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The Charter Travaux Préparatoires and United Nations Powers to Use Armed Force

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 March 2016

C. F. Amerasinghe
C. F. Amerasinghe*
Affiliation:
University of Ceylon, and Cambridge University York Prizeman
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Extract

The powers of the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations to take collective measures for the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly to maintain armed forces for that purpose, and the power of the General Assembly to finance these activities were much discussed during the recent crisis in the Organization when certain members refused to contribute to the support of the UNEF and Congo Operation. Various aspects of the matter have been discussed by writers; they have also been dealt with by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion of June 1962 where it held that the UNEF and Congo Operation undertaken by the General Assembly and Security Council were intra vires the powers of these organs and that the expenses incurred by the Organization in the execution of those ventures were “expenses of the Organization” for the purposes of Article 17 (2) of the Charter. The Court and some of the judges who gave separate opinions further made a definite contribution to the interpretation of certain aspects of the Charter in the course of arriving at these conclusions.

Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 4 , 1966 , pp. 81 - 101
Copyright
Copyright © The Canadian Council on International Law / Conseil Canadien de Droit International, representing the Board of Editors, Canadian Yearbook of International Law / Comité de Rédaction, Annuaire Canadien de Droit International 1966

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References

1 “Issues Before the Nineteenth General Assembly,” International Conciliation, No. 550, (Nov. 1964), at 5 et seq.

2 For example, see Stone, , Aggression and World Order 177 et seq., 184 et seq. (1958)Google Scholar; Sohn, , “The Authority of the United Nations to Establish and Maintain a Permanent United Nations Force,” 52 Am. J. Int’l L. 829 (1958)Google Scholar; Seyersted, , “United Nations Forces: Some Legal Problems,” 37 Brit. Yb. Int‘l L. 351 (1961)Google Scholar ; Miller, E.M., “Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo,” 55 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (1961)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Halderman, John W., “Legal Basis for United Nations Armed Forces,” 56 Am. J. Int’l L. 971 (1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wright, , 4 Int’l Stud. 1 (1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schneider, J.W., “Congo Force and Standing U.N. Force: Legal Experience with ONUC,” 4 Indian J. Int’l L. 269 (1964)Google Scholar; Bowett, , United Nations Forces 90–254, 266–312 (1964).Google Scholar

3 [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151.

4 For a description of the nature of the forces used in UNEF and the Congo Operation, see Seyersted, supra note 2, at 374–90, 390–402. For a definition of collective measures under the Charter, see Halderman, supra note 2, at 973 et seq.

5 For a detailed examination of this contribution, see Amerasinghe, C.F., “The United Nations Expenses Case — A Contribution to the Law of International Organization,” 4 Indian J. Int’l L. 177 (1964).Google Scholar The opinion has also been discussed by Jennings, R.Y., in 11 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1169 (1962)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Hogg, , in 62 Comm. L. Rev. 1230 (1962)Google Scholar ; Monaco, in 45 Revista D.I. 605 (1962) ; Gross, in 18 Int’l Org. 1 (1963) ; Verzijl, , in 10 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 1 (1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Pinto, , in 90 Journal D.I. 204 (1963)Google Scholar ; Rao, Rama, in 12 Indian Yb. Int’l Aff. 134. (1963)Google Scholar ; Simmonds, , in 13 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 854 (1964).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151, 163 et seq., and Amerasinghe, supra note 5, at 198 et seq.

7 It is considered unnecessary to reproduce all the necessary Charter Articles here.

8 Compare the statement of the U.S.A. before the International Court of Justice in the United Nations Expenses Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, Oral Arguments, and Documents 203 et seq. (1962), with that of the Soviet Union, ibid., 270 et seq.

9 3 UNGIO 2.

10 Ibid., 622.

11 Ibid., 377.

12 Ibid., 383.

13 Ibid., 4.86. See also other amendments catalogued at ibid., 641.

14 6 ibid., 296.

15 Ibid., 282.

16 Ibid., 296.

17 Ibid., 649, 654, 657, 663, 684, 701–03.

18 Report of the Rapporteur, ibid., 703.

19 Ibid., 394, 453, 22.

20 Ibid., 23 et seq.

21 Ibid., 34. See also Report of the Rapporteur of Commission I, ibid., 245.

22 Ibid., 245–46.

23 The travaux préparatoires do not indicate whether the General Assembly can take collective measures of any kind, although there is nothing in it to contradict the view that it does. Halderman uses this article as the immediate source of the General Assembly’s authority to take action by the use of armed force: supra note 2, at 992, 994.

24 This was the argument raised by the Soviet group before the International Court of Justice in the United Nations Expenses Case, I.C.J. Pleadings, Oral Arguments and Documents 270 et seq. (1962), (Soviet Union); ibid., 275 (Byelorussian S.S.R.); ibid., 276 (Bulgaria); ibid., 277 et seq. (Ukrainian S.S.R.) ; ibid., 279 et seq. (Rumania).

25 3 UNCIO 7–8.

26 Venezuela, ibid., 202; Guatemala, ibid., 258; Egypt, ibid., 458; Turkey, ibid., 485; Mexico, ibid., 185; Liberia, ibid., 465; Chile, ibid., 287; Paraguay, ibid., 346; Dominican Republic, ibid., 572.

27 Report of Rapporteur of Committee III/1, ibid., 678–85.

28 Ibid., 376–87, 537–41, 555–56, 678–85.

29 Ibid., 112 et seq.

30 11 Ibid., 233.

31 See amendments listed at 3 ibid., 683, 685.

32 Ibid., 186–87.

33 Ibid., 459–60.

34 Ibid., 488.

35 12 ibid., 326.

36 3 ibid., 591.

37 12 ibid., 295–98, 303, 306–08, 315–17. 318.

38 Ibid., 316.

39 The Iranian proposal merely emphasized the need for a fixed period and the granting of power to the General Assembly to take binding action in the same way as the Security Council.

40 Ibid., 503.

41 11 ibid., 14 et seq.

42 See 3 ibid., 683 and 685 for a list of these amendments.

43 See 12 ibid., 278–80, 572–77.

44 Ibid., 575.

45 11 ibid., 26.

46 Ibid., 233 (italics added).

47 3 ibid., 5.

48 [1962] I.G.J. Rep. 151, 165.

49 See, e.g., Guatemala, 3 UNCIO 256 and Mexico, ibid., 175–77 and 181.

50 See, e.g., Chile, ibid., 285; Norway, ibid., 356; New Zealand, ibid., 487; Greece, ibid., 532; Australia, ibid., 544; Iran, ibid., 555.

51 See, e.g., Costa Rica, ibid., 278–81; Paraguay, ibid., 345; France, ibid.,378–82; Ecuador, ibid., 403–11; Turkey, ibid., 481; Dominican Republic, ibid., 567.

52 Ibid., 278–79.

53 Ibid., 598.

54 9 ibid., 22.

55 8 ibid., 217.

56 [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151, 172.

57 9 UNCIO 335–36, 33.

58 Ibid., 44.

59 Ibid., 60.

60 Ibid., 64.

61 Ibid., 43.

62 Ibid., 95, 102, 109.

63 Ibid., 108, 198, 221, 230, 233. It would appear that the two points had much in common; see 5 ibid., 272, 522.

64 9 ibid., 221.

65 Ibid., 243, 247, and 5 ibid., 262, 272, 522, 533, 535.

66 8 ibid., 202.

67 Ibid., 266–67.

68 3 ibid., 284.

69 6 ibid., 346.

70 Ibid., 347.

71 Ibid., 459.

72 Ibid., 82, 247.

73 3 ibid., 623.

74 6 ibid., 310, 424, 430, 436, 486–89, 494–99, 507–13.

75 Ibid., 487.

76 Ibid., 108, 247.