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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 November 2022
Human dignity plays an important role in the international legal order, and references to the principle can be found in various international human rights instruments. Its meaning, however, remains an object of avid discussion due to the impossibility of finding a precise and timeless way of defining the concept. In this article, we argue that acknowledging inherence as an element of human dignity gives extrinsic legal recognition to an intrinsic human condition and tends to expand human dignity’s influence. Vagueness — or openness — in defining the concept provides for a dynamic and evolutionary understanding of human dignity, and, coupled with the idea of inherence, these characteristics represent tools for universalization and adaptation of the concept to new circumstances. These findings are based on a review of philosophical discussions of the idea of human dignity, followed by an analysis of how it is addressed in international legal instruments and international jurisprudence and identification of its recurrent elements. We defend the view that the vagueness of its definition does not mean that its content is impossible to identify in particular circumstances. Scholars and institutions can have a concrete sense of the meaning of human dignity even though its substance may admit new elements as new social demands emerge. In our view, the essential meaning of human dignity is founded on the influence of the whole body of human rights as well as on its particular connection to the rights of social minorities, in which human dignity is emphasized because of the material precariousness of such groups under social systems that subject them to discriminatory treatment.
La dignité humaine joue un rôle important dans l’ordre juridique international et des renvois à ce principe se trouvent dans divers instruments internationaux relatifs aux droits de la personne. Sa portée reste cependant un objet de vives discussions en raison de l’impossibilité de trouver une définition précise et intemporelle du concept. Dans cet article, nous soutenons que la reconnaissance de l’inhérence comme élément de la dignité humaine permet une reconnaissance juridique extrinsèque d’une condition humaine intrinsèque et tend à étendre son influence. L’imprécision — ou l’ouverture — de sa définition permet une appréciation dynamique et évolutive de la dignité humaine et, associées à l’idée d’inhérence, ces caractéristiques représentent des outils d’universalisation et d’adaptation du concept à de nouvelles circonstances. Ces conclusions sont basées sur un examen des origines philosophiques de l’idée de la dignité humaine, suivi d’une analyse de la manière dont elle est abordée dans les instruments juridiques internationaux et la jurisprudence internationale, et de l’identification de ses éléments récurrents. Nous défendons l’idée que l’imprécision de sa définition ne signifie pas qu’il est impossible de cerner son contenu dans des circonstances particulières. Les spécialistes et les institutions peuvent avoir un sens concret de la signification de la dignité humaine même si sa substance peut admettre de nouveaux éléments à mesure que de nouvelles exigences sociales émergent. Pour les auteurs, le sens essentiel de la dignité humaine est fondé sur l’influence de l’ensemble des droits de la personne, ainsi que sur son lien particulier avec les droits des minorités, dans lesquels la dignité humaine est soulignée en raison de la précarité matérielle de ces groupes en vertu de systèmes sociaux qui les soumettent à un traitement discriminatoire.
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc A/810 (1948), preamble, arts 1, 22–23 [UDHR].
2 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7, preamble (entered into force 24 October 1945) [UN Charter].
3 American Convention on Human Rights, 21 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123, arts 5–6, 11 (entered into force 18 July 1978) [ACHR].
4 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2 October 2000, [2000] OJ, C 364/01 (entered into force 1 December 2009) [EU Charter]; Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2702 UNTS 3, preamble, ch 1 (entered into force 1 December 2009).
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Can TS 1976 No 47, preamble, art 10 (entered into force 23 March 1976) [ICCPR].
6 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3, Can TS 1976 No 46, arts 11, 13 (entered into force 3 January 1976) [ICESCR].
7 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195, preamble (entered into force 4 January 1969) [Convention on Racial Discrimination].
8 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13, Can TS 1982 No 31, preamble (entered into force 3 September 1981) [Convention on Discrimination against Women].
9 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 24 January 2007, 999 UNTS 171, preamble, arts 1, 3, 8, 16(4), 24–25 (entered into force 3 May 2008) [Convention on Persons with Disabilities].
10 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, preamble (entered into force 26 June 1987) [Convention on Torture].
11 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 3, arts 17, 70 (entered into force 1 July 2003) [Convention on Migrants].
12 Before Immanuel Kant’s contribution based on rationalism, religious influences included Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola in his famous dissertation “De dignitate hominis” in 1486 and Juan Luis Vives, “Fabula de homine” in 1518. For Vives, as for Pico, dignity meant freedom or human capacity to reach the highest goals because all human beings are equally worthy. Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (Toronto: Pearson, 1949); Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, Discurso sobre a dignidade do homem, translated and introduced by Maria de Lurdes Sirgado Ganho (Lisbon: Edições 70, 2001); Vives, Juan Luis, “Fabula del homine” in Diálogos y otros escritos (Barcelona: Planeta, 1988)Google Scholar.
13 The origins of theoretical concept of human dignity can be found in antiquity. The word “dignity” derives its original meaning from the Latin word “dignitas,” conveying honour and respect. Vocabolario Latino – Italiano. Da Luigi Della Noce e Federico Torre (Torino and Milan: G. Favale e Compagnia and Natale Battezzati, 1856).
14 Conor O’Mahony, “There Is No Such Thing as a Right to Dignity” (2012) 10:2 Intl J Constitutional L 551 at 555 (“[i]n a legal sense, these constitutional provisions and the surrounding case law and literature would seem to establish the following points in relation to human dignity as a constitutional concept in Western states: 1. Every human being has an inherent dignity by virtue of his or her humanity, irrespective of external characteristics including (but not limited to) sex, age, race or ethnicity, religious or political belief, nationality, status, sexual orientation, or mental or physical condition. 2. This inherent dignity demands that certain human rights should be protected. 3. Because dignity inheres in human beings, irrespective of external characteristics, every human being should be entitled to enjoy his or her human rights without suffering any discrimination or distinction based on such external characteristics”).
15 Evadné Grant & Joan Small, “Dignity, Discrimination, and Context: New Directions in South African and Canadian Human Rights Law” (2005) 6:2 Human Rights Rev 25 at 34.
16 O’Mahony, supra note 14 at 557 (“[h]ow is it, if most people can agree that human dignity is very important, that there is so little agreement on what the concept actually entails? The answer to this lies in part in the fact that the project of drafting universal human rights standards is one which naturally has to face up to almost insurmountable problems associated with cultural difference”).
17 Silvia Scarpa, “Conceptual Unclarity, Human Dignity and Contemporary Forms of Slavery: An Appraisal and Some Proposals” (2019) 64 Questions Intl L 19 at 22–23 (“it is worth noting that the concept of human dignity is not only used in the two above-mentioned branches of international law, namely international humanitarian law and international human right law, but also in others, such as international criminal law, and international slavery, trafficking and labour laws, so that its contours — in light of the possibility of fragmentation in international law and the politicization of the notion — might be difficult to trace and to universalize in a manner going beyond the boundaries of particular sub-areas of international law”).
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21 Erin Daly & James R May, “A Primer for Dignity Rights” (2018) 3 Juriste international 21 at 21.
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24 According to Kant, in the realm of purposes everything has either a price or dignity. Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else that is equivalent; on the other hand, whatever is above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has dignity. Kant, supra note 12.
25 Shultziner, Doron, “Human Dignity: Functions and Meanings” (2003) 3:3 Global Jurist Topics 16 Google Scholar.
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27 Hans Jörg Sandkühler, “La dignité humaine et la transformation des droits moraux en droit positif” in Trindade, Antônio Augusto Cançado & Leal, César Barros, eds, Le respect de la dignité humaine (Fortaleza: FB Editora, 2015) 67 Google Scholar.
28 Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, “Dignidad de la Persona, Derechos Fundamentales, Bloque Constitucional de Derechos y Control de Convencionalidad” (2010) 5 Revista de Derecho de la Universidad Católica de Uruguay 79.
29 Valdés, Mariana Blengio, “La dignidad humana como parámetro de interpretación en fuentes de derecho internacional de los derechos humanos y bioética. ¿la definición inexistente?” (2016) 25:49 Revista de Derecho Público 31 Google Scholar.
30 Jack Donnelly, “Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Human Rights Conceptions” (1982) 76 Am Political Science Rev 303.
31 McCrudden, Christopher, “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights” (2008) 19:4 Eur J Intl L 655 at 676 Google Scholar.
32 Ginevra Le Moli, “The Principle of Human Dignity in International Law” in Mads Andenas et al, eds, General Principles and the Coherence of International Law (Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff, 2019) 352 at 360.
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34 Le Moli, supra note 32 at 360.
35 Ibid.
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37 According to Celso D de Albuquerque Mello, human dignity was first affirmed, in an international document, in the Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944, which expanded the purposes of the International Labour Organization. de Albuquerque Mello, Celso D, Curso de Direito Internacional Público , 15th ed (Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2004) at 866Google Scholar. Article II(a) of the declaration provided: “[A]ll human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.”
38 Theodor Meron, in his contribution to the Recueil des Cours, defined human rights as a series of legal entitlements protecting human dignity. But he held that it does not constitute a special field of international law. His purpose was to demonstrate how human rights influence general international law in order to prove that it radiates throughout the whole system, moving international law from “state-centred” to “individual-centred.” Meron, Theodor, “International Law in the Age of Human Rights” (2003) 301 Rec des Cours 9 at 21–22 Google Scholar. According to this conception, human rights would not be a branch of international law but, rather, one of its stems.
39 UDHR, supra note 1, preamble, arts 1, 22–23.
40 UN Charter, supra note 2, preamble.
41 ACHR, supra note 3, arts 5–6, 11.
42 EU Charter, supra note 4, preamble, ch 1.
43 ICCPR, supra note 5, preamble, art 10.
44 ICESCR, supra note 6, arts 11, 13.
45 Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 7, preamble.
46 Convention on Discrimination against Women, supra note 8, preamble.
47 Convention on Persons with Disabilities, supra note 9, preamble, arts 1, 3, 8, 16(4), 24–25.
48 Convention on Torture, supra note 10, preamble.
49 Convention on Migrants, supra note 11, arts 17, 70.
50 UDHR, supra note 1, preamble (“[w]hereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”).
51 Ibid, art 1 (“[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”).
52 UN Charter, supra note 2, preamble (“to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small”).
53 ICCPR, supra note 5, preamble (“[c]onsidering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world[; r]ecognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”).
54 Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 7, preamble (“[c]onsidering that the Charter of the United Nations is based on the principles of the dignity and equality inherent in all human beings. … Considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set out therein, without distinction of any kind, in particular as to race, colour or national origin”).
55 Convention on Discrimination against Women, supra note 8, preamble (“[n]oting that the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women”).
56 Convention on Persons with Disabilities, supra note 9, preamble (“[r]ecalling the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations which recognize the inherent dignity and worth and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world”).
57 Convention on Torture, supra note 10, preamble (“[c]onsidering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world[; r]ecognizing that those rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”).
58 Roberto Andorno raises different cultural traditions in which human dignity finds resonance — from the Christian approach in which human dignity derives from human creation by God in his image to the Kantian position whereby human dignity is founded on the human capacity to conceive. Andorno points out that, although the concept of human dignity is often attributed to Western thought, it is also expressed in the teachings of Confucianism — as a result of the human capacity to be oriented by a sense of justice — and Islamic traditions — justified in the belief that God has endowed human beings with the best shape, intellect, freedom, and dignity. Andorno, Roberto, “Human Dignity and Human Rights” in ten Have, Henk & Gordijn, Bert, eds, Handbook of Global Bioethics (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014) 45 at 46–49 Google Scholar.
59 Regarding the role of principles in the conception of a legal system, Marco Antônio Ribeiro Tura posits that if “law is presented as a teleological-axiomatic system[, this] implies assuming that, contrary to logical-axiomatic systems, [a] legal system is open and movable. … Logical-axiomatic systems are closed and immovable because from a few axioms, formulas held as self-evident trues [sic], it is possible to solve every arising problems [sic]. Now, law does not express itself like the said systems. It is not possible to conceive that every arising problems [sic] can be solved by elements contained within [a] legal system. The … idea that [a] legal system foresees mechanisms to solve antinomies and to fulfill legal gaps weakens its understanding as a logic-axiomatic system. Therefore, [a] legal system has permanent interconnection and interchanging with vital world [sic].… [A][l]egal system, hence, can only be conceived as an open system because it is permanently subjected to the influence of the acting forces over [the] objective world (natural), intersubjective world (social) and subjective world (individual).” Marco Antônio Ribeiro Tura, Placing Principles into a Conception of Law as a System, translated by Emílio Mendonça Dias da Silva (Kindle E-book, 2019) at paras 7–8. It would thus be the role of principles to be open in order to enable a legal system’s adaptability to new circumstances.
60 ACHR, supra note 3, art 5(2) (“[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”).
61 Ibid, art 11(1) (“[e]veryone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized”).
62 EU Charter, supra note 4, art 1 (human dignity) (“[h]uman dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected”).
63 ICCPR, supra note 5, art 10(1) (“[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”).
64 ICESCR, supra note 6, art 13(1) (“[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”).
65 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, Can TS 1992 No 3, art 39 (entered into force 2 September 1990) (“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation or abuse; torture or any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an environment which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child”).
66 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (19 October 2005) in UNESCO, Records of the General Conference, 33rd Sess (Paris, 3–21 October 2005), vol 1 (Paris: UNESCO, 2005) at 74, preambular para 3 (“[r]ecognizing that ethical issues raised by the rapid advances in science and their technological applications should be examined with due respect to the dignity of the human person and universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms”).
67 McCrudden, supra note 31 at 682; South West Africa, Second Phase (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa), [1966] ICJ Rep 6 at 250, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka. This case was initiated by Ethiopia and Liberia against the Union of South Africa in order to evaluate performance of its duties as the mandatory power in South West Africa. Although the court found that there was no legal basis for the applicants’ request, Tanaka J declared in his dissenting opinion that some of the pleadings were well founded. As to the matter of differential treatment of particular population groups, Tanaka J found that the treatment betrayed racial discrimination, which would be contrary to the principle of equality since “[a]s persons they have the dignity to be treated as such” (ibid at 308).
68 In this sense, McCrudden points out that human dignity was first addressed by the European Commission of Human Rights in the East African Asians case, regarding racial discrimination as an infringement of human dignity: East African Asians v United Kingdom (1973), 3 EHRR 76 at paras 189, 207–08 (Eur Comm’n HR). In turn, according to McCrudden, the first reference to the principle was made by the European Court of Human Rights in Tyrer v United Kingdom (1978), No 5856/72, [1978] ECHR 2, 2 EHRR 1, in relation to the imposition of corporal punishment in a judicial sentence. McCrudden, supra note 31 at 683. Since then, the court has invoked human dignity in several cases, most recently in finding that a failure to provide proper medical treatment to a detainee violated the human dignity of the person. Kikolishen v Ucrania, No 65544/11 (15 April 2021).
69 Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandí and Emberá Indigenous People of Bayano and Their Members (Panama) (2014), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 284.
70 Ibid at para 194.
71 Ibid.
72 ACHR, supra note 3, art 1.
73 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women, 9 June 1994, OASTS No 61, 33 ILM 1534, art 4 (entered into force 5 March 1995).
74 Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v Peru (2006), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 160 at paras 68–69.
75 Flor Freire v Ecuador (2016), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 315 at para 109.
76 Ibid.
77 Ximenes Lopes v Brazil (2006), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 149.
78 “The right to life is a fundamental human right, and the exercise of this right is essential for the exercise of all other human rights. If it is not respected, all rights lack meaning. Owing to the fundamental nature of the right to life, restrictive approaches to it are inadmissible. In essence, the fundamental right to life includes, not only the right of every human being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right that he will not be prevented from having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence. States have the obligation to guarantee the creation of the conditions required in order that violations of this basic right do not occur and, in particular, the duty to prevent its agents from violating it.” Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al) v Guatemala (1999), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 77 at para 144.
79 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (2006), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 142 at para 161; Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay (2006), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 146; Case of the Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay (2010), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 214 at paras 194–217.
80 Lunatics Detention Act, Laws of The Gambia, c 40.05.
81 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217 (entered into force 21 October 1986).
82 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Purohit and Moore v Gambia, Communication No 241/2001 (29 May 2003) at paras 55–57, online: <africanlii.org/afu/judgment/african-commission-human-and-peoples-rights/2003/49>.
83 “The Court observes that respect for human rights as a whole is intended to protect the dignity of the human person. However, under Article 5 of the Charter, the protection of human dignity takes a specific form, namely the prohibition of treatment likely to restrict it, such as slavery, slave trade, torture and any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” Léon Mugesera v Rwanda, No 012/2017 (27 November 2020) at para 80 (African Ct HPR), online: <www.african-court.org/cpmt/details-case/0122017>.
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