Nachrichtendienst während des Weltkrieges,” in Was wir vom Weltkrieg nicht wissen, ed. Jost, Walter and Felger, Friedrich (Leipzig, 1936), pp. 103–17.Google Scholar

The latter volume contains several other pieces on N.D. activities, all of them quite episodic in character. Somewhat more informative is the material compiled in Die Weltkriegsspionage: Authentische Enth¨llungen…, ed. von Lettow-Vorbeck, Paul (Munich, 1931), notably the reminiscences of the erstwhile chief of staff at the corps head-quarters (Generalkommando) in Metz, Rudolf von Borries, on “Spionage im Westen vor dem Kriege,” pp. 77–84.Google Scholar For further bibliographic references, see Buchheit, Gert, Der deutsche Geheimdienst: Geschichte der militärischen Abwehr (Munich, 1966);Google Scholar and Gunzenhäuser, Max, Geschichte des geheimen Nachrichtendienstes …: Literaturbericht und Bibliographie (Frankfurt, 1968).Google Scholar

3. From 1913 on, Gempp held several important positions in the N.D. and eventually became Nicolai's deputy at German GHQ. After the war, Gempp played a prominent part in the reorganization of the Reichswehr's intelligence service, the so-called Abwehr, and served as its official chief until June 1927, when he retired from active service.

4. Entitled “Geheimer Nachrichtendienst und Spionageabwehr des Heeres,” the account focuses on the war years, but has several informative background chapters on the period 1866–1914. In the introduction to his multivolume work (written in stages after his retirement and still incomplete by the end of World War II), Gempp notes that for security reasons the records of some N.D. offices had been destroyed in 1918–19, and that he therefore had to rely in part on the oral testimony and private papers of other German officers. Cross-checks with extant documents indicate, though, that Gempp worked very conscientiously with the material he had and that his account is generally very reliable.

A rough, typescript, draft of Gempp's work was found by the Allies among captured OKW documents and is now available on microfilm at the National Archives, Washington, D.C. (Publication T-77, rolls 1438–40, 1442, 1507–9). The MS itself was recently returned to the Federal Republic of Germany. Cited hereafter as Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, with page citations following the penciled corrections in the MS.

5. For recent elaborations on the theme that the army authorities in Berlin were eager for war and in large measure responsible for the provocative character of Germany's policies in July 1914, see, e.g., Kitchen, Martin, The German Officer Corps, 1890–1914 (Oxford, 1968), pp. 108ff.;Google ScholarGasser, Adolf, “Der deutsche Hegemonialkrieg von 1914,” in Deutschland in der Weltpolitik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts: Festschrift für Fritz Fischer, ed. Geiss, Imanuel and Wendt, Bernd Jürgen (Düsseldorf, 1973), pp. 310ff.;Google Scholar and Jarausch, Konrad H., The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, Conn., 1973), pp. 181ff. and passim.Google Scholar For a somewhat different treatment of this issue, cf. Fischer, Fritz, Krieg der Illusionen: Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914 (Düsseldorf, 1969), pp. 682ff. and passim.Google Scholar Fischer, too, maintains that the army leaders wanted war and did their best in July 1914 to get the ball rolling. He emphasizes, on the other hand, that the political authorities in Berlin, from Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg on down, were essentially in agreement with the military, and that German diplomacy after Sarajevo was in fact aimed from the start at provoking a showdown with the Entente.

6. Although the smaller kingdoms of the Reich—Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg—continued to have “general staffs” of their own, the Grosse Generalstab of the Prussian army was in effect serving as the operational planning and—in war—command center for all ground forces of the Reich. It should be added, though, that non-Prussians were occasionally entrusted with important positions in that center, as illustrated by the cases of Wilhelm Groener (an officer of the Württemberg troop “contingent”) or Moltke's much-maligned emissary during the battle of the Marne, Lt. Col. Richard Hentsch, who belonged to the “Royal Saxon Army.”

7. On the organizational development of the army intelligence service since the 1870s, see Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T[eil] I, Abfschnitt] 2–4, passim. Espionage in Britain prior to 1914 was the responsibility of the Imperial Navy, which had a separate N.D. apparatus for that purpose.

8. See ibid., T II, Ab 1, p. 17 and passim. After the war began, the evaluation of material secured by Nicolai's organization was largely taken over by the so-called Intelligence Department (Nachrichten-Abteilung)—later renamed “Foreign Armies” Department—of the German Supreme Army Command (OHL). Contrary to the impression given by Goerlitz, Walter, History of the German General Staff (New York, 1953), p. 173, this “intelligence assessment” branch of the general staff was neither identical with Section Illb nor was it ever directed by Nicolai.Google Scholar

9. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T I, Ab 4, pp. 75ff., 102ff.; and T II, Ab 1, pp. 7f. (The N.O. position in Königsberg was held, since Oct. 1913, by Gempp himself.)

10. Ibid., T II, Ab 1, pp. 40ff.

11. In each Rangliste, the N.O.s assigned to the Generalkotnmandos in the border regions were listed separately, and hence quite conspicuously, right behind the regular staff officers—almost always with an explicit notation that they were “assigned to the Great General Staff” and on special posting (“Kommandiert zur Dienstleistung”).

12. Cf. Albertini, Luigi, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London, 1952–1957), 2: 137ff.;Google ScholarKlein, Fritz et al. , Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, 3 vols., rev. ed. (Berlin, 1970–71), 1: 220f.;Google Scholar Nicolai, Geheime Mächte, pp. 42ff.; and Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br. (hereafter BA-MA), Nachlass Wilhelm Groener, N46/58, handwritten memorandum, n.d., re “Juni-Juli 1914.”

13. Bertrab's position at the periphery of the General Staff is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that during the ensuing war he wound up with a mere divisional command, whereas the other four Oberquartiermeister became chiefs of staff at various Armee-Ober-kommandos or rose to the level of corps commanders.

14. See Geiss, Imanuel, ed., Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch 1914: Eine Dokumentensammlung, 2 vols. (Hanover, 1963–1964), vol. 1, nos. 32–33.Google Scholar

15. Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, p. 698, suggests that by July 18 preparations for the mobilization of the army had already been completed at the Great General Staff. See also Klein, et al. , Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, 1: 222, for the suggestion that “concrete military preparations for the coming war” were initiated in Berlin right after July 6.Google Scholar

16. On the question whether all this absenteeism, and particularly Waldersee's departure from Berlin, was merely intended to camouflage the onset of “war preparations” at the Great General Staff, see below, pp. 64–65.

17. Rather unwisely, Neuhof and several other experienced intelligence specialists of Section IIIb were permitted to transfer to combat units after the war started. Both Neuhof and the prewar N.O. in the Posen corps district, Captain Luders, were killed in action in 1915. See Nicolai, Geheime Mächte, p. 51; and Offizier-Bund, Deutscher, Ehren-Rangliste des ehemaligen Deutschen Heeres (Berlin, 1926), pp. 13, 15.Google Scholar

18. From his position as “Westbearbeiter” on Nicolai's staff, Stotten eventually rose to several important posts in the OHL. In Nov. 1916, he took over the army's Kriegspresseamt. On his limited success in that particular line of work (censorship, propaganda, etc.), see Deist, Wilhelm, ed., Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914–1918, 2 vols. (Düsseldorf, 1970), passim; andGoogle ScholarWeber, Hellmuth, Ludendorff und die Monopole (Berlin, 1966), pp. 67ff.Google Scholar

19. Cf. Mommsen, Wolfgang J., “Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy before 1914,” Central European History 6, no. 1 (1973): 39ff.;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBerghahn, V. R., Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (London, 1973), pp. 188ff.;Google Scholar Kitchen, German Officer Corps, p. 111; and Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, p. 3.

20. See below, pp. 65–66.

21. See Klein, et al. , Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, 1: 221f.Google Scholar

22. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, TII, Ab 1, pp. 3f. Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, p. 702, has neither Waldersee nor Moltke coming back to Berlin until July 26.

23. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, p. 4.

24. Cf. ibid., p. 5; and Nicolai, Geheime Mächte, p. 44.

25. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, pp. nf. and passim. It should be noted that such tension travelers had been sent to Russia once before, in March 1914. See ibid., T I, “Sonderabschnitt Ostpreussen 1906–1914,” pp. 212ff. On the strain in Russo-German relations and the “newspaper war” between the two countries at that time, cf. Albertini, , Origins of the War, 1: 540ff.;Google ScholarBestuzhev, I. V., “Russian Foreign Policy February–June 1914,” Journal of Contemporary History, 1, no. 3 (1966): 93–112, passim; and Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, chaps. 15, 17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26. Württembergisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Stuttgart, “Persönliche Angelegenheiten der Württembergischen Kriegsminister,” (hereafter WHSA/Kriegsminister), Bd. 53, Nicolai to N. O. Karlsruhe, IIIb/4323, July 25, 1914. The text of this circular is also reproduced in Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, pp. 5f. Italics in original.

27. See Ibid., p. 7; and “Sonderabschnitt Ostpreussen: Spawning 23.7.–1.8.1914,” p. 114.

28. In addition to the “military plenipotentiary” (who was regarded as a personal representative of the Kaiser at the Tsarist Court), there was a regular military attaché—Maj. Bernhard Friedrich von Eggeling—on duty at the German embassy in St. Petersburg. On the evolution of this dual representation in Russia, see Meisner, Heinrich O., Militärattachés und Militärbevollmächtigte in Preussen und im Deutschen Reich (Berlin, 1957), pp. 67ff.Google Scholar

29. See Geiss, , Julikrise, vol. 1, no. 355.Google Scholar

30. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, pp. 8f.

31. According to scattered references in Gempp's account, Stratton was an executive of the Pyrene Company Ltd, London. After his return from Russia, in Sept. 1914, he was assigned to the N.O. in Stockholm, Maj. Hermann Friderici, who sent him on a second mission to Russia. Stratton then moved back to England. Friderici, in a report to Section Illb early in 1915, emphasized that Stratton was not prepared to work against Britain but might be available for other assignments in the future. See Ibid., pp. loff.; and Ab 4, pp. 96ff. with Anlage A8.

32. See Ibid., T II, Ab 1, pp. 8, loff., 66ff., and passim.

33. See Ibid., pp. 8f.; and WHSA/Kriegsminister, Bd. 53, Nicolai to N. O. Karlsruhe, IIIb/5044, July 26, 1914.

34. Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, p. 18, simply notes that Nicolai's instructions reflected a proper appreciation of the situation and of the tasks that lay ahead.

35. On the characteristics and implications of Joffre's new plan, cf. de la Guerre, Ministère, Les armées françises dans la Grande Guerre, 11 vols. in 68 (Paris, 1922–1939), 1/1 (rev. ed., 1936): 44ff.;Google Scholar and Williamson, Samuel R. Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904–1914 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 218ff. and passim.Google Scholar

36. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T I, Ab 1, pp. nf., 17, and passim; T II, Ab 2, p. 202; and Ab 8A, pp. 80f. Cf. Liss, Ulrich, “Der Nachrichtendienst in den Grenzschlachten im Westen im August 1914,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 12 (1962): 142ff.Google Scholar

“Number 17” was a socially prominent aristocrat of Austrian background whose undercover work for the Prussian army extended over half a century—from the 1860s to 1917, when he finally “retired,” at age seventy-six. The author is preparing a paper on his career and accomplishments.

37. On the precautionary measures which were adopted in France during the weekend of July 25–26, cf. de la Guerre, Ministère, Les armées françaises, 1/1: 95ff.;Google Scholar and Général [Adolphe] Messimy, Mes Souvenirs (Paris, 1937), pp. 130ff.Google Scholar

38. On the scope and implications of the Russian “premobilization” program, cf. Albertini, , The Origins of the War, 2:3O4ff.;Google ScholarBovykin, V. I., Ocherki istorii vneshnei politiki Rossii, konets XIX veka — 1917 god (Moscow, 1960), p. 155;Google Scholar and Turner, L. C. F., ‘The Russian Mobilization in 1914,” Journal of Contemporary History 3, no. 1 (1968): 75ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

39. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, pp. 18f., and Anlage IV, p. 70. Although the Russian frontier guard units were under the authority of the finance ministry in peacetime, they were a well-trained military force and slated for active participation in the operations of the regular army. Cf. the entry under “Grenzwache (pogranitchnaya strazha),” in Handbuch für Heer und Flotte, ed. von Alten, Georg (Berlin, 1912);Google Scholar and Danilov, Youri, La Russie dans la Guerre Mondiale (Paris, 1927), pp. 66, 136, and passim.Google Scholar

40. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, Anlage III, p. 66; and Anlage IV, pp. 70ff.

41. Established on July 26, the board was composed of the regular staff of the 10th Abteilung plus one representative each from the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Abteilungen and from Section IIIb. See BA-MA, IH 73/1, “Die Organisation des Grossen Generalstabes” (undated MS by Major a.D. Stoeckel), Teil IV, p. 56.

In the index of Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1921), Griesheim is erroneously listed as a major serving as “military attaché in Paris.” There are several other misidentifications of that sort in this often-quoted reference work.Google Scholar

42. See WHSA/Kriegsminister, Bd. 109, Great General Staff, Berlin, July 27, 1914, “IV K, Streng geheim, Durch Offizier geschrieben, Nachrichten vom 27.7. bis 400 Nachmittags.”

The erroneous assumption that mobilization orders had already been issued “for Kiev and Odessa” seems to have been based primarily on a report, of July 26, from the German military attache in St. Petersburg, Major von Eggeling. See Geiss, , Julikrise, vol. 2, no. 416.Google Scholar Eggeling, it should be emphasized, can hardly be blamed for thinking that the Russians had started mobilizing in these southern military districts; for the French military attache thought so too and notified Paris accordingly. See Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Documents diplomatiques français (1871–1914), ser. 3 (Paris, 1929–1936), vol. 11, no. 89.Google Scholar

43. See the “Nachrichten vom 27.7.” document cited in n. 42.

44. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, pp. 20f.; and WHSA/Kriegsminister, Bd. 53, Nicolai to N. O. Karlsruhe, IIIb/5106, July 27, 1914.

45. Although Fischer's office, in Karlsruhe, was rather remote from the Belfort region, intelligence work in that area had been assigned to him (rather than to his colleague in Strasbourg, who was actually much closer to the area) because of existing corps boundaries: the southernmost part of Alsace had been incorporated into the Baden (XlVth) Corps District and was thus under the administrative control of the Karlsruhe Generalkommando. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, p. 49; and the map of prewar corps districts in Deist, , Militar und Innenpolitik, vol. 2, back cover.Google Scholar

46. Stulz was the most senior reserve officer of the Baden Infantry Regiment No. 114 who happened to reside in Karlsruhe. See Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee … für 1914 (Berlin, 1914), p. 699.Google Scholar

47. See WHSA/Kriegsminister, Bd. 53, undated note, “Ka 583, Spannung, U IIIb.”

48. For a synopsis of the incoming reports, see Gempp, Nachrkhtendienst, T II, Ab 1, Anlage IV, pp. 73ff.

49. While the word Grenzschutz has several connotations, it is clearly used here to define a specific set of circumstances, namely the deployment of relatively weak advance units of the regular army along the border for the purpose of covering the mobilization and initial movements of the main forces. The French term couverture is probably the closest equivalent.

50. WHSA/Kriegsminister, Bd. 109, Great General Staff, Berlin, July 28, 1914, “IV K, Geheim … 2. Bericht, Nachrichten bis 28.7., 400 Nachm.,” signed by von Griesheim.

51. See Ibid. Cf. de la Guerre, Ministère, Les armées francaises, 1/1: 96–100;Google Scholar and Messimy, Mes souvenirs, pp. 131–36, on the “precautionary” measures actually put into effect in France by July 28.

52. See, e.g., Albertini, , Origins of the War, 2: 488ff.;Google Scholar and Geiss, , Julikrise, 2: 235f.Google Scholar

53. See Ibid., no. 659.

54. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, pp. 21f. Cf. Reichsarchiv, et al. , Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918: Die militärischen Operationen zu Lande, 14 vols. (Berlin, 1925–1944), 1: 29ff.Google Scholar

55. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, pp. 22f.

56. Cf. Ibid., T I, Ab 4, pp. 113, 117, and passim; T II, Ab 1, p. 23.

57. See WHSA/Kriegsminister, Bd. 53, Nicolai to N.O. Karlsruhe, IIIb/5768, July 28, 1914.

58. Cf. Albertini, , Origins of the War, 2: 490f., 496, and passim;Google ScholarGeiss, , Julikrise, 2: 237;Google ScholarReichsarchiv, , Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, vol. 1: Die Eisenbahnen zu Kriegsbeginn (Berlin, 1928), p. 28; and Kriegsarchiv, Munich, “Akten des Königlichen Kriegsministeriums, Mobilmachung 1914,” M Kr 1765, Wenninger to Bavarian war minister, report no. 3, July 30, 1914.Google Scholar

59. See Geiss, , Julikrise, vol. 2, nos. 661–62.Google Scholar

60. Cf. Fay, Sidney B., The Origins of the World War, 2 vols. (New York, 1928), 2: 496ff.;Google ScholarAlbertini, , Origins of the War, 2: 490ff.;Google Scholar Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, pp. 7O9ff.; and jarausch, Enigmatic Chancellor, pp. 167, 172.

61. An alternate war plan, “Great Deployment East,” which provided for the contingency that France would remain neutral in the opening phases of a Russo-German war, had been abandoned by the Great General Staff early in 1913. The author is preparing a separate paper on the background of that fateful decision. For recent allegations, based entirely on circumstantial evidence, that the abandonment of the alternate plan proves Moltke's determination to attack France and Russia in 1914 or, “at the latest,” in 1915, see Gasser, Adolf, “Deutschlands Entschluss zum Praventivkrieg 1913/14,” in Sieber, Marc, ed., Discordia concors: Festgabe fiir Edgar Bonjour, 2 vols. (Basel, 1968), 1: 176ff.; and his article cited in n. 5, above, pp. 310ff.Google Scholar

62. On the evolution of the “Schlieffen Plan” and its basic features by 1914, cf. Ritter, Gerhard, Der Schlieffenplan (Munich, 1956);Google Scholar idem, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, 4 vols. (Munich, 1954–1968), vol. 2, chaps. 9–10;Google Scholar and Wallach, Jehuda L., Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht (Frankfurt, 1967), pp. 129ff. and passim.Google Scholar For further technical details, see also Reichsarchiv, et al. , Der Weltkrieg … Die militärischen Operationen, 1: 51f.; 2: 3ff. and Anlage 1.Google Scholar

63. See, e.g., Albertini, , Origins of the War, 2: 496f. and 3: 8.Google Scholar

64. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, pp. 31f., and Anlage IV, pp. 81–83 passim.

65. Cf. above, n. 49.

66. See WHSA/Kriegsminister, Bd. 109, Great General Staff, Berlin, July 29, 1914, “IV K, Streng geheim …, 3. Bericht, Nachrichten bis 29.7., 400 Nachm.,” signed by von Griesheim. Unlike the previous two intelligence summaries (of July 27–28), or the next one (of July 30), this particular Bericht was made public right after World War I. For the complete text, see Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, no. 372.

67. See Albertini, , Origins of the War, 2: 498f.Google Scholar

68. See Geiss, , Julikrise, vol. 2, no. 766; and Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, p. 714.Google Scholar

69. Among the reports received by Section IIIb during the previous night and the morning of July 30 were a telegraphic message from “tension traveler” Henoumont (just returned from his second “round trip” to Warsaw) that he had personally seen “numerous troop transports from Kiev toward the Austrian border,” as well as a cablegram from a resident agent in the Ukraine that the Russian 9th Infantry Division had left Poltava for Kiev. See Gempp, Nachrkhtendienst, T II, Ab 1, pp. 32f., and Anlage III, p. 66.

70. Cf. Albertini, , Origins of the War, 3: 6ff.;Google ScholarRitter, , Staatskunst, 2: 319ff.;Google Scholar and Geiss, , Julikrise, 2: 335f See also Kitchen, German Officer Corps, p. 112.Google Scholar

71. No time is recorded, but it may be assumed that the summary was written at about the same time as the previous daily Berichte, i.e., around 4 P.M.

72. See WHSA/Kriegsminister, Bd. 109, Great General Staff, Berlin, July 30, 1914, “IV K …, 4. Bericht,” signed by von Griesheim. (The report continues with various details concerning the Russian preparations, including a listing of places—“Kovno, Grodno, Riga, Libau, also Bialystok and Vilna”—where the imposition of martial law had been reported.)

73. See Ibid.

74. Ibid. On the Liège (Lüttich) issue in German prewar planning, cf. Ritter, , Staatskunst, 2: 332 and passim; and Wallach, Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht, pp. 140ff.Google Scholar

75. Cf. Bovykin, Ocherki istorii vneshnei politiki Rossii, p. 155; and Albertini, , Origins of the War, 2: 571.Google Scholar

76. For a good review of the available evidence on this issue, see Ibid., 3: 24ff.

77. See Ritter, , Staatskunst, 2: 322f;Google Scholar Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, pp. 716f.; and Klein, et al. , Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, 1: 259.Google Scholar

78. See Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab i, pp. 33f., 66f., and 109. While the news of Russia's switch to general mobilization was initially treated with some scepticism in Berlin (see below), it evidently came as no surprise to the three corps commanders in East and West Prussia who had been watching the situation along the border from close by. Cf. Francois, Hermann von, Marneschlacht und Tannenberg (Berlin, 1920), p. 129;Google Scholarvon Notz, Ferdinand, General von Scholtz: Ein deutsches Soldatenleben in grosser Zeit (Berlin, 1937), p. 37; and BA-MA, Nachlass August von Mackensen, N39/220, diary entries July 27–30, 1914.Google Scholar See also BA-MA, Nachlass Hermann von Francois, N274/16, for a “coded” private telegram which the general—after a long reconnaissance ride along the border—sent off from Memel on the morning of July 30, warning his vacationing wife that the” music” was about to start.

79. After the war, Volkmann retired from active service and became a senior official in the Reichsarchiv. He published several important studies on the war period, including a report on German war aims which had been commissioned by the Investigating Committee of the Reichstag. On his postwar activities, see Murawski, Erich, “Die amtliche deutsche Kriegsgeschichtsschreibung über den Ersten Weltkrieg,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 9 (1959): 520;Google Scholar and Klein, et al. , Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg, 2: 18ff.Google Scholar

80. See Hoth's account in Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, pp. 34ff.

81. Ibid., p. 36. On Moltke's “nervous” disposition at this time, see also von Zwehl, Hans, Erich von Falkenhayn … Eine biographische Studie (Berlin, 1926), p. 58; and Colonel von Griesheim's comments to General von Below a few days later in BA-MA, Nachlass Otto von Below, N87/21, handwritten notes on “Tannenberg,” p. 9.Google Scholar

82. See Albertini, , Origins of the War, 3: 33; and Notz, General von Scholtz, p. 37.Google Scholar

83. Cf. Gempp, Nachrichtendienst, T II, Ab 1, pp. 361ff.; and von Schäfer, Theobald, “Generaloberst von Moltke in den Tagen vor der Mobilmachung und seine Einwirkung auf Oesterreich-Ungarn,” Die Kriegsschuldfrage 4 (1926): 535.Google Scholar

84. See Buchheit, Der deutsche Geheimdienst, p. 22, for the details (based on the unpublished papers of a former Abwehr officer, Lt. Col. Johannes Horatzek).

85. See Geiss, , Julikrise, vol. 2, no. 875.Google Scholar

86. On Russia's military programs and the actual strength of her army in 1914, see Emets, V. A., “O roli russkoi armii v pervii period mirovoi voini 1914–1918 gg,” Istoricheskie zapiski 77 (1965): 67ff. and passim;Google Scholar K. F. Shatsillo, “O disproportsii v razvitii voorushennikh sil Rossii nakanune pervoi mirovoi voini (1906–1914 gg),” Ibid. 83 (1969): 123–36; and the older studies by Frantz, Gunther, Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1924)Google Scholar and Russland auf dem Weg zur Katastrophe (1926). Major (Ret.) Frantz was well qualified to write on the Russian army—he had served as Nicolai's “Ostbearbeiter” in Section IIIb before the war and held several important intelligence posts on the Eastern front thereafter.

87. There are some indications that by 1914 Moltke, aside from worrying about the “great military superiority” which Russia and France would attain “in two or three years,” was not exactly sanguine about Germany's ability to defeat the Entente powers even if she struck at them “preventively” in the meantime. For a contrary conclusion (and a review of some of the relevant evidence), see Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, chap. 18 and passim. On Moltke's assessment of Germany's present military chances vis-à-vis the Entente, see also Prince Eulenburg's testimony in Röhl, John C. G., ed., Zwei deutsche Fürsten zur Kriegsschuldfrage: Lichnowsky und Eulenburg und der Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs: Eine Dokumentation (Düsseldorf, 1971), p. 66.Google Scholar

88. The most explicit statement of this thesis may be found in Gasser's articles cited in nn. 5 and 61 above. See also Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, pp. 232ff., 565ff., and passim; and Geiss, Imanuel, Studien tiber Geschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 180f. and passim.Google Scholar

89. See Kriegsarchiv, Munich, “Akten des Königlichen Kriegsministeriums, Berichte des bayerischen Militärbevollmächtigten und des bayerischen Bevollmächtigten zum Bundesrate politischen Inhaltes …,” M Kr 41, Wenninger to Bavarian war minister, Mar. 6 and 16, May 6, and June 16, 1914 (nos. 900, 1052, 1821, 2381); Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Munich, “Akten der Bayerischen Staatskanzlei, Politische Aufzeichnungen 1911–1917,” MA I, Nr. 962, memo by Herding on “Unterredung mit Reichskanzler …, 13 April 1914”; and “Gesandschaft Berlin, Politische Akten 1914,” Nr. 1086, Lerchenfeld to Herding, June 4, 1914; Herding to Bethmann Hollweg, June 12, 1914. Cf. Reichsarchiv, , Das deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen, 1: 3f.;Google Scholar and Groener, Wilhelm, Lebenserinnemngen, ed. Frhr, Friedrich. von Gaertringen, Hiller (Gottingen, 1957), pp. 131f.Google Scholar

90. On this issue, cf. Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen, pp. 686ff., 738, and passim; Hillgruber, Andreas, Deutschlands Rolle in der Vorgeschichte der beiden Weltkriege (Göttingen, 1967), chap. 3; Mommsen, “Domestic Factors,” pp. 39fF.; and Jarausch, Enigmatic Chancellor, pp. 181ff.Google Scholar

91. Concerning Moltke's part in the July Crisis, see also the recent reassessments by Turner, L. C. F., “The Role of the General Staffs in July 1914,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 9 (1965): 305–23; andGoogle ScholarOrigins of the First World War (London, 1970), passim.Google Scholar