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Metternich, the Powers, and the 1831 Italian Crisis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Alan J. Reinerman
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Extract

On February 10, 1831, word reached Vienna that revolution had broken out in central Italy, first in the Duchies of Modena and Parma, then in the Legations, the northern provinces of the Papal State. The news was shortly followed by appeals from the threatened Italian princes for Austrian military intervention, and for Metternich, there could be no doubt as to the proper reply: these revolts were not merely another blow at the tottering conservative order, already hard hit by the July Revolution and its aftermath, but a “question of life and death” for the Habsburg Empire itself. At the Congress of Vienna, Metternich had established Austrian predominance in Italy as a fundamental component of her international position, vital for her status as a great power. Revolution in central Italy, if allowed to go unchecked, would end that predominance, for it would surely spread throughout the peninsula, to create in the end a united and independent Italian state.

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Articles
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Central European History , Volume 10 , Issue 3 , September 1977 , pp. 206 - 219
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Copyright © Conference Group for Central European History of the American Historical Association 1977

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References

1. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter cited: HHSA), Staatskanzlei (all HHSA documents cited are from this section unless otherwise stated), Rom: Varia, “Précis historique sur les mouvements révolutionnaires qui viennent d'éclater …, “ Feb. 14, 1831. There is a vast literature on the internal side of the 1831 Italian revolutions; see the survey in Bibliografia dell'éta del Risorgimento, 2 vols. (Florence, 1972), 2: 73–75, 241–43, 281–84.Google Scholar The situation is much less satisfactory on the international side, particularly on the crucial role of Austria. In contrast to the numerous studies of Metternich's diplomacy during the 1820–21 revolutions, his policy in 1831 has not yet been thoroughly studied, though the standard biography by von Srbik, Heinrich Ritter, Metternich, der Staatsmann und der Mensch, 3 vols. (Munich, 1925–1954), 1: 671–74,Google Scholar gives an accurate but brief account to which later biographers have added nothing. Moreover, the works that do touch on his policy in 1831 tend to be marred both by the anti-Austrian prejudices of the Risorgimento and by a failure to consult HHSA, whose materials are indispensable for a proper understanding of the topic. This is true not only of older works, such as the standard Italian diplomatic history by Bianchi, Nicomede, Storia documentata delta diplomazia europea in Italia dal 1814 al 1861, 8 vols. (Turin, 1865–1872), 3: 43–67,Google Scholar but of more recent treatments such as Silva, Pietro, La Monarchia di Luglio e l'Italia (Turin, 1917), pp. 43–52, 111–37, and passim;Google ScholarGamberale, Bice, “Gli inizi del pontificato di Gregorio XVI: la conferenza diplomatica in Roma e le riforme,” Rassegna storica del Risorgimento 14 (1927): 657–715;Google Scholar and Vidal, César, Louis Philippe, Metternich, et al crise italienne de 1831–1832 (Paris, 1931),Google Scholar which confidently offers an interpretation of Austrian policy without citing either HHSA or a single work in German; all view Austrian policy in the most sinister light, as directed primarily toward annexing part of the Papal State—after having encouraged or at least welcomed the outbreak of revolt there as a pretext for intervention—and preventing any reform in Italy. In contrast, Nada, Narciso, Austria e la Questione Romana dalla Rivoluzione di Luglio alla fine della conferenza diplomatica romana (Turin, 1953),Google Scholar offers an unbiased account, based on HHSA, of Austrian relations with Rome during this period, Pasztor, while Lajos, “I cardinali Albani e Bernetti e l'intervento austriaco del 1831,” Rivista di Storia delta Chiesa in Italia 8 (1954): 95–128, reconstructs, on the basis of materials from the Vatican Archives (hereafter cited: AV),Google Scholar the Roman background of the appeal for Austrian intervention, and Morelli, Emilia, La politica estera di Tommaso Bernetti, Segretario di Stato di Gregorio XVI (Rome, 1953), pp. 21–34,Google Scholar explains the policy of the papal secretary of state during the crisis. Salata, Francesco, Maria Luigia e i moti del trentuno (Parma, 1931),Google Scholar and Pedrotti, Pietro, La missione del Barone Marschall nei Ducati di Parma e Modena nel 1831(Modena, 1931),Google Scholar though not devoid of traditional prejudices, have utilized HHSA and are of value on their limited aspects of the topic. Of works on the international aspects of the 1830–32 revolutions as a whole, the de Guichen, Vicomte, La Révolution de Juillet 1830 et l'Europe (Paris, 1917),Google Scholar is based on wide archival research and contains much useful information, but is poorly organized and makes little attempt to analyze the facts abundantly strewn through it; Huber, Gustav, Kriegsgefahr über Europa 1830–1832 (Berlin, 1932),Google Scholar though much shorter, is far more useful in placing Italian events into their general European context. Of the published sources, the most valuable are Metternich's Mémoires, documents et écrits divers, 8 vols. (Paris, 1880–1884), vol. 5,Google Scholar and Nada, Narciso, ed., Le relazioni diplomatiche fra l'Austria e il Regno di Sardegna, II Series: 1830–1848, vol. 1 (Rome, 1972).Google Scholar

2. HHSA, Vorträge 390, Metternich to Francis I, Feb. 16, 1831. On Metternich's policy in Italy, see: Srbik, , Metternich, 1: 182–229;Google ScholarGrossmann, Karl, “Metternichs Plan eines italienischen Bundes,” Historische Blätter, no. 4 (1931), pp. 37–76;Google ScholarBettanini, A. M., “Un disegno di confederazione italiana,” in his Studi di storia dei trattati (Padua, 1939), pp. 3–50;Google ScholarReinerman, Alan J., “Metternich, Alexander I, and the Russian Challenge in Italy, 1815–1820,” Journal of Modern History 46 (1974): 262–76,CrossRefGoogle Scholar and “Metternich, Italy, and the Congress of Verona, 1821–1822,” Historical Journal 14 (1971): 263–87.Google Scholar

3. On Metternich's policy toward the 1820–21 revolutions, see Schroeder, Paul W., Metternich's Diplomacy at Its Zenith 1820–1823 (Austin, 1962).Google Scholar

4. On the impact of the principle of nonintervention in Italy, see Silva, Pietro, “II principio del non-intervento e i moti del 1831,” Archivio storico per le provincie parmensi 32 (1932): 1–56;Google Scholar for Metternich's judgment on the principle and its effects, see HHSA.Rom: Varia, “Le principe de la non-intervention,” 1831.

5. Metternich, , Mémoires, 5: 46;Google Scholar also, 15, 60, 71; and Archivio di Stato di Torino (hereafter cited: AST), Lettere Ministri: Vienna, Pralormo to la Tour, Aug. 12, 1830.

6. E.g., AV, ANV 258-A, Albani to Spinola, Aug. 10, Sept. 21, Oct. 16, Nov. 13, 1820. HHSA, Sardinien: Berichte, Senfft to Metternich, Sept. 15, 1830, #267; Weisungen, Metternich to Senfft, Sept. 29, 1830.

7. See, e.g., the reports of the French chargé in Rome, Bellocq, to Sebastiani, Oct. 11, Oct. 19, Nov. 2, Dec. 9, 1830, in Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangeres, Paris (hereafter: AMAEP), Correspondance Politique, Rome; and such historians as Vidal, , Louis Philippe; Silva, Monarchia; P. Feret, La France et la Saint-Siège, 2 vols. (Paris, 1911), 2: 438–39;Google Scholar and Gamberale, “Gli inizi.” Metternich's papers in HHSA and elsewhere contain no hint of such an attitude, but reveal instead his determination to avoid intervention if possible, for the reasons given in the text.

8. On French policy toward the Italian revolutions, see: Silva, Monarchia, pp. 1–172; Guichen, Révolution; Vidal, Louis Philippe; Thureau-Dangin, Paul, Histoire de la Monarchie de Juillet, 7 vols. (Paris, 1884–1892), 1: 153–86,Google Scholar and “La politique française en Italie au lendemain de la Revolution de Juillet,” Le Correspondant, June 1887, pp. 781–848; Hillehrand, Karl, Geschichte Frankreichs von der Thronbesteigung Louis Philips, 2 vols. (Gotha, 1877–1879), vol. 1;Google Scholar and Haussonville, M. O., Historie de la politique extérieure du gouvemment française 1830–1848, 2 vols. (Paris, 1850), 1: 1–157.Google Scholar

9. E.g., HHSA, Frankreich: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Sept. 12, Oct. 13, Nov. 12, 1830, Jan. 3, Feb. 15, 1831. AMAEP, C.P.: Autriche, 413, Maison to Sebastiani, Dec. 2, Dec. 12, Dec. 28, 1830, Jan. 4, 1831.

10. HHSA, Frankreich: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Nov. 15, 1830. Thureau- Dangin, “Politique française,” pp. 788–90; Silva, Monarchia, pp. 38–39.

11. Silva, Monarchia, pp. 40–43, 65–69.

12. HHSA, Frankreich: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Oct. 29, 1830, Jan. 14, 1831. Nada, Relazioni, 1: 78–128.

13. On the political situation faced by Louis Philippe, see Thureau-Dangin, , Histoire, vol. 1.Google Scholar

14. E.g., Metternich, Mémoires, 5:45–69. HHSA, Russland: Weisungen, Metternich to Fiquelmont, Oct. 30, 1830, #1, with Mémoire for Count Orloff, Oct. 6, 1830, and Rémarque particuliere; Grossbritannien: Weisungen, Metternich to Esterhazy, Oct. 21, 1830 (only part of this dispatch is printed in Mémoires, 5: 45–48, certain important sections being deleted).

15. HHSA, Grossbritannien: Berichte, Esterhazy to Metternich, Dec. 3, 1830, #63-A. On Palmerston's policy, see Sir Webster, Charles, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841(London, 1951), 1: 76–254.Google Scholar

16. HHSA, Grossbritannien: Berichte, Esterhazy to Metternich, Mar. 4, #6-A; Mar. 21, 1831, #9-B and c.

17. Ibid., Preussen: Berichte, Trautmansdorff to Metternich, Mar. 3, 1831, #18-A. On Prussian policy, see: Hoffmann, K. M., Preussen und die Julimonarchie 1830–1834 (Berlin, 1936);Google ScholarRichter, F., Das europäischen Problem der preussischen Staatspolitik und die revolutionäre Krisis von 1830 bis 1832 (Leipzig, 1933);Google Scholar and Billinger, Robert D. Jr., “The War Scare of 1831 and Prussian-South German Plans for the End of Austrian Dominance in Germany,” Central European History 9 (1976): 203–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18. HHSA, Russland: Weisungen, Metternich to Fiquelmont, Oct. 30, 1830, with Rémarque particulière, and Dec. 4, 1830.

19. Ibid., Berichte, Fiquelmont to Metternich, Dec. 22, 1830/Jan. 3, 1831; Jan. 24/Feb. 5, 1831, #97-A; Sardinien: Weisungen, Metternich to Senfft, Jan. 3, Jan. 11, 1831.

20. HHSA, Vorträge 390, Metternich to Francis I, Feb. 16, 1831; also, Feb. 20, 1831.

21. Ibid., Frankreich: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Jan. 3, 1831, #1 and 2.

22. Ibid., Feb. 15, 1831, #1 and 2; Grossbritannien: Weisungen, Metternich to Esterhazy, Feb. 19, 1831, #2.

23. Ibid., Frankreich: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Feb. 18, 1831. Thureau-Dangin, Histoire, 1: 390–94.

24. Note, e.g., his explanation to the French ambassador that he preferred the risks of war to the certainty of ultimate, if delayed, disaster for the empire if the Italian revolts were allowed to succeed: “Better to die on the field of battle than wait until they come to slit our throats in our own house.” AMAEP, C.P., Autriche 414, Maison to Sebastiani, Feb. 21, 1831. Various historians have asserted that Metternich was only bluffing when he threatened war, on the grounds that he allegedly delayed his intervention until after he had learned that France would not oppose him by force: e.g., Silva, Monarchia, p. 121, and Guichen, Révolution, p. 327. In reality, he had resolved to intervene, and had persuaded the emperor to give orders in that sense to the Austrian army, long before he could learn of the French reaction to his warnings: e.g., HHSA, Vorträge 390, reports of Feb. 13, Feb. 16, Feb. 20, Feb. 27, 1831; Sardinien: Weisungen, Metternich to Bombelles, Feb. 28, 1831, #3, Mar. 4, 1831, #1. It was only the reluctance of the Austrian commander, Frimont, to march until he had received reinforcements that delayed the intervention until March, not any hesitation on the chancellor's part; Metternich was bitterly critical of the delay and sought to end it as soon as possible: Vorträge 390, Feb. 27, 1831; Sardinien: Weisungen, Metternich to Bombelles, Feb. 28, 1831, #3. On his difficulties in getting Frimont to march, see Salata, Maria Luigia, pp. 186–97, and Pedrotti, Missione, pp. 19–51. Frimont had in fact a force more than sufficient to crush the central Italian revolts: by Feb. 1831, the Austrian army in Italy had been reinforced to over sixty thousand men, whereas a force of some twelve thousand proved quite sufficient to restore order in central Italy. The general, however, feared that intervention in Italy would lead to a French invasion, and perhaps a revolution in Lombardy-Venetia as well; he therefore wished reinforcements to enable him to deal with those contingencies before he would detach any of his forces to intervene in central Italy. Metternich, on the other hand, felt that the best hope of avoiding war lay in carrying through the intervention with the maximum speed, thereby presenting France with a fait accompli; Frimont's delays threatened to upset his calculations by giving France time to prepare measures, whether diplomatic or military, against the intervention. This explains his extreme irritation against Frimont, whom he declared “ought to be court-martialled” for disobeying imperial orders: Osten, Prokesch von, Tagebücher 1830–1834 (Vienna, 1909), pp. 80–85.Google Scholar On the situation of the Austrian army in Italy at this time, see: Regele, Oskar, Feldmarschall Radetzky (Vienna, 1957), pp. 199–255;Google Scholar a good short survey of the Austrian military position during the Metternich era is Rothenberg, Gunther E., “The Austrian Army in the Age of Metternich,” Journal of Modern History 40 (1968): 155–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Needless to say, Metternich wanted to avoid war if possible, and no doubt he hoped that, since the French also had good cause to wish to avoid it, a firm stand might persuade them to give way, whereas any show of weakness would encourage them to intervene; however, the documents leave little doubt that had it come to a showdown, he was prepared to fight rather than tolerate a revolution that threatened Austria's vital interests in Italy.

25. E.g., AMAEP, C.P., Autriche, 414, Maison to Sebastiani, Feb. 15, Feb. 21, 1831. Metternich, , Mémoires, 5: 153–56.Google Scholar

26. HHSA, Frankreich: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Feb. 25, 1831. AMAEP, C.P., Autriche 414, Sebastiani to Maison, Feb. 26, 1831. AV, R248, Lambruschini to Bernetti, Feb. 28, 1831, #680 and 681.

27. HHSA, Frankreich: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Mar. 12, 1831. AMAEP, C.P., Autriche 414, Maison to Sebastiani, Mar. 17, Mar. 20, 1831.

28. de Martens, F., Recueil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangeres, vol. 15, Traités avec la France 1822–1906 (St. Petersburg, 1909), p. 136, Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, Mar. 9/21, 1831.Google Scholar

29. Guichen, Révolution, pp. 344–46.

30. HHSA, Grossbritannien: Berichte, Esterhazy to Metternich, Mar. 4, #6-A and B; Mar. 21, #9-B; Mar. 31, 1831, #12-A. See also: Webster, , Palmerston, 1: 201–2;Google ScholarRosselli, Nello, Inghilterra e Regno di Sardegna dal 1815 al 1847 (Turin, 1954), pp. 460–81;Google ScholarLemmi, Francesco, La politica estera di Carlo Alberto (Florence, 1928), 44–46;Google ScholarBianchi, , Storia, 4: 42–43.Google Scholar

31. E.g., HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lutzow to Metternich, Mar. 12, 1831, #203-A; Sardinien: Berichte, Bombelles to Metternich, Mar. 17, 1831, #13-B. Metternich, Mémoires, 5: 93.

32. Thureau-Dangin, Histoire, pp. 190–210.

33. Vidal, Louis Philippe, p. 142; Guichen, Révolution, p. 336.

34. HHSA, Frankreich: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Mar. 21, 1831, #21

35. Ibid., Mar. 27, 1831, #22. AV, R248, Lambruschini to Bernetti, Apr. 4, 1831, #699.

36. Silva, Monarchia, pp. 130–32; Guichen, Révolution, pp. 340–45. The text of the protest is printed in Piano, R. del, Roma e la rivoluzione del 1831 (Imola, 1931), pp. 199–200. The protest went through at least three different versions, each progressively weaker, until the final form was quite mild: Silva, Monarchia, pp. 131–32.Google Scholar

37. HHSA, Frankreich: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Mar. 27, 1831, #22. AV, R248, Lambruschini to Bernetti, Apr. 4, 1831, #699. Hillebrand, Geschichte, 1: 219.

38. HHSA, Frankreich: Weisungen, Metternich to Apponyi, Apr. 2, 1831.

39. Ibid., Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Apr. 15, Apr. 17, 1831. Cf. AV, R248, Lambruschini to Bernetti, Apr. 25, 1831, #705.

40. HHSA, Rom: Weisungen, Metternich to Lutzow, Apr. 22, 1831.

41. Ibid., Apr. 5, #1, Apr. 11, 1831, #1; Frankreich: Berichte, Apponyi to Metternich, Mar. 20, 1831, #20-A. AV, Archivio della Nunziatura di Parigi, Circulars of Bernetti, Apr. 16, Apr. 19, 1831. In June the Piedmontese minister also joined the conference: HHSA, Rom: Berichte, Lutzow to Metternich, May 31, 1831, #229-B.

42. On the diplomatic conference and its failure, see: Nada, Questione; Silva, Monarchia, pp. 133–35; Morelli, Bernetti, pp. 36–55; Gamberale, “Gli inizi.” It is perhaps worth noting here that—in contrast to the charges made by, e.g., Silva, Monarchia, pp. 133–34 and passim, and Gamberale, “Gli inizi,” that Metternich was hostile to reform and sabotaged the efforts of the conference to secure it—that the chancellor had in fact long been in favor of reforming the papal regime, and worked energetically both at the conference and afterwards to secure it: see Reinerman, Alan J., “Metternich and Reform: The Case of the Papal States, 1814–1848,” Journal of Modem History 42 (1970): 524–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43. National Széchényi Library, Budapest, Fonds Apponyi II/450, Mettemich to Apponyi, Sept. 12, 1831.