Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare: Part I, The Traditional Law

Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg

doi:10.1017/S0069005800004471

¹ Hence, the 1949 Geneva Conventions as well as the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict are dealt with here under the heading of “traditional law.”

² See, inter alia, Wehberg, H., “Das Seekriegsrecht,” in Stier-Somlo, (ed.), Handbuch des Völkerrechts Vol. 5, at 15 (Berlin-Stuttgart-Leipzig, 1915).Google Scholar

³ Nys, E., Les origines du droit international, 211 (Paris, 1894).Google Scholar

⁴ Pardessus (Collection des lois maritimes, Vol. II, at cxxii (Paris, 1826)) mentions the following precedent occurring in that year: During the war between Pisa and Genova Pisa captured a Saracen ship that allegedly was carrying goods belonging to a citizen of Genova. The Sultan of Egypt complained of the capture by maintaining that the goods belonged to one of his subjects (it is interesting to note that the Sultan did not advance a violation of his flag). Pisa, after determining the Saracen ownership, released the ship.

⁵ With regard to the consohto del mare, E. Nys (op. cit. supra note 3, at 232) correctly remarks: “Le consulat de la mer n’est pas un code des lois maritimes rédigé et publié par l’autorité législative d’un ou de plusieurs Etats; c’est une collection de coutumes de la mer appliquées par la cour consulaire de Barcelone et on peut le considérer comme résumant les usages maritimes admis dans les différentes riveraines de la Méditerranée.”

⁶ In all these cases the cargo was paid. In case of enemy ships, the captor, having taken the cargo to a port of his country, usually claimed payment for the journey. The neutral owner of the cargo could also purchase the ship. See H. Wehberg, supra note 2, at 18.

⁷ Ibid., 19.

⁸ Wheaton, , Histoire des progrès du droit des gens en Europe, 82 (1841).Google Scholar

⁹ Dupuis, C., Le droit de la guerre maritime d’après les doctrines anglaises contemporaines, 180 (Paris, 1899).Google Scholar

¹⁰ E. Nys, op. cit. supra note 3, at 230.

¹¹ E.g., according to Article 41 of the Magna Charta, with the outbreak of war enemy merchantmen are to be imprisoned and their goods are to be confiscated without payment of compensation. Later, however, according to the Statute of Staples merchantmen of importance for trade relations were given 40 days of grace to leave the country.

¹² In England it was abolished by the Prize Act of 1708, in France by the Ordinance of 1756.

¹³ This is the so-called French doctrine of hostile infection: “La robe d’ennemi confisque la robe de l’ami.”

¹⁴ See Wehberg, supra note 2, at 23.

¹⁵ See E. Nys, op. cit. supra note 3, at 231.

¹⁶ H. Wehberg, supra note a, at 24.

¹⁷ E.g., in the 1642 Treaty between England and Portugal and in the 1661 Treaty between Portugal and The Netherlands.

¹⁸ E.g., in the 1625 Treaty of Southampton between England and The Netherlands.

¹⁹ See the overview by Bernsten, K.H., Das Seekriegsrecht, 7 (Berlin, 1911).Google Scholar

²⁰ Colombos, C.J., The International Law of the Sea, para. 594 (5th ed., London, 1962)Google Scholar; Berber, F., Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts, Vol. II, 183, 191 (Munich 1969)Google Scholar; Oppenheim, /Lauterpacht, , International Law, Vol. II, at 458 (7th ed., London, 1952).Google Scholar See also Lord Palmerston’s speech to the House of Commons on March 17, 1862, Hansard (Commons), 3rd Series, Vol. 165, coll. 1693–99; Steinicke, D., Wirtschaftskrieg und Seekrieg (Hamburg, 1970).Google Scholar

²¹ Tucker, R.W., The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea, 74 (Washington, 1957)Google Scholar; Colombos, supra, para. 599; Berber, supra, 194.

²² See infra pp. 00–00.

²³ See, inter alia, Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 75.

²⁴ For a general overview see Fridman, G.H.L., Enemy Status, in 4 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 613–28 (1955).Google Scholar

²⁵ Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 200.

²⁶ See, e.g. Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 319.

²⁷ See, e.g., Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 204.

²⁸ Trading with the Enemy Act, 1914, 4 and 5 Geo. V, c. 87, and Trading with the Enemy, 1939, 2 and 3 Geo. V, c. 89.

²⁹ Garner, Whereas J.W., International Law and the World War, Vol. 1, at 61 (London, 1929),Google Scholar speaks of “domicile” Oppenheim/Lauterpacht op. cit. supra note 20, at 272 assumes that enemy character is acquired ’ ’by being domiciled’ ’ in an enemy country. According to McNair, , Legal Effects of War, 40 (3rd ed., Cambridge, 1948),Google Scholar “enemy” is “a person of any or no nationality voluntarily resident or present and carrying on business in territory owned or occupied by an enemy power. …”

³⁰ The Privy Council in the Kara Deniz, ([1922] B. & C.P.C. 1070) decided that property belonging to a neutral subject ought to be condemned as the owner had, by trading in Turkey, acquired a hostile commercial domicile there.

The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1939 defines “enemy” as “any individual resident in enemy territory, any individual or body of persons (whether corporate or unincorporated) carrying on business in enemy territory or in any other place, if and so long as the body is controlled by a person who, under this section, is an enemy, and any body of persons constituted or incorporated in, or under the laws of, a State at war with His Majesty, but does not include any individual by reason only that he is an enemy subject.”

³¹ SirMarriott, James, Le Théodore, Hay and Marriott, 258, 261.Google Scholar

³² “Enemy territory” under section 15 of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1939 means “any area which is under the sovereignty of, or in occupation of, a Power with which His Majesty is at war not being an area in the occupation of His Majesty or of a Power allied with His Majesty.”

³³ McNair, , International Law Opinions, Vol. 3, at 27 (Cambridge, 1956).Google Scholar

³⁴ Daimler Co. v. Consolidated Tyre and Rubber Co., [1916] 2 A.C. 307 (H.L.). Note, however, that originally the so-called control theory had been rejected by the House of Lords.

³⁵ C.J. Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 631.

³⁶ Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, in 12 Am. J. Int’l L. suppl., 27 (1918), and Trading with the Enemy Act of December 18, 1941.

³⁷ In 1948 section 39 was amended (Public Law No. 896) and the nationality principle for the “policy of non-return” was introduced, cf. Guessefeld v. McGrath (1952), 19 AILC 325.

³⁸ Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 201; Tansill, , America Goes to War 535 et seq. (1938).Google Scholar

³⁹ On January 12, 1945, the American “black list” comprised 14,543 names; see Stone, J., Legal Control of International Conflicts 452 (1954).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Originally the United States Trading with the Enemy Act, 1917, did not include the control test (see also Schulz Co. v. Raines & Co. (1917, 15 AILC 215; Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller (1925), AILC 275). However, the United States Supreme Court did apply it, arguing that some changes in section 5(b) of the Act effected by the first War Powers Act, 1941, were intended to introduce it (Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332 U.S. 480 (1947); Kaufmann v. Société Internationale (1952), 19 AILC 473).

⁴¹ Cf. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. The Town of New Haven (1823), 19 AILC 41; Janson v. Driefontein (1902), 4 BILC 693); Mössner, J.M., “Enemies and Enemy Subjects,” in: Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Instalment 3, at 163–67, 163 (1982)Google Scholar (cited hereafter as EPIL).

⁴² 343 U.S. 156 (1952).

⁴³ Parfums Tosca case, Ann. Dig., Vol. 9, at 557; Aeroxon case, 20 ILR 615 (1955).

⁴⁴ Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 200; Domke, M., “Feindbegriff,” in Strupp, K./Schlochauer, H.-J., Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts, Vol. 1, at 509 (2nd ed., Berlin, 1960)Google Scholar (cited as hereafter WVR I). At the beginning of the Second World War, the German Ordinance of January 15, 1940, as well as the French Ordinance of September 1, 1939, combined the principle of nationality with the principle of domicile.

⁴⁵ RGBl. 1940 I, at 191; 12, para. 1, states: “wenn das Unternehmen unmittelbar oder mittelbar unter mazgebendem feindlichen Einfluigers steht.”

⁴⁶ Cf. Regulations on Land Warfare, annexed to Convention IV, Arts. 2, 4, 42, 45; Convention VI, Arts. 2, 3, 4; Convention IX, Art. 2; Convention XI, Art. 5. The approach of referring to the belligerent party as such dates back to Hugo Grotius: see his De jure belli ac pacis, Liber III, Caput III, 1.

⁴⁷ Mössner, J.M., “Enemies and Enemy Subjects,” in EPIL 3, at 163–67, 165.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ AIDI, Vol. 26 (1913), pp. 641–72; reprinted in Ronzitti, N. (ed.), The Law of Naval Warfare, 278–328 (Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1988).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Privy Council, The Unitas, [1950] A.C. 536, 552, 558. See also U.S. Supreme Court, Lauritzen v. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 201; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 76.

⁵⁰ Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare, signed at London, February 26, 1909; Text in 3 Am. J. Int’l L., Suppl., 179–220 (1909), and in Ronzitti, (ed.), op. cit. supra note 48, at 224–56.Google Scholar

⁵¹ AIDI, Vol. 26 (1913), 641–72.

⁵² RGBl, 1939, I, at 1585; see also Hyde, C.C., International Law, Vol. 3, at 2075 (2nd ed., Boston, 1945).Google Scholar

⁵³ The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration, Arbitral Award of August 8, 1905, in The Muscat Dhows cuse. See also Breuer, G., “Flaggenrecht, Internationales,” in WVR I, 532.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ U.S. Supreme Court, Lauritzen v. Lauritzen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).

⁵⁵ Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 76; Berber, op. cit. supra note 20 at 203; Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 310.

⁵⁶ Colombos, supra, para. 604. See also The St. Tudno, [1916] P. 271 (SirEvans, Samuel).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Pflüger, H., “Die ’feindliche Eigenschaft’ von Schiff und Ladung in der englischen Prisenrechtsprechung des Weltkriegs,” (Hamburg, 1929).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, Vol. 3, at 2079.

⁵⁹ Similar rules are laid down in Art. 52 of the 1913 Oxford Manual.

⁶⁰ See also Art. 52 of the 1913 Oxford Manual.

⁶¹ Cf. the British report of March 1, 1909, cited in Kalshoven, F., “Commentary on the 1909 London Declaration,” in Ronzitti, N. (ed.), op. cit. supra note 48, at 257–75, 267.Google Scholar

⁶² Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 609; see also Stowell, Lord in The Sechs Geschwister, [1801] 4 C. Rob. 100.Google Scholar

⁶³ U.S. Dept. of State, Memorandum of August 7,1914, Congressional Record, August H, 1914, at 14758; see also Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 78.

⁶⁴ In the case of The Dacia, the French Court of Prize in its decision of August 5, 1915 applied Art. 56 of the London Declaration: 22 Rev. gén. [1915].

⁶⁵ Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 193 f.; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 80 et seq..

⁶⁶ See Tucker, supra, 81; Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2085; Ralshoven, F., “Commentary on the igo9 London Declaration,” in Ronzitti, (ed.), op. cit. supra note 48, at 257–75, 267.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See Tucker, supra, 81; Kaishoven, supra, 267; Schramm, G., Das Prisenrecht 127 (Berlin, 1913).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 605. E.g., in The Roumanian, [1915] 1 Ll.RC. 191 (Sir Samuel Evans), held that goods may be confiscated even when on board British ships.

⁶⁹ Hugo Grotius, op. cit. supra note 46, Caput VI, VI.: “Quare quod dici solet, hostiles censeri res in hostium navibus repertas, non ita accipi debet quasi certa sit juris gentium lex, sed ut praesumtionem quandam indicet, quae tarnen validis in contrarium probationibus possit elidi.”

⁷⁰ Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 616. Note, however, that according to Art. 8, para. 2, of the German Prize Ordinance of 1939, the presumption seems to apply to goods found on board neutral merchant vessels as well, since it only refers to goods in general and not to goods found on board enemy merchant vessels.

⁷¹ Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 85.

⁷² See also ibid., 86.

⁷³ The same applies according to Art. 9 of the 1939 German Prize Ordinance.

⁷⁴ Cf. Privy Council, The Odessa, [1916] 1 A.C. 145.

⁷⁵ The Marie Glaeser, [1914] P. 218.

⁷⁶ Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 606; Krüger, H., “Salvage,” in WVR III, 156 Google Scholar; see also The Two Friends, [1799] 1C. Rob. 271; The Prins Knud, [1942] A.C. 667 (P.C.).

⁷⁷ The present article will not deal with this method. Contraband is being dealt with infra pp. 317–18.

⁷⁸ It is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation to visit and search all merchant vessels, “whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be the destinations” ( Stowell, Lord in The Maria, [1799] 1 C. Rob. 340, 360Google Scholar). Visit and search is not an independent right but “a right growing out of, and ancillary to, the greater right of capture” ( Marshall, Chief Justice in The Nereide [1815], 9 Cranch. 388, 427).Google Scholar See also Scheuner, U., “Durchsuchung von Schiffen,” in WVR I, 407.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1958; Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 866; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 332; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 848; Rousseau, Ch., Le droit des conflits armés, 318.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Schramm, op. cit. supra note 67, at 298; Colombos, supra, para. 866.

⁸¹ “Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants”; cf. Arnold-Forster, , The New Freedom of the Seas 72–73 (1942).Google Scholar

⁸² “it is a fundamental principle of international maritime law that, except by special convention or in time of war, interference by a cruiser with a foreign vessel pursuing a lawful avocation on the high seas is unwarranted and illegal and constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of the country whose flag the vessel flies.” (Anglo-American Claims Commission, cases of The Jessie, The Thomas F. Bayard, and The Pescawha, Nielsen Report (1926), at 479–80 (emphasis added)).

⁸³ See inter alia Rojahn, O., “Ships, Visit and Search,” in EPIL 4, at 224–26Google Scholar; Ottmüller, R., Die Anwendung von Seekriegsrecht in militärischen Konflikten seit 1945 35 (Hamburg, 1978).Google Scholar Even Hugo Grotius, who is considered to be the staunchest supporter of the freedom of navigation, seems indirectly to have accepted certain limitations if an activity on the high seas is harmful or dangerous to another: “Et si quic-quam prohibere posset, puta, piscaturam, qua dici quodammodo potest pisces exhauriri, at navigationem non potest, per quam mari nihil perit.” (Mare liberum, Caput V.) “Unde cum navigatio nemini possit esse nociva nisi ipsi naviganti, par est ut nemini possit, aut debeat impediri, ne in re sua natura libera, sibique nemine noxia navigantium libertatem impediat…” (ibid., Caput VII).

⁸⁴ See Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 849; it is maintained that “whether the part of the open sea in which a belligerent man-of-war meets with a neutral merchantman is near or far away from that part of the world where hostilities are actually taking place makes no difference, so long as there is suspicion against the vessel.”

⁸⁵ See inter alia Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 868; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, supra, 546.

⁸⁶ Stowell, Lord in The Maria, [1799] 1 C. Rob. 340, 360Google Scholar; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 333; Colombos, supra, para. 866; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 848; see also the provisions laid down in Hague Convention VII relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships. Privateering had officially been abolished by the Paris Declaration respecting Maritime Law of April 16, 1856.

⁸⁷ Cf. Colombos, supra, para. 868; see also Scheuner, U., “Durchsuchung von Schiffen,” in WVR I, at 407–08.Google Scholar The equation of submarines with surface warships follows from the 1936 London Procès-Verbal relating to the rules of submarine warfare set forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930 (173 LNTS 353–57; printed in Ronzitti, op cit. supra note 48, at 352.

⁸⁸ Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1971; Scheuner, supra, 407–8.

⁸⁹ Cf. art. 32 of the 1913 Oxford Manual; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 334; Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 870; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 849.

⁹⁰ Colombos, supra, para. 883. With regard to the classes of protected enemy ships, see infra pp. 311–14.

⁹¹ In the 1913 arbitration between France and Italy in the case of The Carthage (Award of the Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in the Case of the French Mail Steamer Carthage, Am. J. Int’l L., 623–29 (1913); RIAA, Vol. II, at 449–61), the arbitral tribunal held: “d’après les principes universellement admis, un bâtiment de guerre belligérant a, en thèse générale et sans conditions particulières, le droit d’arrêter en pleine mer un navire de commerce neutre et de procéder à la visite pour s’assurer s’il observe les règles sur la neutralité, spécialement au point de vue de la contrebande.”

⁹² For a general overview, see Stödter, R., Flottengeleit im Seekrieg (Hamburg, 1936),Google Scholar and Stödter, R., “Convoy,” in EPIL 3, at 128–30.Google Scholar

⁹³ Art. 63 of the 190g London Declaration. See also Stowell, Lord in The Maria, [1799] I C. Rob. 340Google Scholar; the decision of the U.S. German Mixed Claims Commission, United States, Garland Steamship Corp., and Others v. Germany (1924), 7 RIAA 73; The Molano, 7 RIAA 83; Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 135; Stödter, supra, 63.

⁹⁴ Especially during the eighteenth century by states adopting a position of armed neutrality. The Greco-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, in the Kyriakides case, Recueil des décisions des Tribunaux Mixtes, Vol. 8, at 349, 351 (1929), held, that in cases where neutral merchant ships wish to protect themselves against submarines, they should appeal to their own government in order to obtain a convoy for their flag, and it was said that this was a measure of protection expressly indi catee! by art. 6i of the Declaration of London. See also Scheuner, supra note 87, at 408; Schramm, op. cit. supra note 67, at 300.

⁹⁵ [1799] I C. Rob. 340.

⁹⁶ [1804] 5 C. Rob. 174.

⁹⁷ 33 Am. J. Int’l L., Suppl., 166–817 (1939).

⁹⁸ This view is taken, e.g., by Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 195; Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 873; and Stödter, R., “Convoy,” in EPIL 3, at 129.Google Scholar However, Whiteman, M.M., Digest of International Law, Vol. 11, at p. 37 (1968),Google Scholar takes the view that “the right of a neutral state to convoy its merchant vessels is generally recognized in international law.”

⁹⁹ Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 467.

¹⁰⁰ xhis follows from the 1936 London Procès-Verbal.

¹⁰¹ Higgins, Pierce, Defensively Armed Merchant Ships, 25 Google Scholar; Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 884; Schönborn, , “Der Widerstand feindlicher Handelsschiffe gegen Visitationen und Aufbringung,” in AöR 1918, at 161 Google Scholar; Kaak, W., Der gewaltsame Widerstand feindlicher Handelsschiffe gegen prisenrechtliche Maznahmen, (Kiel, 1952).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 194 f.; Dinstein, Y., “Neutrality in Sea Warfare,” in EPIL 4, at 19–28, 24.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ See inter alia The Maria [1799] 1 C. Rob. 340.

¹⁰⁴ Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 195; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 856.

¹⁰⁵ Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 340, believes that “the substantial and compelling reason for diversion was that little or no evidence to support a case of seizure — let alone for later condemnation — could be worked up by restricting attention to the ship’s papers and to the nature of the cargo carried. In the vast majority of instances where vessels were encountered bound for a neutral port, and carrying cargo to be delivered to a neutral consignee, the ship’s papers themselves furnished no real assurance of the ultimate destination of the cargo. Instead, the evidence necessary to justify seizure normally could come only from external sources. Not infrequently, this information was collected prior to the act of visit. More often, however, it could be gathered only after a vessel had been diverted to a belligerent contraband control base.”

¹⁰⁶ Wolf, J., “Ships, Diverting and Ordering into Port,” in EPIL 4, at 223–24Google Scholar; Scheuner, U., “Kursanweisung,” in WVR II, at 385 Google Scholar; Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 887. With regard to state practice during the world wars, see ibid., paras. 889 et seq.

¹⁰⁷ At the beginning of the First World War, the United States, then a neutral, protested against the British practice of diverting neutral vessels into port for search. In a letter dated November 7, 1914, the State Department claimed that “search should be made on the high seas at the time of the visit and…the conclusion of the search should rest upon the evidence found in the ship and investigation and not upon circumstances ascertained from external sources.” See the exchange of notes between Great Britain and the United States in 9 Am. J. Int’l L., Spec. Suppl., 55 (1915); 10 Am. J. Int’l L., Spec. Suppl., 73 (1916).

¹⁰⁸ Wolf supra note 106; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 340; see also The Zamora, [1916] 2 A.C. 77 (P.C.); The Attiki, Ann. Dig., Vol. 12 (1943–45), at 473; Arts. 60–63 of the 1939 German Prize Ordinance; Art. 2 of the British Prize Rules of 1939; Art. 107 of the French Prize Rules of 1934; Art. 182 of the Italian Prize Rules of 1938.

¹⁰⁹ Entscheidungen des Oberprisenhofs, Bd. 1, at 52, 55.

¹¹⁰ Even British authors have steadily maintained that diversion must not be undertaken indiscriminately. In The Bernisse and The Elve, [1921] 458, the Privy Council made clear that under certain circumstances diversion could be held to be unjustified. In The Mim (Ann. Dig. (1947), Case No. 134, at 311), the British Prize Court held that “in the absence of reasonable suspicion the ship must be allowed to proceed.”

¹¹¹ Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 341.

¹¹² Ibid., 280.

¹¹³ Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 898.

¹¹⁴ See Ritchie, H., The “Navicert” System during the World War (1938)Google Scholar; Lovitt, J.V., “The Allied Blockade,” 11 Dept. of State Bull. 597 (1944)Google Scholar; Fitzmaurice, G.G., “Some Aspects of Modem Contraband Control and the Law of Prize,” in 22 BYIL 83 (1945)Google Scholar; Steinicke, D., Kriegsbedingte Risiken der neutralen Seeschiffahrt, (Hamburg, 1968)Google Scholar; Steinicke, D., Das Navicertsystem (Hamburg, 1966).Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 280.

¹¹⁶ Great Britain introduced it in November 1939. The British Order in Council of July 31, 1940, declared that goods that were not covered by a valid navicert would be liable to seizure.

¹¹⁷ Stödter, R., “Safe-Conduct and Safe Passage,” in EPIL 4, at 193–96, 194.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Lovitt, supra note 114, at 601.

¹¹⁹ Steinicke, D., Das Navicertsystem 277 Google Scholar; Stödter, supra note 117, at 195.

¹²⁰ When in the First World War Germany issued safe-conducts for ships, the ships having accepted German control were considered by the United States to have lost their neutral character. According to a French decree of August 27,1918 (Journal officiel, August 8, 1918, at 613) and an Italian decree of October 10, 1918 (Gazetta ufficiale, November 25, 1918, No. 277), neutral vessels that placed themselves under enemy control were considered, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to be navigating in the interest of the enemy and were liable to capture and condemnation. The German Supreme Prize Tribunal in The Ole Wegger (Ann. Dig., Vol. 12 (1943–45), at 532) decided that the acceptance of a British ship’s warrant constituted subjection of a vessel to the enemy’s control and therefore unneutral assistance.

¹²¹ Stödter, supra note 119.

¹²² See, inter alia, Jessup, P.C. (reporter), “Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War,” 33 Am. J. Int’l L., Suppl., 166–793, at 5’4 (1939)Google Scholar; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 282; Steinicke, D., Das Navicertsystem, 101,Google Scholar and Kriegsbedingte Risiken 12.

¹²³ See Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 899, referring inter alia to the Havana Convention of February 20, 1928, on Maritime Neutrality (135 LNTS 188–216; reprinted in Ronzitti (ed.), op. cit. supra note 48, at 771–78).

¹²⁴ Scheuner, supra note 87, at 407; Colombos, supra, para. 893.

¹²⁵ Colombos, supra, paras. 893, 894.

¹²⁶ See, inter alia, Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2074.

¹²⁷ Capture has to be distinguished from the right of angary (see Oppenheim/ Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 759; Lagoni, R., “Angary, Right of,” in Bernhardt, R. [ed.], EPIL 3, at 18 et seq.)Google Scholar and from requisitions (see Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20 paras. 617).

¹²⁸ Steinicke, D., Handelsschiffahrt und Prisenrecht (Hamburg, 1973),Google Scholar gives an excellent overview of treaties, national legislation, and instructions on the treatment of merchant vessels in time of war.

¹²⁹ Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 589; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 74; Lord Stowell in Le Louis, [1817] 2 Dods, 210–43 ; see also the cases of The Jessie, The Thomas F. Bayard, and The Pescawha, decided by the Anglo-American Claims Commission, Nielsen Report (1926), at 479–80.

¹³⁰ Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 193.

¹³¹ See, inter alia, de Mably, Abbé Bonnot, Le droit public de l’Europe fondé sur les traités (Paris, 1748).Google Scholar

¹³² E.g., treaty between Brazil and Uruguay of October 21, 1851; Costa Rica and Colombia of June n, 1856; United States and Prussia of September 10, 1785; United States and Italy of February 26, 1871; art. 211 of the Italian Codice per la marina mercantile of June 25, 1865 and of October 24, 1877 (subject to reciprocity).

According to Berber op. cit. supra note 20, at 206, private enemy property was not affected in the French-German War (1870/71), the Chinese-Japanese War (1894), or in the Spanish-American War (1898).

¹³³ Official Records, Vol. Ill, at 1141; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 74. A statement to the same effect was made in the American memorandum of June 30, 1899, to the 1899 Hague Peace Conference (printed in Niemeyer, Th., Urkundenbuch zum Seekriegsrecht, Vol. 1, at 152 (Berlin, 1913).Google Scholar The U.S.A. held this position from the end of the eighteenth until the beginning of the twentieth century; see, e.g., Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Prussia and the U.S. of September 10, 1785; Italo-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of February 26, 1871.

¹³⁴ Official Records, Vol. Ill, at 183.

¹³⁵ Besides Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Spain, Portugal, Mexico, Colombia, and Panama voted against abolition.

¹³⁶ Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 592. Moreover, the U.S., during the Civil War, had made a notable extension of the doctrine of “continuous voyage” to contraband and even asserted its application to blockade.

¹³⁷ See also Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2061.

¹³⁸ G. Schramm, op. cit. supra note 67, 105; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 462. Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 594, states: “By accepting the inviolability of enemy property before a properly organized international society is created for the permanent peace in future, Great Britain and the United States would be abandoning the most formidable weapon secured to them by their naval superiority” (emphasis added).

¹³⁹ Private yachts, passenger ships, and even wrecks are also liable to capture; Terfloth, K., Das Seebeuterecht an gesunkenen Schiffen (Bonn, 1955).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 74; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 462; G. Schramm, op. cit. supra note 67, 305 et seq.; Higgins, Pierce, “Ships of War as Prize,” in 4 BYIL 103 (1925)Google Scholar; Dinstein, Y., “The Laws of War at Sea,” in Isr. YBHR, 1980, at 40 Google Scholar; Art. 33 of the 1913 Oxford Manual.

¹⁴¹ Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, supra, 476.

¹⁴² Contraband is being dealt with infra, pp. 317–18.

¹⁴³ Art. 21 of the 1909 London Declaration.

¹⁴⁴ Art. 63 of the 1909 London Declaration.

¹⁴⁵ See, e.g., Arts. 64 et seq. of the 1939 German Prize Ordinance; Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 903; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 474. Note that capture differs from other acts, such as those amounting to no more than diversion into port for search. The distinguishing criterion is the intent of the belligerent. See also Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 344. A prize is lost (a) when it escapes through being rescued by its own crew, (b) when the captor intentionally abandons it, or (c) when it is recaptured: see Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, supra, 494.

¹⁴⁶ Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, supra, 474; Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 195 ff.; McNair, op. cit. supra note 29, at 72; Art. 112 of the 1913 Oxford Manual; U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, The Wilhelmina, 78, F. Suppl. 57 (1948).

¹⁴⁷ According to Story (Notes on the Principles and Practice of Prize Courts 28 (1854, ed. by F. T. Pratt), prize extends “to all captures made on the sea jure belli; to all captures in foreign ports and harbours; to all captures made on land by naval forces and upon surrenders to naval forces either solely or by joint operations with land forces; and this, whether the property so captured be goods or mere choses in action; to captures made in rivers, ports and harbours of the captor’s own country, to money received as a ransom or commutation on a capitulation to naval forces alone or jointly with land forces.”

¹⁴⁸ Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 474; Downey, W.G. Jr., “Captured Enemy Property, Booty of War and Seized Enemy Property,” 44 Am. J. Int’l L. 488 (1950)10.2307/2194026CrossRef Google Scholar; Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 930. The same applies to goods on board such vessels if it is property of the enemy state. Private property on board such ships is subject to the law of prize.

¹⁴⁹ Colombos, supra, para. 925; see also Guttinger, P., “Réflexions sur la jurisprudence des prises maritimes de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale,” 25 RGDIP 54 (1975).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ Art. 64 of the 1909 London Declaration.

¹⁵¹ The cases in which an enemy merchant ship may be considered a legitimate military objective and may consequently be sunk on sight or after prior warning are not dealt with here.

¹⁵² Since a judgment of a prize court finally transfers a captured vessel to the captor, it is evident that after transfer the captured vessel as well as her cargo may be destroyed: Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 487.

¹⁵³ The Acteon (1815), 2 Dod. 48; The Felicity (1819), 2 Dod. 381; The Valeria, [1921] 1 A.C. 477; The Stoer [1916] 5 LI. PC. 18.

¹⁵⁴ Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 487 ff.

¹⁵⁵ See the examples given, ibid., 487.

¹⁵⁶ Procès-Verbal relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930, signed at London, November 6, 1936: Text in 173 LNTS 353 (1936).

¹⁵⁷ Oxford Manual of Naval Warfare, adopted by the Institut de Droit International on August 9, 1913, AIDI 26 (1913), at 641 (printed in: Ronzitti [ed.], op. cit. supra note 48, at 277.).

¹⁵⁸ Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, paras. 909 f.; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 487.

¹⁵⁹ Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, supra, 488.

¹⁶⁰ In its award of October 13, 1922, the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration, 17 Am. J. Int’l L. 363, 392 (1923), ruled that “just compensation implies a complete restitution of the status quo ante based not upon future gains… but upon the loss of profits of the… owners as compared with other owners of similar property.“

¹⁶¹ Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 108; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 496, 873.

¹⁶² It is reported that in the Crimean War (1854) for the first time France and Great Britain granted a period of grace to Russian vessels in their respective ports. According to a British Order in Council, “any Russian merchant vessel which prior to the date of this Order shall have sailed from any foreign port bound for any port or place in Her Majesty’s dominions, shall be permitted to enter such port or place and to discharge her cargo, and afterwards forthwith to depart without molestation, and any such vessel, if met at sea by any of Her Majesty’s ships, shall be permitted to continue her voyage to any port not blockaded.”

¹⁶³ G. Schramm, op. cit. supra note 67, 129.

¹⁶⁴ Hence, the period was called “induit,” “délai de faveur,” “days of grace,” “Gunstfrist.” See also Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 47g; L. Kotzsch, “Indult,” in WVR II, 19.

¹⁶⁵ Whereas, e.g., Prussia on June 21, 1866, granted a period of 6 weeks for Austrian merchant vessels, and France at the beginning of the Franco-German War of 1870/71 granted a period of 30 days. In the Spanish-American War, Spain granted 5 days, and at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Russia granted a period of 48 hours. See also Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2045.

¹⁶⁶ Hyde, supra, 2048.

¹⁶⁷ Similar rules are laid down in arts. 36 et seq. of the 1913 Oxford Manual.

¹⁶⁸ The list of signatures, ratifications, and accessions and the reservations of Germany and Russia are printed in Ronzitti, op. cit. supra note 48, at 93.

¹⁶⁹ See, e.g., the decision of the Privy Council in The Achata, [1916] 2 A.C. 198, The Belgia, [1916] 2 A.C. 183 and The Gutenfels, [1916] 2 A.C. 112. A review of First World War practice is given by Higgins, A.P., “Enemy Ships in Port at the Outbreak of War,” in 3 BYIL 55–78 (1923–24)Google Scholar; and by Kotzsch, supra note 164, at 19. See also Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 3, 2049 et. seq.

¹⁷⁰ Great Britain denounced the Convention in 1925, France in 1939.

¹⁷¹ Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 193; Rowson, S.W.D., “Prize Law during the Second World War,” in 24 BYIL 160 (1947)Google Scholar; de Guttry, A., “Commentary on the 1907 Hague Convention VI,” in Ronzitti (ed.), op. cit. supra note 48, at 102.Google Scholar Lord Merriman in The Pomona held that in absence of reciprocal agreement there was no rule of international law exempting from condemnation enemy ships found in a belligerent’s port at the outbreak of hostilities: Ann. Dig. (19417–42), Case No. 159, at 509–14. Germany formally adhered to Hague Convention VI subject to reciprocity.

¹⁷² For an assessment of the current legal situation, see Heintschel, W. Heinegg, v. (ed.), The Military Objective and the Principle of Distinction in the Law of Naval Warfare: Collected Papers and Proceedings, Bochum, FRG, November 1989.Google Scholar

¹⁷³ Passenger ships, which according to the traditional law are considered merchant vessels, are not exempt from capture. However, as the case of The Athenia shows, in the Second World War there at least existed a prohibition of sinking without prior warning: see Zemanek, K., “The Athenia,” in EPIL 3, at 41.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁴ See, inter alia, Art. 3, para. 2, and Art. 8 of Hague Convention XI.

¹⁷⁵ Art. 3, Hague Convention XI, relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War. Perhaps the most important decision on that issue is the one by the U.S. Supreme Court in The Pagúete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). See also Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 477; Hyde, op. cit. supra note 42, at 2053; O’Connell, D.P., The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 2, at 1122.Google Scholar In the case of The Berlin, 7 LI.P.C. 544 (1921), the Privy Council, while in principle acknowledging the special protection of such vessels, held that The Berlin “by reason of her size, equipment, and voyage,…was a deepsea fishing vessel engaged in a commercial enterprise which formed part of the trade of the enemy country, and, as such could be and was properly captured as prize of war.”

¹⁷⁶ Hague Convention XI, Art. 3. See also Shearer, I.A., “Commentary on Hague Convention XI,” in Ronzitti, (ed.), op. cit. supra note 48, at 186 Google Scholar; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 96; G. Schramm, op. cit. supra note 67, 143.

¹⁷⁷ Hague Convention XI, Art. 4. See also Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2056; Tucker, supra, 96; Schule, A., “Schiffe mit humanitären Zwecken,” in WVR III, 209.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁸ Art. 14, para. 1 (b), of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. See also Prott, L.V., “Commentary,” in Ronzitti, (ed.), op. cit. supra note 48, at 585.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁹ See, inter alia, O’Connell, op. cit. supra note 175, at 1123; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 538, 541; Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, paras. 660; Art. 45 of the 1913 Oxford Manual.

¹⁸⁰ That was expressly acknowledged by the Privy Council in the case of The Bathori. See also Stödter, R., “Geleit,” in WVR I, 639 Google Scholar; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, supra, 536; Art. 48 of the 1913 Oxford Manual. This, of course, only applies with regard to the belligerent having issued them.

¹⁸¹ Art. 38, Geneva Convention II.

¹⁸² Art. 23, para, 1, Geneva Convention IV.

¹⁸³ Art. 59, Geneva Convention IV.

¹⁸⁴ Arts. 22 et seq., Geneva Convention II. See also Mossop, J.C., “Hospital Ships in the Second World War,” in 26 BYIL 398 (1949)Google Scholar; Schule, A., “Lazarettschiffe,” in WVR II, 408.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁵ Similar rules were laid down in the Postal Treaty between Great Britain and Denmark of 1846.

¹⁸⁶ G. Schramm, op. cit. supra note 67,149; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 480.

¹⁸⁷ See also Art. 53, para. 2, of the 1913 Oxford Manual.

¹⁸⁸ E.g., in 1799 the Prussian merchant Diana which because of distress was compelled to put into Dunkerque, was released by the French prize court.

¹⁸⁹ Art. 34 of the 1913 Oxford Manual; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 479; G. Schramm, op. cit. supra note 67, 151.

¹⁹⁰ See, inter alia, Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 96; Art. 39, Geneva Convention II.

¹⁹¹ See, e.g., Art. 34, Geneva Convention II; Art. 3, para. 2, Hague Convention XI.

¹⁹² See, e.g., Art. 31, Geneva Convention II.

¹⁹³ 1856 Paris Declaration; Arts. 21 and 63 of the 1909 London Declaration and infra, p. 322–27.

¹⁹⁴ Art. 29 of the London Declaration; see, e.g., Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 685.

¹⁹⁵ Art. 38, Geneva Convention II; see also Art. 29 of the London Declaration.

¹⁹⁶ This follows from the fact that otherwise the special status of such societies would be meaningless.

¹⁹⁷ Protected by the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

¹⁹⁸ Arts. 74 and 122 et seq. Geneva Convention III.

¹⁹⁹ Art. 23, para. 1, Geneva Convention IV.

²⁰⁰ Art. 59, Geneva Convention IV.

²⁰¹ Art. ι, Hague Convention XI.

²⁰² See, inter alia, Hyde, op. cit. supra note 42, at 1974.

²⁰³ See the examples given by Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 666.

²⁰⁴ Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 90.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 94; Scheuner, U., “Beuterecht im Seekrieg,” in WVR 1, 199.Google Scholar

²⁰⁶ Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 623; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 165; Scheuner, U., “Neutralitätsrechte und -pflichten im Seekrieg,” in WVR II, 601 Google Scholar; Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 210.

²⁰⁷ Rights and duties of neutral states, as distinguished from neutral nationals and neutral ships, are not dealt with here. However, aspects of neutrality and nonbelligerency will be dealt with infra.

²⁰⁸ Supra.

²⁰⁹ See, inter alia, Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2041.

²¹⁰ Breach of blockade is not dealt with here.

²¹¹ The question whether a belligerent may capture and condemn neutral merchant vessels by way of reprisal in response to violations of the neutral flag state’s duty of impartiality will not be dealt with here. In this regard see Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 252. The position taken here is that a belligerent may not assert the law of reprisals in order to justify actions against neutral merchant vessels and their cargo because of prior violations of the laws of war by the adversary.

²¹² See infra; Berber, op. cit. supra note 20, at 223; Tucker, supra, 253.

²¹³ Tucker, ibid., 346.

²¹⁴ The German Oberprisenhof in The Medea (Entscheidungen des Oberprisenhofs Bd. 1 (1918), at 131) held that destruction of neutral merchant vessels may be exercised if in accordance with Art. 49 of the London Declaration.

²¹⁵ See Art. 37 of the London Declaration; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 276; Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2160; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 826. However, a “vessel may not be captured on the ground that she has carried contraband on a previous occasion if such carriage is in point of fact at an end” (Art. 38 of the London Declaration). With regard to the question which articles constitute contraband, see supra.

²¹⁶ The former position was taken by Anglo-American doctrine and practice (see, inter alia, Privy Council, The Sidi Ifni, [1945] 1 LI.P.C. (2nd) 200, 204; The Ringende Jacob [1798] 1 C. Rob. 89), the latter by continental European countries (see, inter alia, the decision of the German Oberprisenhof in The Björn, Entscheidungssammlung Bd. 1, at 152).

²¹⁷ This view is also taken by Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 277. Note, however, that Hyde op. cit. supra note 52, at 2160, obviously takes a different position. In the case of The Berkelstrom, the Netherlands government took the view that neutral prizes may not be destroyed because the 1909 London Declaration had remained unratified. In that case the proportion of contraband carried by the vessel played a decisive role, too.

²¹⁸ See supra.

²¹⁹ See, inter alia, Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2307 ff. According to Art. 7 of the 1907 Hague Convention XIII concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, “a neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit, for the use of either belligerent, of arms, ammunition, or, in general, of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet.” Only the supply of war materials by a neutral Power itself is prohibited (Art. 6). However, according to the Washington Rules of 1871 which were adopted for the Court of Arbitration in the case of The Alabama “[a] neutral Government is bound…to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties.”

²²⁰ The Kronprinsessin Margareta, [1921] 1 A.C. 754. Lord Summer in The Prins der Nederlande, [1921] 1 A.C. 760, put it as follows: “Neutrals who carry contraband do not break the law of nations; they run a risk for adequate gain, and, if they are caught, take the consequences. If they know what they are doing, those consequences may be very serious; if they do not, they may get off merely with some inconvenience or delay; this must suffice them.”

²²¹ Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 940.

²²² G. Schramm, op. cit. supra note 67, 160.

²²³ Art. 63 of the London Declaration; Rojahn, O., “Ships, Visit and Search,” in EPIL 4, at 224 Google Scholar; Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1981; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 856.

²²⁴ Der Prozez gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof, Band I, Nuremberg, 1947, at 350, 352.

²²⁵ Of course, one could argue that if the destruction of enemy merchant vessels is restricted to exceptional cases, in any event the same must be true with regard to neutral merchant vessels. This does not mean, however, that reference to the 1936 London Protocol is indispensable.

²²⁶ Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 918.

²²⁷ That was already acknowledged in the treaties concluded between The Netherlands, Sweden, and France in 1614 and between The Netherlands and the Hanse in 1615.

²²⁸ At the beginning of the Crimean War (1854), the transmission of information was equated to carriage of contraband. At the beginning of the Civil War (1861), a similar position was taken by Great Britain, France, and Spain in their respective declarations of neutrality. See also Art. 8 of the Italian Ordinance of June 20, 1866; the French Instructions of July 25, 1870; Art. 10 para. 7 of the Spanish Instructions of April 24, 1898, and Art. 15 of the U.S. Instructions to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers of June 20, 1898.

²²⁹ Italian Prize Ordinance of June 20, 1866; Russian Prize Ordinance of February 14, 1904, and Japanese Prize Ordinance of 1904.

²³⁰ See, inter alia, G. Schramm, op. cit. supra note 67, 253.

²³¹ Official Records, Vol. Ill, at 1135.

²³² At that meeting Lord Reay made the following statement: “La définition soumise à la Conférence du vaisseau auxiliaire par la Délégation britannique visait l’assistance hostile et une infraction aux obligations des neutres. La question de l’assistance hostile, aussi connue sous le nom de ‘non neutral service’ n’ayant pas été étudiée, ne se trouvant pas au programme de la Conférence, nous sommes d’avis que la discussion serait prématurée et qu’elle pourra être incluse dans le programme d’une Conférence ultérieure après avoir subi un examen sérieux de la part des Gouvernements représentés à la Conférence. Je suis autorisé par mon Gouvernement à retirer la définition du vaisseau auxiliaire. Le Droit international existant sera applicable à l’assistance hostile.”

²³³ This heading is a bad translation from the French “De l’assistance hostile,” for hostile assistance does not imply a violation of the laws of neutrality.

²³⁴ Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 319.

²³⁵ Apart from the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare which simply provide that “a neutral private aircraft is liable to capture if it is engaged in unneutral service” (Art. 53 c), there is no codification on this issue whatsoever. Nevertheless, it may be assumed that the rules on unneutral service also apply to neutral aircraft.

²³⁶ with regard to Part IV of the 1930 London Naval Treaty, the Committee of Experts emphasized that “the expression ‘merchant vessel,’ where it is employed in the declaration, is not to be understood as including a merchant vessel which is at the moment participating in hostilities in such a manner as to cause her to lose her right to the immunities of a merchant vessel” (Documents of the London Naval Conference 1930, London, 1930, at 443).

²³⁷ This includes transmission of intelligence to the enemy. See, inter alia, Mallison, W.T., Studies in the Law of Naval Warfare: Submarines in General and Limited Wars, 122 Google Scholar; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 837.

²³⁸ Supra, 00; see also Stödter, R., Flottengeleit, , and “Convoy,” in EPIL 3, at 128–130 Google Scholar; Donner, M., “Armed Merchant Ships and Convoys,” in Fleck, D. (ed.), The Gladisch Committee on the Law of Naval Warfare, 26.Google Scholar

²³⁹ Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 839; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 322.

²⁴⁰ See supra, 00.

²⁴¹ Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, supra 833. In the case of The Friendship, [1807] 6 C. Rob. 420, the High Court of Admiralty condemned The Friendship because it was considered to be a “vessel engaged in the immediate military service of the enemy.”

²⁴² Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2174; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 330.

²⁴³ Tucker, supra, 320; Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 833.

²⁴⁴ Tucker, supra, 325. However, as shown in the case of The Asama Maru, belligerents regularly confine themselves to removing enemy persons from the neutral vessel; see also The Manouba, Martens, N.R.G. Vol. 8, at 170; Briggs, H.W., “Removal of Enemy Persons from Neutral Vessels on the High Seas,” in 34 Am. J. Int’l L. 249 (1940)10.2307/2192997CrossRef Google Scholar; Scheuner, U., “Die Wegnahme feindlicher Staatsangehöriger von neutralen Schiffen,” in ZVR 24 (1941), 411.Google Scholar

²⁴⁵ The Maria, [1799] 1 C. Rob. 340, 374; The Elsebe, [1804] 5 C. Rob. 174.

²⁴⁶ However, in The Nereide, (1815) 9 Cranch. 388, 441, Mr. Justice Story took the English view.

²⁴⁷ Blockade is not being dealt with here.

²⁴⁸ Unneutral service is being dealt with supra, 319–22.

²⁴⁹ See supra.

²⁵⁰ See, inter alia, Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2163; Scheuner, U., “Konterbanderecht,” in WVR II, 290.Google Scholar

²⁵¹ U. Scheuner, ibid.; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 263; Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 706.

²⁵² Colombos ibid. The Declaration of Paris of 1856 uses the term without attempting to define it.

²⁵³ Even though a number of bilateral treaties had been concluded in order to fix what articles belonged to which category, they, because of their differing content, did not contribute to a clarification.

²⁵⁴ Hugo Grotius, op. cit. supra note 46, Caput I, V: “Sunt enim res quae in bello tantum usum habent, ut arma: sunt quae in bello nullum habent usum, ut quae voluptati inserviunt: sunt quae et in bello et extra bellum usum habent, ut pecuniae, commeatus, naves, et quae navibus adsunt. … In tertio ilio genere usus an-cipitis distinguendus erit belli status.”

²⁵⁵ See also the overview given by Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2099.

²⁵⁶ Garner, J.W., “Violations of Maritime Law by the Allied Powers during the World War,” 25 Am. J. Int’l L. 33 (1931).CrossRef Google Scholar

²⁵⁷ Cases in which proof of the destination is complete are laid down in Art. 31.

²⁵⁸ See also the commentary by Renault in the Rapport général présenté à la Conférence Navale au nom du Comité de Rédaction.

²⁵⁹ According to Art. 34, this destination is presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to enemy authorities, or to a contractor established in the enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. A similar rebuttable presumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy.

²⁶⁰ See also the commentary by Renault, supra note 258.

²⁶¹ Verzijl, J.H.W., Le droit des prises de la Grande Guerre (Leyden, 1924)Google Scholar; Whiteman, M.M., Digest of International Law, Vol. 1, c. 32 (Washington, 1968)Google Scholar; Gervais, A., “Le droit des prises maritimes dans la seconde guerre mondiale. La jurisprudence française (britannique, italienne, allemande) des prises maritimes dans la seconde guerre mondiale,” in RGDIP 1948, at 82–161 Google Scholar; 1949, at 201–74; 1950, at 251–316; 1951, at 481–546. Parties to the Balkan wars of 1912/13 more or less adhered to its rules, even though, in the case of The Carthage, coal and foodstuffs were considered contraband: see Scheuner, , “Konterbanderecht,” in WVR II, 291.Google Scholar

²⁶² Oppenheim/Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 801.

²⁶³ British High Court of Justice, The Alwaki [1940] P. 215.

²⁶⁴ See, inter alia, the judgement of February 1, 1918, of the Privy Council in The Louisiana, [1918] 7 LI.P.C. 410; [1918] A.C. 461. In The Kim and Other Vessels, [1915] P. 367, it was declared: “Apart altogether from the special adaptability of these cargoes (i.e. foodstuffs) for the armed forces, and the highly probable inference that they were destined for the forces, even assuming that they were indiscriminately distributed between the military and civilian population, a very large proportion would necessarily be used by the military forces.” With regard to the controversy on foodstuffs, see Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2108.

²⁶⁵ Scheuner, , “Konterbanderecht,” in WVR II, 291.Google Scholar

²⁶⁶ Arts. 40–60 of the French Instructions of March 8, 1934.

²⁶⁷ Arts. 159–67 of the Italian Legge della Guerra of July 8, 1938.

²⁶⁸ E.g., the list of articles of absolute contraband announced by Great Britain on September 4, 1939, comprises inter alia coin, bullion, currency, evidence of debt; also metal, materials, dies, plates, machinery, or other articles necessary or convenient for their manufacture. The 1939 German Prize Ordinance included a list of articles of absolute contraband similar to that of the London Declaration. However, on September 12, 1939, a new list (RGBl. 1939 I, 1585) was published, which was to a great extent identical with the British list of September 4.

²⁶⁹ Colombos, op. cit. supra note 20, para. 776, referring to Hall, 781.

²⁷⁰ Ann. Dig., (1938–40), Case No. 223, at 586.

²⁷¹ See the examples given by Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2130, and by Oppenheim/ Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, at 816, 821.

²⁷² Cases of the German vessels Bundesrath, Herzog and General, Pari. Papers, Africa, No. 1 (1900).

²⁷³ Briggs, H.W., The Doctrine of Continuous Voyage (1926)Google Scholar; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 270; Scheuner, , “Konterbanderecht,” in WVR II, 291.Google Scholar See also the cases of The Kim [1915] R 215, and The Louisiana [1918] A.C. 461.

²⁷⁴ Privy Council, The Monte Contes, [1944] Ac. 6.

²⁷⁵ British High Court of Justice, The Charles Racine, [1944] 1 LI.P.C. (2nd), 187.

²⁷⁶ Privy Council, The Stjernblad, [1918] 6 LI.P.C. 101.

²⁷⁷ Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 273.

²⁷⁸ The Sarah Christina, [1799] 1 C. Rob. 237; The Eleonora Wilhelmina, [1807] 6 C. Rob. 331; The Kim, [1915] Ρ 215; U.S. Supreme Court in Carrington v. Merchants’ Insurance Co. (1834) 8 Peters, 495; The Peterhoff (1866), 5 Wall. 28.

²⁷⁹ E.g., the French Prize Court in The Frederick VIII (Journal Officiel of May 19,1922, at 5277) stated that such goods were protected by the rules laid down in the 1856 Paris Declaration. Lord Merriman in The Hakozaki Maru considered the doctrine of infection to be “highly artificial.” See also Tucker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 276, fn. 29.

²⁸⁰ See, inter alia, Kaishoven, F., “Commentary on the igoa London Declaration,” in Ronzitti, (ed.), op. cit. supra note 48, at 269.Google Scholar

²⁸¹ Ibid., 272.

²⁸² See Whiteman, M.M., Digest of International Law, Vol. 10, at 797 (Washington, 1968).Google Scholar

²⁸³ Hyde, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1965.

²⁸⁴ Among those precedents, the most prominent are: The Roumanian, [1914] 1 B.& CRC. 75. 356; Ten Bales of Silk at Port Said, [1916] 1 B.& C.P.C. 247.

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Visit, Search, Diversion, and Capture in Naval Warfare: Part I, The Traditional Law

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