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Why Does Canada Have So Many Unresolved Maritime Boundary Disputes?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 August 2017

MICHAEL BYERS  and
ANDREAS ØSTHAGEN
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Abstract

Canada has five unresolved maritime boundaries. This might seem like a high number, given that Canada has only three neighbours: the United States, Denmark (Greenland), and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon). This article explores why Canada has so many unresolved maritime boundaries. It does so through a comparison with Norway, which has settled all of its maritime boundaries, most notably in the Barents Sea with Russia. This comparison illuminates some of the factors that motivate or impede maritime boundary negotiations. It turns out that the status of each maritime boundary can only be explained on the basis of its own unique geographic, historic, political, and legal context. Canada’s unresolved maritime boundaries are the result of circumstances specific to each of them and not of a particular policy approach in Ottawa.

Résumé

Le Canada a cinq frontières maritimes qui n’ont pas encore été délimitées. Ce nombre peut paraitre élevé étant donné que le Canada n’a que trois voisins: les États-Unis, le Danemark (Groënland) et la France (St. Pierre et Miquelon). Cet article cherche à découvrir pourquoi le Canada a tant de frontières maritimes irrésolues. Pour ce faire, l’article se penche sur le cas de la Norvège, qui a réussi à délimiter toutes ses frontières maritimes, y compris dans la mer de Barents avec la Russie. Cette comparaison met en relief certains des facteurs qui favorisent ou entravent les négociations pour la résolution de différends maritimes frontaliers. Il s’avère que le statut des frontières maritimes ne peut s’expliquer qu’en prenant en considération leurs particularités géographiques, historiques, politiques et légales. Ainsi, le fait que le Canada n’ait pas encore réussi à fixer nombre de ses frontières maritimes est le résultat de circonstances uniques à chacune d’elles plutôt que d’une approche politique particulière véhiculée par Ottawa.

Keywords

CanadaNorwaymaritime boundariesinternational disputeslaw of the seatreaty negotiationCanadaNorvègefrontières maritimesdifférends internationauxdroit de la mernégociation de traités
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 54 , October 2017 , pp. 1 - 62
Copyright
Copyright © The Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international 2017 

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References

1 Sergei Lavrov & Jonas Gahr Støre, “Canada, Take Note: Here’s How to Resolve Maritime Disputes,” Globe and Mail (21 September 2010), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/canada-take-note-heres-how-to-resolve-maritime-disputes/article4326372/>.

2 Canada also has unresolved boundaries beyond 200 nautical miles from shore — between adjacent or opposing “extended continental shelves” — in the Beaufort Sea (with the United States), central Arctic Ocean (Denmark and Russia), Gulf of Maine (United States), and potentially off St. Pierre and Miquelon (France). Last but not least, it has a dispute with the United States over the status of the Northwest Passage. However, this article considers these disputes only insofar as they are relevant to the maritime boundary disputes within 200 nautical miles from shore.

3 Victor Prescott & Grant Boyes, “Undelimited Maritime Boundaries in the Pacific Ocean Excluding the Asian Rim” (International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University) (2000) 2:8 Maritime Briefings 11.

4 Victor Prescott & Clive Schofield, Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004); Mom Ravin, Law of the Sea: Maritime Boundaries and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (2005), online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/mom_0506_cambodia.pdf>.

5 Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf, Presidential Proclamation no 2667 (28 September 1945); Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 29 April 1958, 499 UNTS 311 [Geneva Convention].

6 ED Brown, “Delimitation of Offshore Areas: Hard Labour and Bitter Fruits at UNCLOS III” (1981) 5:3 Marine Policy 172. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 [UNCLOS].

7 Donald M McRae, “Canada and the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries,” in Donald M McRae & Gordon Munro, Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1989) 145 at 147.

8 Christopher Kirkey, “Delineating Maritime Boundaries: The 1977–1978 Canada–US Beaufort Sea Continental Shelf Delimitation Boundary Negotiations” (1995) 25 Can Rev Am Stud 49, 55.

9 Ibid at 55–56, quoting Lorne Clark.

10 Kirkey, ibid at 59–60 writes: “U.S. officials were concerned that by deviating from this position, which seeks to delimit wet boundaries according to the principle of equidistance — except in cases where specifically defined circumstances exist — American ability to successfully prevail either in the course of international negotiations over future maritime boundary cases, or regarding those cases brought before the ICJ, would be greatly reduced.”

11 Ibid at 59.

12 Ibid at 60.

13 McDorman, Ted L, Salt Water Neighbors: International Ocean Relations between the United States and Canada (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 135.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 Ibid at 140–42.

15 Ibid at 137.

16 US Senate, Maritime Boundary Settlement with Canada, Executive Report no 5, 97th Congress, 1st Session (1981) at 2, cited in ibid.

17 This was the first occasion on which two states took up the option of a chamber. See E Valencia-Ospina, “The Use of Chambers of the International Court of Justice” in V Lowe & M Fitzmaurice, eds, Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 503.

18 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), [1984] ICJ Rep 246 [Gulf of Maine].

19 McDorman, supra note 13 at 176–78. This issue could be dealt with in a new agreement — which will eventually be needed, in any event, to take the Canada–US boundary into the extended continental shelf — by using a “special area” to assign Canada’s rights over the 163 nautical square miles to the United States, in return for a US compromise elsewhere. Special areas were pioneered in the 1990 United States–Soviet Union Boundary Treaty, where they did not attract protests from other states, and the same technique has been used in the 2010 Norway–Russia Boundary Treaty. See Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary, 26 September 1990, 29 ILM 941 (1990), online: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125431.pdf>; Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean (English translation), online: <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/ud/vedlegg/folkerett/avtale_engelsk.pdf>. See also Byers, International Law and the Arctic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) at 35–36, 43–44.

20 Kirkey, supra note 8 at 64, n 17.

21 Erik B Wang, “Canada-United States Fisheries and Maritime Boundaries Negotiations: Diplomacy in Deep Water” (1981) 38:6 & 39:1 Behind the Headlines 1 at 15, quoted in Kirkey, supra note 8 at 64, n 17.

22 McDorman, supra note 13 at 134.

23 Kirkey, supra note 8 at 64, n 17, quoting correspondence from Colson.

24 McDorman, supra note 13 at 141.

25 Treaty of Paris, 3 September 1783, online: <https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/paris.html>.

26 Gulf of Maine, supra note 18 at 265–66.

27 McDorman, supra note 13 at 193–94.

28 Kim Mackrael, “Canada, Denmark Closer to Settling Border Dispute,” Globe and Mail (29 November 2012), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canada-denmark-closer-to-settling-border-dispute/article5831571/>.

29 Bernard H. Oxman, “International Maritime Boundaries: Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations” (1994–95) 26:2 U Miami Inter-Am L Rev 243 at 256.

30 One example is Pheasant Island in the middle of the Bidasoa River between France and Spain. See Byers, supra note 19 at 15.

31 McDorman, supra note 13 at 184 (referring to Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Diplomatic Note, ICJ Pleadings, 103 (1976) vol 5, Annex 8 to Reply of the United States, 529–30.

32 David H Gray, “Canada’s Unresolved Maritime Boundaries” (1997) 5:3 International Boundaries Research Unit (IBRU) Boundary & Security Bulletin 61 at 62.

33 Great Britain/Russia: Limits of Their Respective Possessions on the North-West Coast of America and the Navigation of the Pacific Ocean, 16 February 1825, 75 CTS 95.

34 Ibid, art 3.

35 See, eg, US Department of State, Exclusive Economic Zone and Maritime Boundaries, Public Notice 2237 (1995) 60 Fed Reg 43825–29.

36 See McDorman, supra note 13 at 181–90, for the definitive presentation of the dispute as previously understood.

37 Randy Boswell, “‘Astonishing’ Data Boost Arctic Claim,” Ottawa Citizen (12 November 2008) at A3; Sian Griffiths, “US-Canada Arctic Border Dispute Key to Maritime Riches,” BBC News (2 August 2010), online: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-10834006>.

38 UNCLOS, supra note 6.

39 Randy Boswell, “Beaufort Sea Breakthrough,” Vancouver Sun (17 February 2010), online: <http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2010/02/beaufort-sea-breakthrough.html>.

40 Canada, Speech from the Throne (3 March 2010), online: <http://www.speech.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1388>.

41 Randy Boswell, “Canada Ready to Settle Beaufort Sea Dispute with U.S.: Cannon,” Vancouver Sun (14 May 2010), online: <http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2010/05/canada-ready-to-settle-beaufort-sea-dispute-with-us-cannon.html>.

42 Department of Foreign Affairs, “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad” (2010), online: <http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng.pdf>; Randy Boswell, “Work Underway to Resolve Beaufort Sea Boundary Dispute,” Vancouver Sun (26 July 2010), online: <http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2010/07/work-underway-to-resolve-beaufort-sea-boundary-dispute.html>.

43 For the 2011 “disposition map” of the Beaufort Sea and Mackenzie Delta produced by Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, showing past discoveries and “shows,” see <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/nog_mp_bsmd_pg_1317059161670_eng.pdf>.

44 Gary Park, “Beaufort Find Is Oil, Not Gas,” Petroleum News (21 October 2007) 12, online: <http://www.petroleumnews.com/pntruncate/304958258.shtml>.

45 Dina O’Meara, “Imperial Oil, Exxon-Mobil Canada Bet C$585M on Offshore Arctic Oil and Gas,” Resource Investor (19 July 2007), online: <http://www.resourceinvestor.com/2007/07/19/imperial-oil-exxonmobil-canada-bet-c585m-on-offsho>.

46 Scott Haggett, “BP Bids Big for Canadian Arctic Drilling Rights,” Reuters (9 June 2008), online: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/06/09/uk-energy-arctic-idUKN0947438920080609>.

47 Shaun Polczer, “Firms Team Up in Arctic,” Calgary Herald (31 July 2010), online: <http://www2.canada.com/calgaryherald/news/calgarybusiness/story.html?id=a3a43f92-a51d-4402-a76d-61362b8105b8>.

48 “Shell Ends Exploration in Arctic Near Alaska ‘for the Foreseeable Future’,” Associated Press (28 September 2015), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/shell-stops-arctic-drilling-development-1.3246355>.

49 Ibid.

50 “Ban on New Arctic Drilling Gives Canada Leg Up, U.S. Lawmakers Say,” Reuters (21 December 2016), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/offshore-ban-in-arctic-will-cost-northern-economy-northwest-territories-premier-says/article33402219/>.

51 Kirkey, supra note 8 at 58–59.

52 Randy Boswell, “Beaufort Sea Breakthrough,” Vancouver Sun (17 February 2010), online: <http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2010/02/beaufort-sea-breakthrough.html>.

53 See, eg, Maura Forrest, “Pasloski Says Beaufort Sea Drilling Lease Violates Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty,” Yukon News (23 March 2016), online: <http://yukon-news.com/news/pasloski-says-beaufort-sea-drilling-lease-violates-canadas-arctic-sovereign/>.

54 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement (as amended), online: <http://www.daair.gov.nt.ca/_live/documents/documentManagerUpload/InuvialuitFinalAgreement1984.pdf>. Under section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982, (UK), 1982, c 11, “rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired” are “recognized and affirmed.” See <http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-12.html#sc:7_II>.

55 Inuvialuit Final Agreement, supra note 54, especially s 12(2): “The Yukon North Slope shall fall under a special conservation regime whose dominant purpose is the conservation of wildlife, habitat and traditional native use.” Curiously, the Inuvialuit Settlement Region extends more than 600 nautical miles northward into the Beaufort Sea, well beyond Canada’s exclusive jurisdiction over the living resources of the exclusive economic zone, though it is unclear whether Canada (in 1984 or at any time since) purports to exercise any exclusive jurisdiction beyond 200 nautical miles. For a map of the Inuvialuit settlement area, see <http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100031121/1100100031129#chp7>.

56 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, art 46(1): “A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.”

57 Constitution Act 1982, supra note 54, s 35; R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 (Canada); Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 SCR 511; Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 SCR 388; Tsilhqot’in v. British Columbia [2014] 2 SCR 256.

58 Convention between his Majesty and the United States of America, for the Adjustment of the Boundary between the Dominium of Canada and the Territory of Alaska, 24 January 1903, online: <https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Hay-Herbert_Treaty>. For the definitive history of the arbitration, and the resulting dispute over Dixon Entrance, see Charles B Bourne & Donald M McRae, “Maritime Jurisdiction in the Dixon Entrance: The Alaska Boundary Re-examined” (1976) 14 CYIL 183.

59 Alaska Boundary Case (Great Britain v United States), 20 October 1903, reprinted in UNRIAA, vol 40, 481–540, online: <http://www.legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XV/481-540.pdf>.

60 McDorman, supra note 13 at 168.

61 Bourne & McRae, supra note 58 at 215.

62 McDorman, supra note 13 at 285.

63 McRae, supra note 7 at 154–55. Treaty between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Pacific Salmon, July 2014, Pacific Salmon Commission, online: <http://www.psc.org/>.

64 McDorman, supra note 13 at 170–72.

65 Ibid.

66 See: DM Johnston & MJ Valencia, Pacific Ocean Boundaries: Status and Solutions (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) at 100 (explaining how the “symbolic significance” of the A-B line “almost precludes the political possibility of a concession by Canada”).

67 Reference re: Ownership of the Bed of the Strait of Georgia and Related Areas, [1984] 1 SCR 388, online: <https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/5267/index.do>.

68 Submission of the Province of British Columbia on West Coast Maritime Boundaries between Canada and the United States (Victoria: Queen’s Printer, 1977) [Submission of the Province of British Columbia].

69 Treaty Establishing the Boundary in the Territory on the Northwest Coast of America Lying Westward of the Rocky Mountains, 15 June 1846, online: <https://web.archive.org/web/20091113034143/http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca_us/en/cus.1846.28.en.html>.

70 See US notes reprinted in Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Reply of the United States, ICJ Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, vol V, Annex 4, 503–4.

71 McDorman, supra note 13 at 175.

72 McRae, supra note 7 at 154–55.

73 Submission of the Province of British Columbia, supra note 68.

74 Byers, supra note 19 at 133–34, 137–38.

75 Act to Amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, SC 1969–70, c 68, s 1243.

76 Gray, supra note 32 at 68.

77 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Greenland and Canada, 17 December 1973, 13(3) ILM 506 (1974), online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/DNK-CAN1973CS.PDF> [Agreement on the Continental Shelf].

78 Gray, supra note 32 at 68.

79 Agreement on the Continental Shelf, supra note 77.

80 For more on Hans Island, see Byers, supra note 19 at 10–16.

81 In 2005, Canada and Denmark issued a joint statement, indicating that their officials would “discuss ways to resolve the matter.” In the meantime, “all contact by either side with Hans Island will be carried out in a low key and restrained manner.” Canada–Denmark Joint Statement on Hans Island (19 September 2005), online: <http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/canadadenmark-joint-statement-on-hans-island.html>.

82 See, eg, Martin Mittelstaedt, “Canada Closes Ports in Shrimp Dispute,” Globe and Mail (15 February 2010), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canada-closes-ports-in-shrimp-dispute/article1468540/>.

83 Steve Ducharme, “Shell’s Oil Permits Near Lancaster Sound Still Valid, INAC Says,” Nunatsiaq News (11 April 2016), online: <http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674shells_oil_permits_near_lancaster_sound_still_valid_inac_says/>.

84 Oxman, supra note 29 at 250, n 14.

85 Gray, supra note 32 at 68.

86 See: Executive Order no 176 on the Fishing Territory of Northern Greenland (14 May 1980), online: <http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/den99033E.pdf>.

87 Gray, supra note 32 at 68.

88 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] ICJ Rep 116.

89 Calderbank, Bruce et al, Canada’s Offshore: Jurisdiction, Rights, and Management, 3rd ed (Victoria: Trafford Publishing, 2006) at 163.Google Scholar

90 “Royal Decree on Amendment of Royal Decree on Delimitation of the Territorial Waters of Greenland, 15 October 2004” (2005) 56 Law of the Sea Bulletin 126 at 128, online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin56e.pdf>.

91 For a map showing the Danish equidistance line post-2004, see the Map of the Outer Limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone of Greenland, reprinted in “Executive Order on the Exclusive Economic Zone of Greenland, 20 Oct. 2004” (2005) 56 Law of the Sea Bulletin 133 at 136, online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin56e.pdf>.

92 Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, “Canada and Kingdom of Denmark Reach Tentative Agreement on Lincoln Sea Boundary,” News Release (28 November 2012) (with backgrounder), online: <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=709479>. See also Kim Mackrael, “Canada, Denmark a Step Closer to Settling Border Dispute,” Globe and Mail (30 November 2012), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canada-denmark-a-step-closer-to-settling-border-dispute/article5831571/>.

93 2009 Act on Greenland Self-Government, online: <http://uk.nanoq.gl/∼/media/f74bab3359074b29aab8c1e12aa1ecfe.ashx>.

94 Department of Foreign Affairs, “Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad” (2010), online: <http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/CAFP_booklet-PECA_livret-eng.pdf>.

95 Randy Boswell, “Canada Ready to Settle Beaufort Sea Dispute with U.S.: Cannon,” Vancouver Sun (14 May 2010), online: <http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2010/05/canada-ready-to-settle-beaufort-sea-dispute-with-us-cannon.html>.

96 Court of Arbitration for the Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and France: Decision in Case Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas (St. Pierre and Miquelon), 10 June 1992, 31 ILM 1145 (1992), para 8 [Court of Arbitration for the Delimitation of Maritime Areas].

97 Ibid.

98 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of France on Their Mutual Fishing Relations, 27 March 1972, reprinted in National Legislation and Treaties Relating to the Law of the Sea, UN Legislative Series (1974) at 570–72 [Canada–France Fishing Agreement].

99 Agreement Establishing a Court of Arbitration for the Purpose of Carrying Out the Delimitation of Maritime Areas between France and Canada, 30 March 1989, 29 ILM 1 (1990).

100 Court of Arbitration for the Delimitation of Maritime Areas, supra note 96. The situation today is further complicated by the fact that the continental shelf in this area extends well beyond 200 nautical miles. In 2013, Canada filed a submission concerning the seabed along the entire coast of Newfoundland, including offshore from St. Pierre and Miquelon, with the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The next year, France included an area of seabed offshore St. Pierre and Miquelon within its submission to the same body. Canada responded by reiterating that France has no rights — to either additional exclusive economic zone or extended continental shelf — beyond those awarded by the tribunal in 1992.

101 Saunders, Phillip M & VanderZwaag, David L, “Canada and St. Pierre and Miquelon Transboundary Relations: Battles and Bridges” in Russell, Dawn A & VanderZwaag, David L, eds, Recasting Transboundary Fisheries Management Arrangements in Light of Sustainability Principles: Canadian and International Perspectives (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010) 209.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

102 Canada–France Fishing Agreement, supra note 98 at 570–72.

103 Ted L McDorman, “Canada and France Agree to Arbitration for the St. Pierre and Miquelon Boundary Dispute” (1990) 5 Intl J Estuarine & Coastal L at 357, 358.

104 Ibid at 357, 358–59.

105 Ibid at 357, 359.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid 357, 358–59.

108 Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, “Norsk oljehistorie på 5 minutter” (“Norwegian Oil History in 5 Minutes”), Oil Gas (2016), online: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/energi/olje-og-gass/norsk-oljehistorie-pa-5-minutter/id440538/>.

109 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, “Norway’s Petroleum History,” Nor Pet (2017), online: <http://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/norways-petroleum-history/>.

110 Geneva Convention, supra note 5.

111 Helge Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene om Norges kontinentalsokkel” (“The Negotiations over Norway’s Continental Shelf”), Store Nor Leks (Great Norwegian Encyclopaedia) (2014), online: <https://snl.no/Forhandlingene_om_Norges_kontinentalsokkel> [Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene”].

112 Ibid.

113 Helge Ryggvik, “A Short History of the Norwegian Oil Industry: From Protected National Champions to Internationally Competitive Multinationals” (2015) 89:1 Business History Rev 3 at 6–7.

114 Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene,” supra note 111.

115 Kindingstad, Torbjørn, Norges oljehistorie (Norwegian Oil History) (Oslo: Wigestrand, 2002).Google Scholar

116 LC Green, “The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1951 (ICJ Reports 1951, p. 116),” (1952) 15:3 Modern L Rev 373.

117 Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, supra note 109.

118 McHarg, Aileen et al, Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

119 Alex G Oude Elferink, The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 74–86 [Elferink, Delimitation of the Continental Shelf].

120 Ibid.

121 Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene,” supra note 111.

122 Elferink, Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, supra note 119 at 80–90.

123 Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene,” supra note 111.

124 Kindingstad, supra note 115.

125 Geneva Convention, supra note 5.

126 Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene,” supra note 111; Kindingstad, supra note 115; Ulleland, Petter, Den undersjøiske fjellhylle: Konsolideringen av den norske kontinentalsokkel 1982–2007 (Tromsø: University of Tromsø, 2008).Google Scholar

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128 Churchill, Robin, “Claims to Maritime Zones in the Arctic — Law of the Sea Normality or Polar Peculiarity?” in Elferink, Alex Oude & Rothwell, Donald, eds, The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) 105 at 118 [Churchill, “Claims to Maritime Zones”].Google Scholar

129 Ibid.

130 Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene,” supra note 111; Ulleland, supra note 126.

131 Churchill, “Claims to Maritime Zones,” supra note 128.

132 Robin Churchill, “The Greenland-Jan Mayen Case and its Significance for the International Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation” (1994) 9:1 Intl J Mar Coast L 1 [Churchill, “Greenland-Jan Mayen Case”].

133 Ibid.

134 Ulf Linderfalk, “The Jan Mayen Case (Iceland/Norway): An Example of Successful Conciliation,” Social Science Research Network (24 May 2016) at 1–26, online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2783622>; Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene,” supra note 111.

135 Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 22 October 1981, online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/ISL-NOR1981CS.PDF> [Agreement between Iceland and Jan Mayen].

136 Ibid.

137 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v Norway), [1993] ICJ Rep 38, online: <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/78/6743.pdf>.

138 Hoel, Alf Håkon, “The Legal-Political Regime in the Arctic” in Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: Regional Dynamics in a Global World (New York: Routledge, 2014) 49 at 55; Churchill, “Greenland-Jan Mayen Case,” supra note 132.Google Scholar

139 Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene,” supra note 111.

140 Kindingstad, supra note 115.

141 Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene,” supra note 111; Linderfalk, supra note 134.

142 Agreement between Iceland and Jan Mayen, supra note 135.

143 Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene,” supra note 111.

144 Guðni Th Jóhannesson, “The Jan Mayen Dispute between Iceland and Norway, 1979–1981: A Study in Successful Diplomacy?” Arctic Frontiers, Tromsø (24 January 2013), online: <http://gudnith.is/efni/jan_mayen_dispute_24_jan_2013>.

145 Agreement between Iceland and Norway Concerning Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits, 3 November 2008, online: <http://www.nea.is/media/olia/JM_unitisation_agreement_Iceland_Norway_2008.pdf>.

146 Agreed Minutes Concerning the Right of Participation pursuant to Articles 5 and 6 of the Agreement of 22 October 1981 between Iceland and Norway on the Continental Shelf in the Area between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 3 November 2008, online: <http://www.nea.is/media/olia/JM_agreed_minutes_Iceland_Norway_2008.pdf>.

147 Jonas Karlsbakk, “Norway and Iceland Sign Border Treaty,” Independent Barents Observer (5 November 2008), online: <http://barentsobserver.com/en/node/20950>. According to the same report, the new treaty was signed just three days after the Norwegian Bank gave the Icelandic government a loan of approximately €1 million as part of Norway’s assistance to Iceland during the global financial crisis.

148 McDorman, supra note 13 at 333–37.

149 Churchill, “Greenland-Jan Mayen Case,” supra note 132 at 6.

150 Ibid at 3–6.

151 Ibid at 3.

152 Svalbard Treaty, 9 February 1920, online: <http://www.sysselmannen.no/Documents/Sysselmannen_dok/English/Legacy/The_Svalbard_Treaty_9ssFy.pdf>.

153 Robin Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Marine Management in Disputed Areas: The Case of the Barents Sea (London: Routledge, 1992) at 63.

154 Ibid at 47.

155 Ibid at 63.

156 Geneva Convention, supra note 5. See Tore Henriksen & Geir Ulfstein, “Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty” (2011) 42 Ocean Development & Intl L 1 at 2 [Henriksen & Ulfstein, “Maritime Delimitation”].

157 Henriksen & Ulfstein, “Maritime Delimitation,” supra note 156.

158 Zia, Asim, Kelman, Ilan & Glantz, Michael H, “Arctic Melting Tests the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea” in Pincus, Rebecca H & Ali, Saleem H, eds, Diplomacy on Ice Energy and the Environment in the Arctic and Antarctic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015) at 132.Google Scholar

159 Arild Moe, Daniel Fjærtoft & Indra Øverland, “Space and Timing: Why Was the Barents Sea Delimitation Dispute Resolved in 2010?” (2011) 34:3 Polar Geography 145 at 147.

160 Laila Ø Bakken & Kristian Aanensen, “Historisk løsning av delelinjen” (“Historical Settlement of the Delimitation Line”), Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (27 April 2010), online: <https://www.nrk.no/norge/--historisk-losning-av-delelinjen-1.7098938>

161 Ibid.

162 Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Kingdom of Norway on the Maritime Delimitation in the Varangerfjord Area, reprinted in (2007) 67 UN Law of the Sea Bulletin 42, online: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulletin67e.pdf> (Agreement on the Varangerfjord Area).

163 “Agreement between Norway and Russia on Maritime Delimitation in the Varangerfjord Area,” Press Release (2007), online: <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/Agreement-signed-between-Norway-and-Russ/id476347/>.

164 “Joint Statement on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean” (27 April 2010), online: <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/030427_english_4.pdf>.

165 Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, 2010, online: <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/ud/vedlegg/folkerett/avtale_engelsk.pdf> [English translation] (Treaty on the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean). See also Henriksen & Ulfstein, “Maritime Delimitation,” supra note 156; Thilo Neumann, “Norway and Russia Agree on Maritime Boundary in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean” (2010) 14:34 ASIL Insight, online: <http://www.asil.org/files/2010/insights/insights_101109.pdf>. On the prompt ratifications, see Walter Gibbs, “Norway Hails Barents Treaty OK by Russian Duma,” Reuters (26 March 2011), online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/26/barentstreaty-idUSLDE72P0HY20110326>. For a map of the new boundary line, see <http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/kart/kart_100914_ny.gif>.

166 Henriksen & Ulfstein, “Maritime Delimitation,” supra note 156 at 7.

167 For a more detailed analysis, see Byers, supra note 19 at 43–44.

168 Moe, Fjærtoft & Øverland, supra note 159.

169 Willy Østreng & Yngvild Prydz, Delelinjen i Barentshavet: Planlagt samarbeid versus uforutsett konflikt? (The Boundary in the Barents Sea: Planned Cooperation versus Unexpected Conflict) (2007).

170 Bakken & Aanensen, supra note 160.

171 Claes, Dag H & Moe, Arild, “Arctic Petroleum Resources in a Regional and Global Perspective” in Tamnes, Rolf & Offerdal, Kristine, eds, Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: Regional Dynamics in a Global World (London: Routledge, 2014) 97 at 102–10.Google Scholar

172 Ibid.

173 Øistein Harsem, Arne Eide & Knut Heen, “Factors Influencing Future Oil and Gas Prospects in the Arctic” (2011) 39:12 Energy Policy 8037.

174 Claes & Moe, supra note 171.

175 Tore Henriksen & Geir Ulfstein, “Maritime Delimitation in the Arctic: The Barents Sea Treaty” (2010) 42:1–2 Ocean Dev Intl L 1; Agreement on the Varangerfjord Area, supra note 162; Treaty on the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, supra note 162.

176 Atle Staalesen, “Lukoil Is Norway’s New Arctic Petro Partner,” Independent Barents Observer (24 May 2016), online: <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry/2016/05/lukoil-norways-new-arctic-petro-partner>.

177 Geir Hønneland, “Co-management and Communities in the Barents Sea Fisheries” (1999) 58:4 Hum Organ 397 [Hønneland, “Co-management and Communities”]; Geir Hønneland, “Norsk-russisk miljø-og ressursforvaltning i nordområdene” (“Norwegian–Russian Environmental and Resource Management in the High North”) (2012) 29 Nordlit, online: <http://septentrio.uit.no/index.php/nordlit/article/view/2303/2134>.

178 Geir Hønneland, “Co-Management and Communities in the Barents Sea Fisheries” (1999) 58:4 Human Organization 397.

179 Geir Hønneland, Hvordan skal Putin ta Barentshavet tilbake? (How Will Putin Reclaim the Barents Sea?) (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2013) [Hønneland, Hvordan skal].

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid.

182 Andreas Østhagen, “High North, Low Politics Maritime Cooperation with Russia in the Arctic” (2016) 7:1 Arctic Rev L & Politics 83.

183 “Norway and Russia to Step Up Cooperation in Hunt for Arctic Oil,” Reuters (28 November 2016), online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/norway-russia-oil-idUSL8N1DT3H9>.

184 Moe, Fjærtoft & Øverland, supra note 159.

185 Ibid.

186 Alex G Oude Elferink, “Maritime Delimitation between Denmark/Greenland and Norway” (2007) 38:4 Ocean Dev Intl Law 375 [Elferink, “Maritime Delimitation”].

187 Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British Overseas Dominions and Sweden Concerning Spitsbergen signed in Paris 9th February 1920, 9 February 1920, 1–15, online: <http://www.sysselmannen.no/Documents/Sysselmannen_dok/English/Legacy/The_Svalbard_Treaty_9ssFy.pdf>.

188 Torbjørn Pedersen & Tore Henriksen, “Svalbard’s Maritime Zones: The End of Legal Uncertainty?” (2009) 24:1 Intl J Mar Coastal L 141.

189 Erik J Molenaar, “Fisheries Regulation in the Maritime Zones of Svalbard” (2012) 27:1 Intl J Marine Coastal L 3.

190 Hønneland, Hvordan skal, supra note 179 at 31.

191 McDorman, supra note 13 at 21–34.

192 DH Anderson, “The Status under International Law of the Maritime Areas around Svalbard” (2009) 40:4 Ocean Dev Intl L 373.

193 Torbjørn Pedersen, “The Svalbard Continental Shelf Controversy: Legal Disputes and Political Rivalries” (2006) 37:3–4 Ocean Dev & Intl L 339; Thomas Nilsen, “Limits of Norway’s Arctic Seabed Agreed,” Independent Barents Observer (16 April 2009), online: <http://barentsobserver.com/en/node/19278>.

194 Johan Hammerstrøm, “Russland varsler Svalbard-bråk om nye oljeområder,” E24 (2015), online: <http://e24.no/makro-og-politikk/russland/russland-varsler-svalbard-braak-om-nye-oljeomraader/23686830>.

195 Anderson, supra note 192 at 373–84.

196 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on the One Hand, and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Together with the Home Rule Government of Greenland on the Other Hand, Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf and the Fisheries Zones in the Area between Greenland and Svalbard, Copenhagen, 20 February 2006, 2378 UNTS 21 [Svalbard–Greenland Delimitation Agreement].

197 See generally Elferink, “Maritime Delimitation,” supra note 119.

198 Ida Cathrine Thomassen, The Continental Shelf of Svalbard: Its Legal Status and the Legal Implications of the Application of the Svalbard Treaty Regarding Exploitation of Non-Living Resources (Tromsø: University of Tromsø, 2013) at 30.

199 Elferink, “Maritime Delimitation,” supra note 119 at 376.

200 Thomassen, supra note 198.

201 Oxman, supra note 29 at 254.

202 Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene,” supra note 111.

203 Oxman, supra note 29 at 254, n 24.

204 Ibid at 265.

205 Moe, Fjærtoft & Øverland, supra note 159 at 147.

206 Agreement on an Interim Practical Arrangement for Fishing in an Adjoining Area in the Barents Sea, 1978, original Norwegian text reprinted in Overenskomster med fremmede stater (1978) at 436. For more details, see Kristoffer Stabrun, “The Grey Zone Agreement of 1978: Fishery Concerns, Security Challenges and Territorial Interests” (2009) 13 FNI Rep 1.

207 Tamnes, supra note 127 at 294–302; Moe, Fjærtoft & Øverland, supra note 159 at 148.

208 Moe, Fjærtoft & Øverland, supra note 159.

209 Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene,” supra note 111.

210 When it later became apparent that the field that stimulated the Norwegian oil boom in the 1970s — Ekofisk — was located on the Norwegian side of the tri-point where the Norwegian, British, and Danish continental shelves meet in the North Sea, questions were raised in the United Kingdom and Denmark about the 1964 and 1965 agreements. However, the newly agreed boundaries were never challenged. Kristin Øye Gjerde, “Kunne Valhall vært dansk?” (“Could Valhall Have Been Danish?”) Kult Valhall (2015) online: <http://www.kulturminne-valhall.no/Historien/1960-aarene-Oljeleting/Kunne-Valhall-vaert-dansk>; Ryggvik, “Forhandlingene,” supra note 111.

211 See, eg, Tamnes, supra note 127; Iver B Neumann et al, Norge og alliansene: gamle tradisjoner, nytt spillerom (Norway and Alliances: Old Traditions, New Games) (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2008); Marie Haraldstad, “Embetsverkets rolle i utformingen av norsk sikkerhetspolitikk: Nærområdeinitiativet” (“The Role of the Norwegian Bureaucracy in the Design of Norwegian Security Policy: The Neighborhood Policy Initiative”) (2014) 72:4 Int Polit 431; Iver B Neumann & Sieglinde Gstöhl, Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World? Small States in International Relations (San Diego: International Studies Association, 2006).

212 Tamnes, supra note 127; Olav Riste, “With an Eye to History: The Origins and Development of ‘Stay-Behind’ in Norway” (2007) 30:6 J Strateg Stud 997.

213 Although this does not imply that Norway is devoid of power politics, as an active North Atlantic Treaty Organization member with a dependence on the United States for security assurances. See Paal S Hilde, “Armed Forces and Security Challenges in the Arctic” in Rolf Tamnes & Kristine Offerdal, eds, Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic: Regional Dynamics in a Global World (London: Routledge, 2014) 147; Leif C Jensen & Geir Hønneland, “Framing the High North: Public Discourses in Norway after 2000” (2011) 28:1 Acta Boreal 37; Østhagen, supra note 182.

214 Tamnes, supra note 127.

215 Referring to the Labour party (red), the Socialist party (red/green), and the Center party (agrarian green).

216 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, St.meld. nr. 30 (2004–2005): Muligheter og utfordringer i nord (Oslo, 2005); Olav Orheim et al, NOU 2003:32 Mot nord! Utfordringer og muligheter i nordområdene (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affaris, 2003); Bjørn Brunstad et al, Big Oil Playground, Russian Bear Preserve or European Periphery? (Delft: Eburon Academic Publishers, 2004).

217 ECON, 2025 Ringer i vannet (2025 Circles in the Water) (Oslo: ECON, 2006) at 1–29, online: <http://www.aksjonsprogrammet.no/vedlegg/ECON_ringer06.pdf>, 2005); Brunstad et al, Big Oil Playground.

218 Hønneland, Hvordan skal, supra note 179; Hønneland, “Co-management and Communities,” supra note 177.

219 Jensen & Hønneland, supra note 213.

220 Hønneland, Hvordan skal, supra note 179.

221 See Moe, Fjærtoft & Øverland, supra note 159.

222 Katarzyna Zysk, ‘Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Restraints’ in Barry Scott Zellen, ed, Fast-changing Arctic: Rethinking Arctic Security in a Warmer World (Calgary: Calgary University Press, 2013) 281.

223 Moe, Fjærtoft & Øverland, supra note 159 at 158.

224 Oxman, supra note 29 at 259, n 35; Churchill, “Greenland-Jan Mayen Case,” supra note 132.

225 Oxman, supra note 29 at 251.

226 Ibid at 294.

227 Lackenbauer, Whitney P, “Polar Race or Polar Saga? Canada and the Circumpolar World” in Kraska, James, ed, Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 219.Google Scholar

228 McDorman refers to the “emotional freight” of sovereignty disputes, especially for Canada via-à-vis the United States. McDorman, supra note 13 at 3.

229 Brooks, Stephen, “Canada–United States Relations” in Courtney, John C & Smith, David E, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Canadian Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 379.Google Scholar

230 North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993).

231 McDorman, supra note 13 at 195.

232 In the Gulf of Maine case, supra note 18, Canada was concerned that advancing an equidistance-based argument would weaken its position in the Beaufort Sea and Dixon Entrance. It therefore reframed the argument to focus on equity considerations; considerations that, not coincidentally, led to an equidistant result. See McRae, supra note 7 at 155.

233 Weil, Prosper, The Law of Maritime Delimitation: Reflections (London: Grotius Publications, 1989).Google Scholar

234 Paraphrasing Moe, Fjærtoft & Øverland, supra note 159 at 158.

235 Øyvind Ravna, “Samerett og samiske rettigheter i Norge” (“Sami Law and Sami Rights in Norway”) in Juss i Nord: Hav, fisk og urfolk: En hyllest til Det juridiske fakultet ved Universitetet i Tromsøs 25-årsjubileum (Law in the North: Ocean, Fish and Indigenous Peoples: A Tribute to the Legal Faculty at the University of Tromsø’s 25 th Anniversary) (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2012).