Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare: Part II, Developments since 1945

Wolff Heintschel Von Heinegg

doi:10.1017/S0069005800005075

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, at 76 (April 1992).

² According to the U.S. Department of Defense, there were not enough helicopters able to insert a full takedown team onto a vessel. Therefore, altogether there occurred only 11 takedowns: ibid., 78.

³ Exec. Orders No. 12, 724–25, 55 Fed. Reg. 33089–92 (1990), issued Aug. g, 1990, citing, inter alia, S.C. Res. 661, the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C, paras. 1601–51 (1988), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, ibid., paras. 1701–6 (1988), and the UN Participation Act, 22 ibid, paras. 287-87e (1988).

⁴ E.g., Special Warning No. 80, Aug. 17, 1990, in Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographie/Topographie Center, Notice to Mariners III-I. 15 (No. 36, l990).

⁵ See inter alia Brown, E. D., “World War Prize Law Applied in a Limited War Situation: Egyptian Restrictions on Neutral Shipping with Israel,” 50 Minnesota L. Rev. 849 (1965-66)Google Scholar; Dinstein, Y., “The Laws of War at Sea,” Isr.YBHR, 56 (1980)Google Scholar; Gross, L., “Passage through the Suez Canal of Israel-Bound Cargo and Israel Ships,” 51 Am. J. Int’l L. 530 (1957)CrossRef Google Scholar.

⁶ See inter alia Security Council, SCOR, 553rd meeting of Aug. 16, 1951, at 23.

⁷ “Réglementant la procedure relative à l’inspection des navires et des avions et la capture des prises de la guerre Palestinienne” (J. O. [France] No. 36 of Apr. 4, 1950), later Loi No. 32 du 1er avril 1950 relative au Conseil de Prises (J. O. [France] No. 64 of June 26, 1950). English translation in UN Doc. S/3179 (Feb. 15, 1954).

⁸ See Ottmüller, R., Die Anwendung von Seekriegsrecht in militärischen Konflikten seil 1945, at 133, 180 Google Scholar (Hamburg, 1978); Trappe, J., “On the Jurisdiction of the Egyptian Prize Court, 1948–1960,” 10 Rev.Egypt.DI 60 (1960)Google Scholar.

⁹ UN Security Council, 558th meeting, Sept. 1, 1951, SCOR paras. 5,6; UN Docs. S/2322 and S/1367. See also the statement by the Israeli delegate during the 658th meeting on Feb. 5, 1954.

¹⁰ Statement of the Egyptian delegate during the 661st meeting of the Security Council on Mar. 12, 1954 (SCOR paras. 4 ff.), and during the 682nd meeting on Oct. 14, 1954 (SCOR para. 113).

¹¹ The Lea Lott (Dec. 12, 1959), 28 I.L.R. 652 (1963) and 16 Rev.Egypt.DI 106 (1960); The Inge Toft (Apr. 10, 1960), 31 I.L.R. 510 (1966) and 16 Rev.Egypt.DI 118 (1960).

¹² The Zemalek, 6 Rev.Egypt.DI 212 (1950); The Triport, 6 Rev.Egypt.DI 266 (1950); The Nord Cap, 5 Rev.Egypt.DI 149 (1949); The Narrandera, 5 Rev.Egypt.DI 152 (1949); The Talthybias, 6 Rev.Egypt.DI 227 (1950).

¹³ The Captain Marioli, 28 I.L.R. 662 (1963); 15 Rev.Egypt.DI 186 (1959); The Inge Toft (Apr. 10, 1960), 31 I.L.R. 510 (1966); 16 Rev.Egypt.DI 118(1960).

¹⁴ The Arsia, 6 Rev.Egypt.DI 223 (1950); The Empire Pickwick, 5 Rev.Egypt.DI 148 (1949); The Hoegh de Vries, 6 Rev.Egypt.DI 225 (1950); The Fedala, 13 Rev.Egypt.DI 131 (1957).

¹⁵ The Derwenthal, 6 Rev.Egypt.DI 218 (1950); The Lea Lott, 16 Rev.Egypt.DI 106 (1960).

¹⁶ The Marine Cap, 16 I.L.R. 571 (1949); 5 Rev.Egypt.DI 155 (1949); The Inge Toft, 31 I.L.R. 510 (1966); 16 Rev.Egypt.DI 118 (1960).

¹⁷ The Good Hope, 16 I.L.R. 574 (1949); 6 Rev.Egypt.DI 214 (1950); The Derwenthal, 6 Rev.Egypt.DI 218 (1950); The Hendand, 16 I.L.R. 597 (1949); 5 Rev.Egypt.DI 155 (1949); The Hoegh de Vries, 17 I.L.R. 447 (1950); 6 Rev.F.gypt.DI 225 (1950).

¹⁸ The Triport, 6 Rev.Egypt.DI 266 (1950); The Nord Cap, 5 Rev.Egypt.DI 149 (1949); The Talthybias, 6 Rev.Egypt.DI 227 (1950).

¹⁹ 31 I.L.R. 518 (1966); see also O’Connell, D. P., “International Law and Contemporary Naval Operations,” 44 BYIL 19, 27 (1970)Google Scholar.

²⁰ UN Doc. S/2322.

²¹ Hecker, Cf. H., “Indien erläßt ein Prisengesetz,” Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 455 (1972)Google Scholar; see also Baxter, R. R., “The Law of War in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: On Water and on Land,” 5 Towson State J. Int’l Aff. 1–17 (1971)Google Scholar.

²² Cf. 71 Marine-Rundschau 46 (1974) ; see also R. Ottmüller, op. at. supra note 8, at 292; Jablonsky, W., “Die Seekriegführung im vierten Nahostkrieg,” 71 Marine-Rundschau 645–65 (1974)Google Scholar.

²³ Cf. 71 Marine-Rundschau 46 (1974).

²⁴ The last neutral merchant ship that was visited and searched by an Egyptian warship in November 1973 was the Japanese Kijo Maru; see 71 Marine-Rundschau 115 (1974).

²⁵ Archiv der Gegenwart 1973, 18229 A 6.

²⁶ Ibid., 18315 A 2 B.

²⁷ R. Ottmüller, op. cit. supra note 8, at 294.

²⁸ Archiv der Gegenwart 1973, 18315 A 5. E.g., the Federal Republic of Germany had assured the Egyptian government that no U.S. war material destined for Israel would be shipped from German territory. Hence, the Israeli merchant vessel Palmah had to leave the port of Bremerhaven without cargo; see 70 Marine-Rundschau 47 (1973).

²⁹ Sharma, Cf. P., The Indo-Pakistan Maritime Conflict, 1965: A Legal Appraisal (Bombay, 1970)Google Scholar.

³⁰ Gazette of Pakistan Extraordinaire of Sept. 9, 1965.

³¹ The All Pakistan Legal Decisions 1965, at 575.

³² Ibid., at 437. Schedule I on absolute contraband comprised:

“(a)
“(a) All kinds of arms, ammunitions and explosives, and all kinds of materials or appliances suitable for use in chemical, biological or atomic warfare; machines for the manufacture or repair of any of the foregoing; component parts thereof, articles necessary or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients used in their manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of such materials or ingredients.
(b)
(b) Fuel of all kinds; all contrivances for, or means of, transportation on land, in water or air, and machines used in their manufacture orrepair; component parts thereof; instruments, articles and animals necessary or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients used in their manufacture, articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of such materials or ingredients.
(c)
(c) All means of communication, tools, implements, instruments, equipment, maps, pictures, papers and other articles, machines, or documents necessary or convenient for carrying on hostile operations; articles necessary or convenient for their manufacture or use.
(d)
(d) Precious metals and objects made thereof, coin bullion, currency, evidence of debts, debentures, bonds, coupons, stocks and shares of any negotiable or marketable security; precious or semi-precious stones, jewels; also metal, materials, dies, plates, machinery, or other articles necessary or convenient for their production, manufacture.Schedule II on conditional contraband comprised “All kinds of food, foodstuffs, feed, forage and clothing and manufactured textile products; tobacco, articles and material necessary or convenient for their production, manufacture or use.”

³³ “In Supersession of the Proclamation as to Contraband of War, dated 9th September, 1965,” The All Pakistan Legal Decisions 1965, at 472.

³⁴ Published in Gazette of India Extraordinaire of Sept. 14, 1965, Part II, Section 3, Subsection (i).

³⁵ See 46 Int’l Leg. Mat. 472 (1970); 69 RGDIP 182 (1965).

³⁶ Ibid..

³⁷ P. Sharma, op. at. supra note 29, at 87.

³⁸ R. Ottmüller, op. at. supra note 8, at 186.

³⁹ The correct number of captured Pakistani vessels is not clear; it ranges from three to ten. See Palit, D. K., The Lightning Campaign, 150 (Salisbury, 1972)Google Scholar; Rohwer, J. , “Der indisch-pakistanische Konflikt 1971,” 71 Marine-Rundschau 7 (1974)Google Scholar; Kaul, R., “The Indo-Pakistani War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean,” 99 U.S. Naval Inst. Proc. 172 (May 1973)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ D. K. Palit, supra, at 150;J. Rohwer, 71 Marine-Rundschau 7 (1974); Kaul, R., 99 U.S. Naval Inst. Proc. 172 (May 1973)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ D. Κ. Palit, op. cit. supra note 39, at 149.

⁴² Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Dec. 17, 1971, reprinted in The All Pakistan Decisions 5, Vol. XXIV, at 1 13 (1972).

⁴³ Printed in R. Ottmüller, op. cit. supra note 8, at 275. In the introduction India declared:

1.
1. Whereas the security of India is threatened by aggression of Pakistan and by the armed conflict initiated by it … whereas it is necessary to specify the articles, which are intended to be treated as contraband of war.
2.
2. Now, therefore, the Government of India declares that during the continuance of this armed conflict or until the Government of India do give further public notice, the articles in schedule hereto shall be treated as contraband of war.
3.
3. The Government of India reserves the right to add, to delete, to modify the schedule as and when it finds necessary.”

⁴⁴ Circular Letter No. 59 — Int. of Dec. 15, 1971 concerning “Safety Measures to Be Taken by Neutral Ships in the Bay of Bengal.”

⁴⁵ Gazette of India, Dec. 16, 1971, Part II, section 1, at 671.

⁴⁶ D. K. Palit, op. at. supra note 39, at 149; J. Rohwer, 71 Marine-Rundschau 22 (1974).

⁴⁷ See inter alia Ch. Rousseau, 69 RGDIP 78, at 89 (1965): “il n’est pas facile de qualifier la situation qui a découlée de l’ouverture des hostilités entre les Etats.”

⁴⁸ Schindler, D., “Aspects contemporains de la neutralité,” 121 Receuil des Cours 223, 282 (1967 II)Google Scholar; Lauterpacht, E., “The Legal Irrelevance of the ’State of War’,” 62 Am. Soc. Int’l L. Proc. 58, 60 (1968)Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ R. Ottmüller, op. at. supra note 8, at 283.

⁵⁰ See, e.g., Christol, C. Q. /Davies, C. R., “Maritime Quarantine: The Naval Interdiction of Offensive Weapons and Associated Material to Cuba,” 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 525 (1963)CrossRef Google Scholar; Fenwick, C. G., “The Quarantine Against Cuba, Legal or Illegal?,” 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 588 (1963)CrossRef Google Scholar; Mallison, W. T., “Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine Interdiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law,” George Washington L. Rev. 335 (1962)Google Scholar.

⁵¹ The Korean conflict involved a formal blockade proclamation, but the primary naval campaign involved fishing boat interception: see Cagle, M. W. /Manson, F. A., The Sea War in Korea 281, 296 (Annapolis, 1957)Google Scholar. The Falklands/ Malvinas conflict took place in one of the less travelled sea areas, and all attacks on merchantmen involved ships integrated into the war-fighting or war-sustaining effort except Argentina’s attack on the S.S. Hercules; see Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y., 1986).

⁵² Lucchini, Cf. L., “Actes de contrainte exercés par la France en Haute Mer au cours des opérations en Algérie,” Annuaire Français de Droit International 803–22 (1966)Google Scholar.

⁵³ O’Connell, D. P., 44 BYIL 36 (1970)Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Décret 56/274, Journal Officiel of Mar. 19, 1956 al 2665.

⁵⁵ E.g., the German vessel Bilbao and the Bulgarian Chipka in the English Channel, the German Las Palmas twenty-two nautical miles south of Cape Vicent, the German Archsum fifty-four nautical miles east of Gibraltar.

⁵⁶ That was the case with regard to the German vessels Helga Böge, Alcyone, Weissensee, and A C. Rickmers; see R. Ottmüller, op. cit. supra note 8, at 135.

⁵⁷ That was the case with regard to the Polish vessel Monte Cassino and the Italian vessel Baizar, see Annuaire Français de Droit International, 1962, at 921.

⁵⁸ That was the case with regard to the German vessel Morsum, the British Athos II and the Dutch Bjess Bosch.

⁵⁹ Ottmüller, op. cit. supra note 8, at 137.

⁶⁰ With regard to the Yugoslav vessel Slovenija, French Foreign Minister Pineau declared in January 1958: “Il y a aucune commune mesure entre les prejudice subi par lajugoslavie, de fait de l’arraisonnement d’un navire, et celui qui eût subi la France, si lesdites armes avaient été dirigés contre nos soldats.”

⁶¹ E.g., in the case of the German vessel Helga Böge.

⁶² O’Connell, D. P., 44 BML 30 (1970)Google Scholar.

⁶³ Printed in 4 Int’l. Leg. Mat. 461 (1965).

⁶⁴ For an overview of U.S. measures in North Vietnamese waters, see Swayze, F. B., “Traditional Principles of Blockade in Modern Practice: United States Mining of Internal and Territorial Waters of North Vietnam,” 29 JAG Journal 143–73 (1977)Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ O’Connell, D. P., The Influence of Law on Sea Power 177 (Manchester, 1975)Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ O’Connell, D. P., 44 BYIL 33 (1970)Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ With regard to exclusion zones in the Gulf, see the study by Fenrick, W.J., “The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of Naval Warfare,” XXIV Canadian Yearbook of International Law 91, 116 (1986)Google Scholar; also Leckow, R., “The Iran-Iraq Conflict in the Gulf: The Law of War Zones,” 37 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 629–44 (1988)CrossRef Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ UN Doc. S/14637.

⁶⁹ Report of the Security Council, June 16, 1981 —June 15, 1982, UN GA Off. Rec: Thirty-Seventh Session, Supp. No. 2 (A/37/2), at 69, para. 902.

⁷⁰ On July 23, 1985, Tehran had issued a statement that the Iranian Navy would, in accordance with International Maritime Law, confiscate any cargo destined for the Iraqi regime.

⁷¹ UN Doc. S/17482.

⁷² Letter of Sept. 25, 1985, UN Doc. S/17496.

⁷³ On Oct. 8, 1985, Iran was reported to have detained cargo destined to the UAE consisting inter alia of electronic equipment. On Oct. 10, 1985, the German vessel Ville d’Aurore was stopped on its journey from Oman to Dubai. In Nov. 1985, again a German and a Kuwaiti vessel were stopped by Iranian forces. In Jan. 1986, the search of a U.S. ship and a British ship was reported.

⁷⁴ On Jan. 2, 1986, the Danish vessel Homeland, and on Jan. 12, 1986 the U.S. ship President Tailor and seven further neutral merchant vessels; cf. Ch. Rousseau, , “Chronique,” 90 RGDIP 678 (1986).Google Scholar For an overview of Iranian and Iraqi actions taken against neutral merchant vessels, see House of Commons, Third Special Report from the Defence Committee (Session 1986–87) The Protection of British Merchant Shipping in the Persian Gulf (Report and Memoranda, London 1987).

⁷⁵ See Gioia, A. and Ronzini, N., “The Law of Neutrality: Third States’ Commercial Rights and Duties,” in I. F. Dekker and H. H. G. Post (eds.), The Gulf War of 1980–1988, at 231 (Dordrecht/Boston/London Google Scholar, 1992).

⁷⁶ With regard to the British position that the exercise of the right of visit and search is lawful only if it constitutes an act of self-defence under Art. 51 of the UN Charter, see infra notes 147 ff. and accompanying text.

⁷⁷ E.g., the protest by the USSR with regard to Iranian measures taken against the Soviet tankers Piotr Yemisov and Tutov on Sept. 2 and 3, 1986; cf. Rousseau, Ch., “Chronique,” 91 RGDIP 139 (1987)Google Scholar. For further examples of the reactions of flag states, see A. Gioia and N. Ronzitti, op. cit. supra note 75, at 226.

⁷⁸ Rousseau, Ch., “Chronique,” 90 RGDIP 233 (1986)Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ Rousseau, Ch., “Chronique,” 91 RGDIP 139 (1987)Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ Department of Defense, A Report to the Congress on Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf (June 15, 1987), ii (Report by the Secretary of Defense, C. Weinberger).

⁸¹ See, inter alia, 87 Dept. of State Bull. 87 (June 1987); ibid., 60 (July 1987); ibid., 78 (Aug. 1987); ibid., 42 (Oct. 1987). See also A. Gioia and N. Ronzitti, supra note 75, at 240.

⁸² SCOR, Doc. S/PV 2546, June 1, 1984.

⁸³ The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (Washington, D.C., 1989) [hereinafter NWP 9].

⁸⁴ Canadian Forces, Law of Armed Conflict Manual (Second Draft) [hereinafter Canadian Draft Manual].

⁸⁵ Humanitäres Völkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten: Handbuch, ZDv 15/2 (Bonn, Aug. 1992) [hereinafter ZDv 15/2].

⁸⁶ “All vessels operating under an enemy flag and all aircraft bearing enemy markings possess enemy character. However, the fact that a merchant vessel flies a neutral flag or that an aircraft bears neutral markings does not necessarily establish neutral character. Any merchant vessel or aircraft owned or controlled by or for an enemy Slate, enemy persons, or any enemy corporation possesses enemy character, regardless of whether or not such a vessel or aircraft operates under a neutral flag or bears neutral markings.”

⁸⁷ “In principle, the enemy character of a merchant vessel is determined by the flag the ship is entitled to fly.”

⁸⁸ See ZDv 15/2, para. 1027.

⁸⁹ If neutral merchant vessels and aircraft take a direct part in the hostilities on the side of the adversary or if they act in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to the enemy’s armed forces according to NWP 9, section 7.5.1, they acquire the character of an enemy warship or military aircraft. The same applies according to the Canadian Draft Manual, section 717, para. 4.

⁹⁰ ZDv 15/2, para. 1027.

⁹¹ See Part I of this study in XXIX Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 288 (1991).

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Canadian Draft Manual, section 720; ZDv 15/2, paras. 1014, 1 140; NWP 9, section 7.6.

⁹⁴ Ibid., section 720, para, a.e.; NWP 9, section 7.6.1, para. 5.

⁹⁵ Ibid., section 720, para. 2.C.; NWP 9, section 7.6.1, para. 3.

⁹⁶ Ibid., section 716, para. 3.a.; NWP 9, section 8.2.2.2; ZDv 15/2, para. 1025.

⁹⁷ Ibid., section 717, para, i.e.; NWP 9, section 7.9.

⁹⁸ Section 7.4.2.

⁹⁹ Section 720, para. a.f. (10).

¹⁰⁰ Para. 1141.

¹⁰¹ NWP 9, section 7.4.2.

¹⁰² In principle, the term “merchant vessel” also applies to other seagoing private vessels, such as yachts and pleasure boats.

¹⁰³ Canadian Draft Manual, section 716, para. 1; NWP 9, section 8.2.2.1; ZDv 15/2, para. 1023. The same applies to enemy warships and military aircraft, since they are “classical” military objectives.

¹⁰⁴ NWP 9, section 8.2.2.1.

¹⁰⁵ Canadian Draft Manual, section 716, paras. 3, 4, and 5; NWP 9, section 8.2.8.2; ZDv 15/2, para. 1025. If they are military objectives, they may be attacked and sunk like enemy warships.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., section 716, para. 2; NWP 9, section 8.2.2.1; ZDv 15/2, para. 1026.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., section 723, para. 3; ZDv 15/2, para. 1028.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., section 718; NWP 9, section 8.2.3; ZDv 15/2 paras. 1034 ff. and 1054 ff.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² NWP 9, section 8.2.3, footnote 63; ZDv 15/2, para. 1035.

¹¹³ Ibid, para. 6.

¹¹⁴ ZDv 15/2, para. 1036.

¹¹⁵ Canadian Draft Manual, section 721, para. 6; NWP 9, section 7.4.1.2.

¹¹⁶ ZDv 15/2, para. 1031.

¹¹⁷ NWP 9, section 7.4.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., section 7.9.

¹¹⁹ Canadian Draft Manual, section 717, para. 4; NWP 9, section 7.5.1. It may be added that, according to the Canadian Draft Manual, the same applies if they “actively resist visit and search or capture; refuse to stop upon being duly summoned; or sail under convoy of enemy warships or military aircraft.”

¹²⁰ NWP 9, section 7.9.1. See also Canadian Draft Manual, section 717, paras. 2 and 3; ZDv 15/2, para. 1148.

¹²¹ Ibid., section 7.4; ZDv 15/2, para. 1109.

¹²² Canadian Draft Manual, section 721, para. 1; NWP 9, section 7.4.1 ; ZDv 15/2, para. 1143.

¹²³ Canadian Draft Manual, section 721, para. 2.

¹²⁴ Canadian Draft Manual, section 721, paras. 3 and 4; NWP 9, section 7.4.1.1.

¹²⁵ NWT 9, section 7.4.1.1.

¹²⁶ For this reason the German Manual, in para. 1031, exempts certain articles that are not protected under the provisions of NWP 9 and of the Canadian Draft Manual.

¹²⁷ Greenwood, Ch., “Self-defence and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict,” in Dinstein, Y. and Tabory, M. (eds.), International Law at a Time of Perplexity 273 (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1988)Google Scholar; Lagoni, R., “Gewaltverbot, Seekriegsrecht und Schiffahrtsfreiheit im Golfkrieg,” in Fürst, W., Herzog, R., and Urnbach, D. C. (eds.), Festschrift für Wolfgang Zeidler, Vol. 2, 1833 (Berlin/ New York, 1987)Google Scholar; Ronzitti, N., “The Crisis of the Traditional Law Regulating International Armed Conflicts at Sea and the Need for its Revision,” in Ronzitti, N. (ed.), The Law of Naval Warfare 1 (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1988)Google Scholar.

¹²⁸ Bothe, M., “Neutrality in Naval Warfare: What is Left of Traditional International Law?” in Delissen, A.J. M. and Tanja, G.J. (eds.), Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead 392 (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1991)Google Scholar; Ronzitti, N., “The Crisis of the Traditional Law Regulating International Armed Conflicts at Sea and the Need for Its Revision,” in Ronzitti, N. (ed.), op. cit. supra note 127, at 1.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ That position is taken by Fenwick, C. G., International law, 727 (4th ed., New York, 1965)Google Scholar; see also Fenwick, C. G., “The Old Order Changeth, Yielding Place to New,” 47 Am.J. Int’l L. 84 (1953)CrossRef Google Scholar; Gleichenstein, M. v., Das Verhältnis des neutralen Mitgliedstaates zur Organisation der Vereinten Nationen, dargestellt am ßäspiel der Schweiz 63 (Hamburg, 1952)Google Scholar. For further references, see Bindschedler, R. L., “Frieden, Krieg und Neutralität im Völkerrecht der Gegenwart,” in Festschrift für W. Wengler, Vol 1, at 27, 31 (Berlin, 1973)Google Scholar.

¹³⁰ See Heintschel, W. v. Heinegg, , “Kriegsentschädigung, Reparation oder Schadenersatz?: Die möglichen Forderungen an den Irak nach Beendigung des Golf-Kriegs,” 90 Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 113 (1991)Google Scholar; Berber, F., lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, Vol. II, at 238 (Munich, 1969)Google Scholar.

¹³¹ Goodrich, L. M., Hambro, E., and Simons, A. P., Charter of the United Nations 300 (New York/London, 1969)Google Scholar; Frowein, J. A., “Commentary on art. 42,” in Simma, B. (ed.), Charta der Vereinten Nationen: Kommentar 588 (Munich, 1991)Google Scholar.

¹³² Fischer, H. and Heintschel, W. v. Heinegg, , “Kein Mitgliedstaat der UN kann im Golfkrieg ’neutral’ sein,” BO-FAX Nr. 10 (Jan. 31, 1991)Google Scholar.

¹³³ E.g., Iran declared its neutrality and decided to observe certain traditional neutral obligations such as retaining Iraqi soldiers and aircraft.

¹³⁴ This is, e.g., also acknowledged by Ch. Greenwood, op. at. supra note 127, at 274; and by M. Bothe, op. cit. supra note 128, at 392.

¹³⁵ Ch. Greenwood op. cit. supra note 127; R. Lagoni, op. cit. supra note 127; N. Ronzitti, op. cit. supra note 127; M. Bothe, op. cit. supra note 128.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ N. Ronzitti, op. cit. supra note 127, at 4.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ See Part I of this study in XXIX Canadian Yearbook of International Law [hereinafter Yearbook], at 304 (1991). See also Annex AS7-3 to the Annotated Supplement to The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (NWP 9 (REV.A)/FMFM 1–10: “OPNAVINST 3120.328 Standard Organization and Regulations of the U.S. Navy"; Annex AS/-4: “Instructions for PrizeMasters, Naval Prize Commissioners and Special Naval Prize Commissioners” and Annex AS/-5: United States Prize Statutes, 10 U.S. Code, Chap. 655 (1982).

¹⁴⁰ See Part I of this study in Vol. XXIX of this Yearbook at 304 ff. (1991).

¹⁴¹ To this effect, see Lauterpacht, H., “Rules of Warfare in an Unlawful War,” in Lipsky, G. A. (ed.), Law and Politics in the World Community 89, 104 (Berkeley/ Los Angeles, 1953)Google Scholar.

¹⁴² See Part I of this study in Vol. XXIX of this Yearbook at 304 ( îggi ), and supra notes 102 ff. and accompanying text.

¹⁴³ Goldie, L. F. E., “Excursus” (unpublished paper); see also Dinstein, Y., Isr.YBHR 40 (1980)Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁴ Ch. Greenwood, op. cit. supra note 127, at 283; R. Lagoni, op. cit. supra note 127, at 1843; N. Ronzitti, op. cit. supra note 127, at 7.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ N. Ronzitti, op. cit. supra note 127, at 10. See also M. Bothe, op. cit. supra note 128, at 393.

¹⁴⁷ Printed in House of Commons, Third Special Report from the Defence Committee (Session 1986–87), supra note 74 at 91–92.

¹⁴⁸ Statement by the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Jan. 28, 1986, House of Commons Debates, Vol. 90, col. 426; reprinted in 57 BYIL 583 (1986).

¹⁴⁹ Of course, as one author has put it, the effectiveness of the law of neutrality to a great extent depends on the neutrals’ abilitities to enforce that law: see Norton, P. M., “Between the Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow of the Law of Neutrality,” 17 Harv. Int’l L.J. 249, 276 (1976)Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁰ See section B of this article, infra.

¹⁵¹ The position taken here is that freedom of navigation is of importance only with regard to neutral shipping. In the case of enemy shipping, it plays no decisive role.

¹⁵² See inter alia Y. Dinstein, Isr.YBHR 40 (1980).

¹⁵³ See Part I of this study in Vol. XXIX of this Yearbook at 296 (1991).

¹⁵⁴ UN Doc. A/CONF.13/L.53.

¹⁵⁵ UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122.

¹⁵⁶ See inter alia Gloria, Ch., “Internationales öffentliches Seerecht,” in Ipsen, K. , Völkerrecht, § 49 Rn. 4 ff. (3d ed., Munich, 1990)Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁷ Fenrick, W. S., “Legal Aspects of the Falklands Naval Conflict,” RDPMDG 243 (1985)Google Scholar; R. Ottmüller, op. cit. supra note 8, at 35; R. Lagoni, op. cit. supra note 127, at 1835.

¹⁵⁸ See inter alia Dinstein, Y., Isr.YBHR 40 (1980)Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁹ This follows from the 1856 Paris Declaration, Hague Convention XIII, and the 1909 London Declaration.

¹⁶⁰ According to Boczek, B. A., Flags of Convenience: An International Inegal Study 2 (Cambridge, Ma, 1982)Google Scholar, “functionally, a ‘flag of convenience’ can be defined as the flag of any country allowing the registration of foreign-owned and foreign-controlled vessels under conditions which, for whatever reasons, are convenient and opportune for the persons who are registering the vessel.”

¹⁶¹ Today about one quarter of the total merchant shipping is flying the flags of Panama and of Liberia.

¹⁶² Dinstein, Y., Isr.YBHR 40 (1980)Google Scholar.

¹⁶³ See supra notes 86 ff. and accompanying text.

¹⁶⁴ E.g., A. Gioia and N. Ronzitti, op. cit. supra note 75, at 221.

¹⁶⁵ Danziger, Cf. R., “The Persian Gulf Tanker War,” 111 U.S. Naval Inst. Proc. 160 (May, 1985)Google Scholar; see also the Conference Report on “The Persian/Arabian Gulf Tanker War: International Law or International Chaos,” 19 Ocean Development and Int’l L. 299–321 (1988).

¹⁶⁶ E.g., Res. 540 (1983) of Oct. 31, 1983.

¹⁶⁷ Sofaer, A. D., “Complied with U.S. Laws,” New York Times, Aug. 16, 1987.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ In this respect, see McConnell, M. L., “Darkening Confusion Mounted Upon Darkening Confusion: The Search for the Elusive Genuine Link,” 16 J. of Maritime L. and Com. 365 (1985)Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁹ Nordquist, M. H. and Wachenfeld, M. G., “Legal Aspects of Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers and Laying of Mines in the Persian Gulf,” 31 GYIL 138, 139 (1988)Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 151.

¹⁷¹ U.S. Dept. of State, Current Policy No. 958, International Shipping and the Iran-Iraq War (May 17, 1987), at 2.

¹⁷² Advice by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to British Shipping, printed in House of Commons, Third Special Report from the Defence Committee (Session 1986–87), supra note 74 at 91–92.

¹⁷³ 87 Dept. of State Bull. 60 (July 1987); ibid., 42 (Oct. 1987); 88 Dept. of State Bull. 44 (June 1988); see also A. Gioia and N. Ronzitti, op. cit. supra note 75, at 233.

¹⁷⁴ North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. Rep. 42, para. 73.

¹⁷⁵ Such a position is taken by Bothe, M., “Neutrality at Sea,” in Dekker, I.F. and Post, H.H.G. (eds.), op. cit. supra note 75, at 205, 210.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ M. Bothe, op. cit. supra note 128, at 389.

¹⁷⁸ Partsch, K.J., “Armed Conflict,” in Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Instalment 3, at 27 (1982)Google Scholar [hereafter EPIL].

¹⁷⁹ Proponents of the latter position are: Tucker, R. W. The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea 199 (Washington, D.C., 1957)Google Scholar; Delbez, L., “La notion juridique de guerre,” 57 RGDIP 177–209 (1953)Google Scholar; Lauterpacht, E. , 62 Am. Soc. Int’l L. Proc. 58 (1968)Google Scholar; Castrén, E., The Present Irne of War and Neutrality 31 (Helsinki, 1954)Google Scholar; Kussbach, E., “Neutral Trading,” EPIL 4, at 9 (1982)Google Scholar; Meng, W., “War,” EPIL 4, at 290 (1982)Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁰ In numerous instances, parties to a conflict wanted to avoid the conflict being designated “war” in the legal sense in order to avoid certain legal (or political) restraints.

¹⁸¹ See, e.g., Bindschedler, R. L., “Neutrality, Concept and General Rules,” EPIL 4, at 10 (1982)Google Scholar; Kussbach, E., “L’évolution de la notion de neutralité dans les conflits armés,” 17 Military L. and L. of War Rev. 26 (1979)Google Scholar.

¹⁸² F. Grob in 1949 had furnished ample proof for the non-existence of a “state of war” in the legal sense: see Grob, F., The Relativity of War and Peace 179 (New Haven, 1949)Google Scholar.

¹⁸³ See inter alia Bindschedler, R. L., EPIL 4, at 13 (1982)Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁴ Arts. 2 (c), 9 (2), 19, 31, 39, 64.

¹⁸⁵ M. Bothe, op. cit. supra note 128, at 390.

¹⁸⁶ Meyrowitz, H., “Le protocole additionel I aux Conventions de Genève de 1949 et le droit de la guerre maritime,” 89 RGDIP 243 (1985)Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁷ Rauch, E., The Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Repercussions on the Law of Naval Warfare 57 (Berlin, 1984)Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁸ Bothe, M., “Commentary on the 1977 Geneva Protocol I,” in Ronzitti, N. (ed.), op. cit. supra note 127, at 761.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁹ For an overview, see M. Bothc, ibid., 760. See also the commentaries and preliminary results of the Round-Table of Experts on International Humanitarian Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea held in Bochum (FRG) in 1989, in Heintschel, W. v. Heinegg, von (ed.), The Military Objective and the Principle of Distinction in the Law of Naval Warfare (Bochum, 1991)Google Scholar. The three manuals under scrutiny here also acknowledge the customary character of the definition of military objectives and its validity for the law of naval warfare: see NWP 9, section 8.1.1; Canadian Draft Manual, section 714; ZDv 15/2, para. 1017.

¹⁹⁰ Supra notes 1 to ff. and accompanying text.

¹⁹¹ See M. Bothe, in N. Ronzitti (ed.), op. cit. supra note 127, at 763.

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Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare: Part II, Developments since 1945

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