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Private Rights, the Use of Maps, State Responsibility, and Other Issues in the International Court of Justice’s Boundary Jurisprudence: 2000-10

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez
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Summary

Boundary disputes constitute one of the most delicate issues for states, such that it is not surprising that frontier issues are among the most recurrent before the International Court of Justice (IC J) and have given rise to a rich jurisprudence. This jurisprudence comprises traditional areas: consent in boundary treaties, the principle of uti possidetis juris, the notion of effectivités, and maritime delimitation. However, it also includes other topics that usually receive less attention, but which are nonetheless important to states and sometimes underlie their significant interest in boundary disputes. This article deals with such topics in order to show how the IC J has handled them in its boundary jurisprudence of the first decade of the new millennium. The author discusses IC J decisions addressing types of territory that cannot be appropriated, terra nullius, private rights, state succession, unilateral donations as sources of title to territory, irrelevant criteria in establishing title to territory (particularly historical consolidation), the use of maps, and state responsibility in connection with boundary disputes.

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Articles
Information
Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 49 , 2012 , pp. 177 - 211
Copyright
Copyright © The Canadian Council on International Law / Conseil Canadien de Droit International, representing the Board of Editors, Canadian Yearbook of International Law / Comité de Rédaction, Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 2012

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Footnotes

Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, LL.D., School of International Development and Global Studies, University of Ottawa. This article forms part of a series of articles dealing with the International Court of Justice’s boundary jurisprudence from 2000 to 2010, including Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, “Boundary Treaties in the International Court of Justice’s Jurisprudence: 2000-2010” (2012) 23 EJIL 495; and Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, “The International Court of Justice’s Use of the Vienna Convention in the Interpretation of Boundary Agreements: 2000-2010” (2012) 3 J Int’l Dispute Settlement 409.

References

1 Atwood, Margaret Moral Disorder and Other Stories (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2006) at 131.Google Scholar

2 Although some scholars seem to make a distinction between boundary and territorial disputes (eg, Shaw, Malcolm N “The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today” (1996) 67: 1 Brit YB Int’l L 77 at 79)Google Scholar, this article uses the term “boundary disputes” as comprising territorial disputes. As the chamber of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali), [1986] ICJ Rep 554 at 563 [Burkina Faso/Mali], “the effect of anyjudicial decision rendered either in a dispute as to attribution of territory or in a delimitation dispute is necessarily to establish a frontier.”

3 This article includes a judgment of a chamber of the Court as part of the case law. Although it seems that this ruling cannot be formally equated with those rendered by the full Court, the judgment is relevant for this article’s purposes. The reasons are twofold. First, as Judge Oda once stated, “the chamber is a component of the Court, bound by its Statute and Rules” (see Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras), Constitution of Chamber, Order of 8 May 1987, [1987] ICJ Rep 10 at 13). And, second, the Court draws no distinction between its judgments and those of chambers when providingjustifications for its legal reasoning.

4 The Chamber of the Court in Frontier Dispute (Benin v Niger) noted the principle of uti possidetis juris as defined in Burkina Faso/Mali, supra note 2 at 566: “[I]ts essence lies’ in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved,’ including former administrative delimitations established during the colonial period that became international frontiers.” See Frontier Dispute (Benin v Niger), [2005] ICJ Rep 90 at 108 [Benin/Niger].

5 In Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras), the ICJ affirmed the long-standing definition of the elements of effectivités articulated by the Permanent Court of International Justice: “A sovereign title may be inferred from the effective exercise of powers appertaining to the authority of the State over a given territory. To sustain a claim of sovereignty on that basis, a number of conditions must be proven conclusively. As described by the Permanent Court of International Justice, ‘a claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title such as a treaty of accession but merely upon continued display of authority, involves two elements each of which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority.’” Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, Judgment, 1933, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 53, pp. 45–46). See Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras), [2007] ICJ Rep 659 at 712 [Nicaragua/Honduras].

6 See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar vBahrain), [2001] ICJ Rep 40 [Qatar/Bahrain]. For assessments of thisjudgment, see Plant, Glen “International Decisions” (2002) 96: 1 AJIL 198 10.2307/2686136CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Evans, Malcolm D “Decisions of International Tribunals: The International Court ofJustice” (2002) 51:03 ICLQ 709 10.1093/iclq/51.3.709CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tanaka, Yoshifumi “Reflections on Maritime Delimitation in the Qatar/Bahrain Case” (2003) 52:1 ICLQ 53 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Emmanuel Decaux, “Affaire de la Délimitation maritime et des questions territoriales entre Qatar at Bahreïn, Fond (arrêt du 16 mars 2001 Qatar c Bahreïn)” (2001) 47 AFDI 177.

7 For an analysis of the ICJ’s pronouncements regarding this topic, see Tanaka, supra note 6 at 71.

8 See Qatar/Bahrain, supra note 6 at 101–2.

9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, Article 13(1).

10 See Qatar/Bahrain, supra note 6 at 100.

11 See ibid.

12 See ibid at 102. This holding was ratified by the ICJ in Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 92.

13 See Qatar/Bahrain, supra note 6 at 102. The impact of this conclusion on this dispute was that Fasht ad Dibal, which was located within the territorial seas of either Qatar or Bahrain, was not taken into account by the ICJ when it drew the equidistance line to construct the single maritime boundary between the two states. See ibid at 102–3. See further in this regard Plant, supra note 6 at 202. The Court ultimately concluded that Qatar had sovereignty over Fasht ad Dibal as it fell on its side of the single maritime boundary thus drawn. See Qatar/Bahrain, supra note 6 at 117. For an analysis of the Court’s decision on this point, see Decaux, supra note 6 at 230–33.

14 For instance, the 1978 Torres Strait Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea in Regard to Low-Tide Elevations as Part of the Seabed, 18 December 1978, 18 ILM 291 (1979). See Tanaka, supra note 6 at 73.

15 See Qatar/Bahrain, supra note 6 at 101. The ICJ thus followed its previous case law, specifically The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v United Kingdom), [1953] ICJ Rep 47, and the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), [1992] ICJ Rep 351, in which it had recognized that certain kinds of territory could not be appropriated. See Tanaka, supra note 6 at 73. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the ICJ affirmed these findings in its judgment in Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v Singapore), [2008] ICJ Rep 12 at 100–1 [Malaysia/Singapore], regarding another low-tide elevation named South Ledge.

16 The core of the controversy was the determination of a single maritime boundary between the parties in the Caribbean Sea as well as sovereignty over some islands in the disputed area, namely Bobel Cay, South Cay, Savanna Cay, Port Royal Cay, and other rocks, banks, and reefs. See Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 685. The ICJ could not determine sovereignty over the islands on the basis of uti possidetis juris, but it ruled in favour of Honduras on the sovereignty issue on the basis of its effectivités (at 721). For an assessment of this judgment, see Lathrop, Coalter G “International Decisions” (2008) 102:1 AJIL 113 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kirk, Elizabeth A “Decisions of International Courts and Tribunals” (2008) 57:3 ICLQ 701.10.1017/S0020589308000547CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 704.

18 See Affaire des frontières colombo-vénézuéliennes (Colombie c Vénézuéla), (1922) I RIAA 223 at 228, as quoted by the Court in Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 701. It is important to mention that the significance of this finding is not diminished by the fact that both parties to this dispute had agreed that the islands were not terra nullius at the time of independence (at 687). It is not for parties, but for the Court, to make the final determination in this regard.

19 See Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 708.

20 See Malaysia/Singapore, supra note 15 at 100–1. The parties agreed to submit to the ICJ their dispute related to sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge. The Court found that title to Pedra Branca belonged to Malaysia but that it had been transferred to Singapore due to the latter’s effectivités and the former’s acquiescence, as evidenced by Malaysia’s actions, unilateral statements recognizing Singapore as the titleholder, and, of paramount importance, Malaysia’s omissions and lack of any act of sovereignty over the island for decades (at 95-96). The Court also ruled that Middle Rocks belonged to Malaysia (at 99) and that South Ledge belonged to the state in whose territorial waters it was located (at 101). For evaluations of this decision, see Lathrop, Coalter G “International Decisions” (2008) 102:4 AJIL 828 10.2307/20456682CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cleméntine Bories, “L’arret de la Cour internationale de Justice du 23 mai 2008 dans l’affaire Souveraineté sur Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks et South Ledge (Malaisie/Singapour)” (2008) 54 AFDI 227.

21 See Malaysia/Singapore, supra note 15 at 35.

22 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v Malaysia), [2002] ICJ Rep 625 at 634 [Indonesia/Malaysia]. Ligitan is a very small island, with just a few trees and not permanently inhabited. Sipadan is also small but is densely wooded, and it has been a tourist resort since the 1980s (at 4). Indonesia claimed that it had sovereignty over the two islands by virtue of a 1981 convention between the Netherlands and Great Britain, on the basis of effectivités carried out by both the Netherlands and Indonesia and as successor of the Sultan of Bulungan, who previously had authority over the islands. Malaysia, for its part, argued that its sovereignty existed by virtue of its being the last link in a chain of transfers of title (which included Spain, the United States, and the United Kingdom) from the original sovereign, the Sultan of Sulu. The ICJ, however, held that the treaty the parties were relying on did not establish sovereignty over the islands and that title did not pass to any of the parties as successors (at 678). The Court then relied on effectivités and concluded that the islands belonged to Malaysia (at 686). For an analysis of this judgment, see Perri, Delphine “Titre conventionnel et effectivités: L’affaire de la Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan at Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie c Malaisie)” (2002) 48 AFDI 322.10.3406/afdi.2002.3704CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 See Indonesia/Malaysia, supra note 22 at 674–75.

24 Ibid at 675.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid at 676.

28 Ibid at 677.

29 Ibid at 669, 678.

30 Ibid at 678.

31 Ibid at 686.

32 See Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), [2009] ICJ Rep 213 at 265 [CostaRica/Nicaragua]. For commentary on this judgment, see Bjorge, Eirik “Current Developments: International Courts and Tribunals” (2011) 60:1 ICLQ 271.10.1017/S0020589310000758CrossRefGoogle Scholar

33 See Costa Rica/Nicaragua, supra note 32 at 244. 1858 Treaty of Limits, 15 April 1858, reproduced in Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), written submissions of Costa Rica, 29 September 2005, at 221.

34 Costa Rica/Nicaragua, supra note 32 at 245.

35 Ibid at 226.

36 Ibid at 246. Judge ad hoc Guillaume considered that there was no basis in the treaty for the non-commercial navigational right the ICJ declared to exist for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the San Juan River. See Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Declaration of Judge ad hoc Guillaume, [2009] ICJ Rep 290 at 300. This view is supported by Sarah Cassella, who also considers that this right was created by the Court for equity reasons (ex aequo et bono). See Cassella, Sarah “Rééquilibrer les effets inéquitables d’une délimitation territoriale: l’arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice du 13 juillet 2009 dans l’affaire du Différend relatif à des droits de navigation et des droits connexes (Costa Rica c Nicaragua)” (2009) 55 AFDI 253 at 266 10.3406/afdi.2009.4071CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Finally, Coalter Lathrop deems that this holding of the Court may well mean that riparian rights may well become part of customary international law related to the navigational uses of international boundary waters. See Lathrop, Coalter G “International Decisions” (2010) 104 AJIL 454 at 459.10.5305/amerjintelaw.104.3.0454CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37 See Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), [2002] ICJ Rep 303 [Cameroon/Nigeria]. The main point of contention in this case, for the purpose of this article, was sovereignty over the Bakassi peninsula and a parcel in the area of Lake Chad that included thirty-three villages. The ICJ was also called on to determine the course of the maritime boundary between the two countries. The case had a significant natural resource dimension, given the oil concessions granted by both parties. The judgment left the concessions mostly untouched. The Court’s judgment was severely criticized by Nigeria, which was disappointed with the outcome, in particular, the Court’s conclusion that the Bakassi peninsula belonged to Cameroon, since this was the most important issue between the parties. The intervention of the UN Secretary General was requested by the parties to implement the decision. For assessments of thisjudgment, see Crook, John H “The 2002 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice” (2003) 97:2 AJIL 352 at 354 10.2307/3100112CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wbekker, John H “International Decisions” (2003) 97:2 AJIL 387 10.2307/3100114Google Scholar; Merrills, JG “Decisions of International Tribunals: International Court ofJustice” (2003) 52:3 ICLQ 775 at 788 10.1093/iclq/52.3.775Google Scholar; D’Argent, Pierre “Des frontières et des peuples: l’affaire de la Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria, arrêt sur le fond ” (2002) 48 AFDI 281 10.3406/afdi.2002.3703CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an additional evaluation of thejudgment from the perspective of counsel for Cameroon, see Mendelson, Maurice “The Cameroon – Nigeria Case in the International Court ofJustice: Some Territorial Sovereignty and Boundary Delimitation Issues” (2004) 75:1 Brit YB Int’l L 223.Google Scholar

38 Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37 at 452.

39 Ibid at 455.

40 Ibid at 451–52.

41 Both parties, which had formerly been part of French West Africa, requested that the ICJ form a Chamber to adjudicate their dispute related to the course of their boundary in the Niger River sector and in the Mekrou River sector, as well as with respect to sovereignty over the islands in the river, particularly Lété Island. The island was one of the most complex issues of the controversy and had been in dispute for decades. See Benin/Niger, supra note 4 at 107. The Chamber stated that no party had legal title on the basis of the principle of uti possidetis juris and decided the case on the basis of effectivités (at 127). The Chamber declared that the boundary between the parties followed the main navigable channel of the Niger River at the time of independence and that those islands that were to the right of the channel belonged to Benin and those on the left to Niger (at 133). While this conclusion granted the island of Lété to Niger, the Chamber ruled in favour of Benin regarding the course of the boundary in the region related to the River Mekrou (at 144, Sketch Map no 5, 148–49). For commentary on this judgment, see Mathias, Stephen “The 2005 Judicial Activity of the International Court ofJustice” (2006) 100:3 AJIL 629 at 634 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Allen, Stephen “Decisions of International Tribunals: International Court ofJustice” (2006) 55 ICLQ 729 10.1093/iclq/lei115Google Scholar; Norodom, Anne-Thida “L’arrêt de la Chambre de la Cour internationale de Justice dans l’affaire du Différend frontalier (Bénin/Niger) ” (2005) 51 AFDI 185.10.3406/afdi.2005.3879CrossRefGoogle Scholar

42 See Benin/Niger, supra note 4 at 140.

43 However, some authors have criticized the ICJ for not always fully taking into consideration the important human dimension of boundary disputes. According to Emmanuel Decaux, this was the case with the Court’s decision in Qatar/Bahrain, supra note 6. He says: “[L]a Cour semble s’être raccrochée à ce qui était pour elle le terrain le plus familier, plaquant une grille de lecture étatique sur les émirats du Golfe, en négligeant les réalités humaines qui ont longtemps marquée la région, comme la mobilité des groupes nomades et la non-appropriation des bien rares du désert ou des richesses de la mer.” See Decaux, supra note 6 at 211.

44 See Malaysia/Singapore, supra note 15 at 33.

45 Ibid at 35.

46 Ibid at 35–37.

47 Ibid at 37–38.

48 See Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37 at 402. 1913 Anglo-German Agreement, Treaty Series No. 13 (1913). United Kingdom Cd. 7056 (with maps).

49 See Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37 at 404.

50 Ibid at 405.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid at 406.

54 Ibid at 404.

55 Ibid at 404, 407. Judge Koroma, for instance, dissented as to this conclusion. In his view, a correct interpretation of the text of the treaty led to the conclusion that it had only a protective nature and involved neither cession nor transfer of territory. See the dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma (at 479–81).

56 See Indonesia/Malaysia, supra note 22 at 669–74.

57 Ibid at 674; see also 678.

58 Ibid.

59 See Mendelson, supra note 37 at 232–33.

60 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma in Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37.

61 See D’Argent, supra note 37 at 308.

62 See Malaysia/Singapore, supra note 15 at 47.

63 Ibid at 49.

64 See Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37 at 346.

65 Fisheries (United Kingdom v Norway), [1951] ICJ Rep 130 at 137.

66 Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37 at 352.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid at 352–54.

69 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma in Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37 at 485. As to the length of time required for historical consolidation, Judge Koroma held that this would depend on the particular facts of the case and on the area, and he suggested that shorter periods of time should be recognized in certain circumstances (ibid).

70 Ibid at 484–85.

71 See note 20 and accompanying text in this article.

72 Merrills, supra note 37 at 796.

73 Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v United States of America), (1928) II RIAA 829 at 855 [Island of Palmas].

74 Malaysia/Singapore, supra note 15 at 95–97.

75 Ibid at 95–96.

76 Malaysia/Singapore, supra note 15 at 99.

77 Bories, supra note 20 at 231.

78 For a previous assessment of the role of maps in boundary delimitations, see Akweenda, Sakeus “The Legal Significance of Maps in Boundary Questions: A Reappraisal with Particular Emphasis on Namibia” (1989) 60 Brit YB Int’l L 205.Google Scholar

79 Hyde, Charles Cheney “Maps as Evidence in International Boundary Disputes” (1933) 27 AJIL 311 at 311.10.2307/2189557CrossRefGoogle Scholar

80 Akweenda, supra note 78 at 206–11.

81 Ibid at 212–18.

82 Ibid at 219. For instance, the sole arbitrator in the Island of Timor case declared that a private map “could not be weighed in value with the two official maps signed by the commissioners or delegates of the two states.” See Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law, Arbitral Award Rendered in Execution of the Compromis Signed at the Hague, April 3, 1913 between the Netherlands and Portugal Concerning the Subject of the Boundary of a Part of Their Possessions in the Island of Timor” (1915) 9 AJIL 240 at 259.

83 For instance, in the Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v UK), Judge Carneiro stated in his individual opinion that the maps at issue in that dispute were not decisive in settling the legal question regarding territorial sovereignty. However, he pointed out that maps could be used as evidence showing that exercises of sovereignty were known. See The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France v United Kingdon), Individual Opinion of Judge Levi Carneiro, [1953] ICJ Rep 85 at 105. See also Akweenda, supra note 78 at 220.

84 Ibid at 211.

85 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v Thailand), [1962] ICJ Rep 6 [Preah Vihear].

86 Akweenda, supra note 78 at 223.

87 Preah Vihear, supra note 85 at 34. As to the claim of error, the ICJ held that “the plea of error cannot be allowed as an element vitiating consent if the party advancing it contributed by its own conduct to the error, or could have avoided it, or if the circumstances were such as to put that party on notice of a possible error” (at 26).

88 Akweenda, supra note 78 at 210.

89 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Article 31(3)(b) [VCLT].

90 Burkina Faso/Mali, supra note 2 at 586. It is important to mention that this finding of the Chamber took place in the context of the application of the uti possidetis juris principle, which had initially not yielded a boundary. See also Akweenda, supra note 78 at 225.

91 Indonesia/Malaysia, supra note 22 at 667. See also Benin/Niger, supra note 4 at 119–20; Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 723.

92 See Benin/Niger, supra note 4 at 119.

93 See Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 723 (reaffirming the ICJ’s previous holding in Burkina Faso/Mali, supra note 2 at 583.

94 See Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 722–33 (citing Honduras Borders ( Guatemala vHonduras), (1933) II RIAA 1307 at 1325).

95 See Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37 at 337–38.

96 Ibid at 345–46.

97 Ibid at 345. 1919 Milner-Simon Declaration, 10 July 1919, reproduced in Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), written submissions of Cameroon, 29 March 1994, at 318; 1931 Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes, 9 January 1931, reproduced in Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), written submissions of Cameroon, 29 March 1994, at 318.

98 Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37 at 383. Thomson-Marchand Declaration, 29 December 1929 and 31 January 1930, written submissions of Cameroon, 29 March 1994, at 318.

99 Indonesia/Malaysia, supra note 22 at 661–62.

100 Ibid at 662.

101 Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37 at 366–67.

102 Ibid at 367.

103 VCLT, supra note 89, Article 31(2).

104 Indonesia/Malaysia, supra note 22 at 648–49.

105 Ibid at 649.

106 Ibid at 650.

107 Ibid at 650–51; see also 663–64.

108 Ibid at 664.

109 Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37 at 358.

110 Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 718–19.

111 See Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia), Preliminary Objections, [2007] ICJ Rep 832 at 865–67 [Nicaragua/Colombia (Preliminary Objections)]. For an evaluation of this judgment, see Mathias, Stephen “Current Developments: The 2007 Judicial Activity of the International Court ofJustice” (2008) 102:3 AJIL 588 at 602 10.2307/20456647CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Treaty Concerning Territorial Questions at Issue between Colombia and Nicaragua, 24 March 1928, reproduced in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia) (Preliminary Objections), written submissions of Colombia, 21 July 2003, at 842; Protocol of Exchange of Ratifications, signed on 5 May 1930, reproduced in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia) (Preliminary Objections), written submissions of Colombia, 21 July 2003, at 843.

112 Nicaragua/Colombia (Preliminary Objections), supra note 111 at 868.

113 Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 722, 723.

114 Ibid at 723 (citing Island of Palmas, supra note 73 at 852–53).

115 Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 724.

116 Benin/Niger, supra note 4 at 147–48.

117 Malaysia/Singapore, supra note 15 at 95 (citing Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, 13 April 2002, at 28, online: UN High Commissioner for Refugees˂http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a54bbec0. htm˃).

118 Malaysia/Singapore, supra note 15 at 94.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid at 95.

121 Indonesia/Malaysia, supra note 22 at 667–68. It is important to mention that Indonesia was also relying on maps produced by the United Kingdom, Malaysia’s predecessor, which, in Indonesia’s view, contradicted Malaysia’s claims (at 28, 40).

122 Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 722.

123 Malaysia/Singapore, supra note 15 at 94–95.

124 Ibid at 95.

125 Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37 at 316–17.

126 Ibid at 452. Bekker has criticized this conclusion. See Bekker, supra note 37 at 397.

127 D’Argent, supra note 37 at 318.

128 Costa Rica/Nicaragua, supra note 32 at 222–24.

129 Nicaragua/Honduras, supra note 5 at 705. In this case, Nicaragua reserved its right to make a damage claim but did not develop it during the proceedings, such that the ICJ did not rule on it (at 666–67, 760–64).

130 Cassella, supra note 36 at 277.

131 Cameroon/Nigeria, supra note 37 at 452.

132 Costa Rica/Nicaragua, supra note 32 at 222–24.

133 Ibid at 267.

134 Ibid.

135 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 24 April 1963, entered into force on 19 March 1967, 596 UNTS 261. Germany sought assurances that the United States would not repeat these unlawful acts regarding the detention of, or criminal proceedings against, German citizens. The ICJ declared that a program designed and put in place by the United States to strengthen the consular notification at the state and local level addressed this concern. See LaGrand (Germany v United States of America), [2001] ICJ Rep 466 at 511–13, 516.

136 Sir Jennings, Robert Yewdall “Speech by Sir Robert Yewdall Jennings on the Report of the International Court of Justice,” UN Doc A/46/PV.44 (1991)Google Scholar, reprinted in “Official Documents” (1992) 86 AJIL 249 at 252.

137 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain ( Qatar v Bahrain), Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva and Koroma, [2001] ICJ Rep 145 at 150.