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Climate Change and International Legal Personality: “Climate Deterritorialized Nations” as Emerging Subjects of International Law?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2022

DAVORIN LAPAŠ
DAVORIN LAPAŠ*
Affiliation:
Davorin Lapaš, Professor of Public International Law, Department of Public International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia; Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration; Member of the International Law Association Committee on International Law and Sea Level Rise ([email protected]).
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Abstract

This article deals with the sea level rise phenomenon caused by the climate change process and its impact on the statehood of so-called disappearing island states as well as on the consequent factual and legal status of their populations. In classical international law doctrine, the loss of a state’s territory will lead to the extinction of statehood and, consequently, the loss of that state’s international legal personality, and possibly also to the statelessness of its nationals. This article proposes an alternative solution based on the transformation of disappearing island states into new non-territorial subjects of international law — “climate deterritorialized nations” — as successors to disappeared inundated states.

Résumé

Résumé

Cet article traite du phénomène d’élévation du niveau de la mer causé par le processus de changement climatique, et de son impact sur le statut factuel et juridique d’États insulaires dits en voie de disparition ainsi que de leurs populations. Dans la doctrine classique du droit international, la perte du territoire d’un État conduira à l’extinction de son statut d’État et, par conséquent, à la perte de sa personnalité juridique internationale, ainsi qu’à l’apatridie éventuelle de ses ressortissants. Cet article propose une solution alternative basée sur la transformation d’États insulaires en voie de disparition en de nouveaux sujets du droit international non territoriaux — des “nations déterritorialisées par le climat” — en tant que successeurs d’États inondés disparus.

Keywords

climate change“climate deterritorialized nations”disappearing island statesinternational legal personalitysea level risesubjects of international lawchangement climatiqueélévation du niveau de la merÉtats insulaires en voie de disparition“nations déterritorialisées par le climat”personnalité juridique internationalesujets du droit international
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international , Volume 59 , November 2022 , pp. 1 - 35
Copyright
© The Canadian Yearbook of International Law/Annuaire canadien de droit international 2022

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References

1 Sir John Fischer Williams, “The Legal Character of the Bank for International Settlements” (1930) 24:4 Am J Intl L 665 at 665.

2 See e.g. Crawford, James, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006) at 45–61 Google Scholar; Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts, Oppenheims’s International Law, vol 1, Introduction and Part 1, 9th ed (London: Harlow, Longman, 1992) at 120–23.

3 VĐ Degan, Međunarodno pravo (Rijeka: Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Rijeci, 2000) at 231.

4 Thus, as Tiffany TV Duong states, “[f]inally, climate change has a built-in disparate impact: those countries producing the most harmful GHGs are usually the least affected by climate change disasters, while those producing the least seem to bear the greater brunt of global warming harms. Moreover, the victims of climate change, often small islands or poor nations, are frequently in the worst position to adapt and mitigate the damages.” Tiffany TV Duong, “When Islands Drown: The Plight of ‘Climate Change Refugees’ and Recourse to International Human Rights Law” (2010) 31:4 U Penn J Intl L 1239 at 1243.

5 Migration and Climate Change, International Organization for Migration (2008), online: <www.iom.cz/files/Migration_and_Climate_Change_-_IOM_Migration_Research_Series_No_31.pdf>.

6 See e.g. J McAdam, “Self-determination and Self-governance for Communities Relocated across International Borders: The Quest for Banaban Independence” (2017) 24 Intl J Minority & Group Rights 428 at 433. See also United Nations (UN), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights, Climate Change and Migration (last visited 7 March 2022), online: <ohchr.org/en/climate-change/human-rights-climate-change-and-migration>.

7 In this context, it is also worth noting some other terms denoting the status of governments and peoples that have lost their territory — for example, “nations ex situ” (Maxine Burkett), “ecological refugee state” (Jörgen Ödalen), “state substitute” (Julien Jeanneney), or “pseudo-states” (Sabine Lavorel). See Maxine Burkett, “The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialized Nationhood, and the Post-Climate Era” (2011) 2 Climate L 345 at 345–74; Jörgen Ödalen, “Underwater Self-determination: Sea-level Rise and Deterritorialized Small Island States” (2014) 17:2 Ethics, Policy & Environment 225 at 230; Julien Jeanneney, “L’Atlantide. Remarques sur la submersion de l’intégralité du territoire d’un État” (2014) 118:1 RGDIP 95 at 128ff; Sabine Lavorel, “Les enjeux juridiques de la disparition du territoire de petits États insulaires” in P Bacot & A Geslin, eds, Insularité et sécurité. L’île entre sécurité et conflictualité (Brussels: Bruylant, 2014) 19 at 44ff.

8 Hermann Mosler, “Réflexions sur la personnalité juridique en droit international public” in J Baugniet, ed, Mélanges offerts à Henri Rolin (Paris: Éditions A Pedone, 1964) 228 at 239.

9 Thus, Rolando Quadri states: “C’est la science du droit international et seulement elle qui pour des raisons systématiques manifestes a besoin d’utiliser l’idée abstraite de sujet de droit. Et cette idée doit être tirée de l’ordre juridique international dans son ensemble, de sa structure et de son esprit.” Rolando Quadri, “Cours général de droit international public” (1964) 113:3 Rec des Cours 237 at 375. Similarly, Cezary Berezowski states: “Les catégories des sujets du droit international et leur nombre varient selon les relations internationales existantes et les règles juridiques de ces relations.” Cezary Berezowski, “Les problèmes de la subjectivité international” in Vladimir Ibler, ed, Mélanges offerts à Juraj Andrassy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968) 31 at 32. For a similar attitude, see David I Feldman, “International Personality” (1985) 191:2 Rec des Cours 343 (“[H]istoric-comparative analysis has proved that international legal relations of each stage of historical development had their … particular international personality” at 357).

10 See Feldman, supra note 9 at 406.

11 “L’existence de normes indiquant que certaines entités possèdent la personnalité internationale (…) n’a pas été établie dans le droit international positif. La pratique internationale ne permet pas de constater l’existence de telles normes.” Julio A Barberis, “Nouvelles questions concernant la personnalité juridique internationale” (1983) 179:1 Rec des Cours 145 at 168.

12 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) explicitly confirmed this attitude in the so-called Reparation case. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, [1949] ICJ Rep 174 at 178 [Reparation].

13 See Berezowski, supra note 9 at 31.

14 Thus, for example, in his Manual of International Law in 1902, Franz von Liszt began the chapter on subjects of international law with the following words: “Only States are subjects of international law — holders of international rights and duties” (in German: “Nur die Staaten sind Subjekte des Völkerrechts: Träger von völkerrechtlichen Rechten und Pflichten”). Franz von Liszt, Das Völkerrecht — systematisch dargestellt (Berlin: Verlag von O Haering, 1902) at 34. For a similar approach, see the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case in 1927: “International law governs relations between independent States.” The Case of S.S. “Lotus” (1927), PCIJ (Ser A) No 10 at 18.

15 See Feldman, supra note 9 at 359. See also Tunkin, GI, ed, International Law (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986)Google Scholar at 101–04, 120–22.

16 See Scelle, Georges, Cours de droit international public (Paris: Éditions Domat-Montchrestien, 1948)Google Scholar at 512.

17 Thus, Cheng states: “[A]voir la personnalité juridique internationale signifie être le destinataire direct des règles du droit international.” Bin Cheng, “Introduction” in M Bedjaoui,ed, Droit international, bilan et perspectives, vol 1 (Paris: Pedone, 1991) at 25. See also Barberis, supra note 11 at 169.

18 Thus, Capotorti states: “[D]ire qu’une entité possède la personnalité pour l’ordre juridique international dénote exactement la capacité du sujet à devenir titulaire des droits et des obligations prévus par cet ordre.” Francesco Capotorti, “Cours général de droit international public” (1994) 248:4 Rec des Cours 9 at 42.

19 MN Shaw, International Law, 9th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021) at 180.

20 See e.g. Levi, W, Contemporary International Law: A Concise Introduction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979)Google Scholar at 63; B Vukas, “States, Peoples and Minorities” (1991) 231:6 Rec des Cours 267 at 486. Cf Feldman, supra note 9 at 359.

21 See e.g. Jennings & Watts, supra note 2 at 119–20.

22 See Constantin Th Eustathiades, “Les sujets du droit international et la responsabilité internationale. Nouvelles tendances” (1953) 84:3 Rec des Cours 397 at 414–15. See also P Reuter, Droit international public (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1983) at 175; Barberis, supra note 11 at 165.

23 Mugerwa, Nkambo, “Subjects of International Law” in Sørensen, M, ed, Manual of Public International Law (London and New York: MacMillan and St Martin’s Press, 1968)Google Scholar 247 at 249.

24 Kelsen, Cf Hans, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1945)Google Scholar at 93. Thus, Hermann Mosler defines legal personality as follows: “It means that a person possesses the capacity to be the subject of legally relevant situations…. Legal capacity is a status in law which is, in a legal system, the reference point of conferring rights, obligations and competences.” Mosler, Hermann, “Subjects of International Law” in Bernhardt, R, ed, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol 7 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984)Google Scholar at 443. See also Walter, Christian, “Subjects of International Law” in Wolfrum, Rüdiger, ed, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol 9 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012)Google Scholar 634 at 639.

25 Thus, the ICJ in its earlier-mentioned advisory opinion in the so-called Reparation case, supra note 12 at 178, stated: “The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community.” See also the Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów, Réponse du Gouvernement allemand à l’exception préliminaire du Gouvernement polonais (Response of the German Government to the Preliminary Objection of the Polish Government) (1927), PCIJ (Ser C) No 13-I at 173. See also L Caflisch et al, eds, Les sujets du droit international, vol 3 (Geneva: Librairie E Droz, 1973) at 33.

26 See Barberis, supra note 11 at 168; Mosler, supra note 8 at 250.

27 See e.g. Shaw, supra note 19 at 238.

28 Christian Tomuschat, “General Course of Public International Law” (1999) 281 Rec des Cours 23 at 159.

29 See Davorin Lapaš, “Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities for IGO-Like Entities: A Step towards a New Diplomatic Law?” (2019) 16:2 Intl Organizations L Rev 378 at 397–98.

30 Cf Mosler, supra note 24 at 443; Feldman, supra note 9 at 359; Jennings & Watts, supra note 2 at 119–20.

31 Eustathiades, supra note 22 at 414–15; Mugerwa, supra note 23 at 249.

32 Mugerwa, supra note 23 at 249.

33 Shaw, supra note 19 at 180.

34 MS McDougal, “International Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary Conception” (1953) 82:1 Rec des Cours 137 at 161. On the other hand, “for many scholars, the modern subject is no longer acceptable as the basis for bringing us truth; new — post-modern — methods to gather knowledge, to find the available fragments of truth and to account for the phenomenon of man are needed.” JE Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personality — An Inquiry into the History and Theory of International Law (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2004) at 370–71.

35 Nijman, supra note 34 at 403.

36 See R Higgins, “Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law” in R Falk, F Kratochwil & SH Mendlowitz, eds, International Law: A Contemporary Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985) 476 at 480.

37 Cf Allott, Philip J, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 372–73Google Scholar.

38 Cf Berezowski, supra note 9 at 33. See also Fortin, K, The Accountability of Armed Groups under Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) at 71–89 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Portmann, R, Legal Personality in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 29–42 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Vukas, supra note 20 at 280.

40 Crawford, supra note 2 at 45–46.

41 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934), art 1.

42 See e.g. McAdam, J, “‘Disappearing States’, Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law” in McAdam, J, ed, Climate Change and Displacement. Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 105 at 110–11Google Scholar; Ödalen, supra note 7 at 227.

43 See Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Committee, Opinion No 1, 29 November 1991, reprinted in (1992) 31 ILM 1494 at 1495.

44 Vukas, supra note 20 at 296.

45 Thus, James Crawford points out that “statehood has been preserved amidst the chaos of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the lack of any overall governmental authority in Somalia.” Crawford, supra note 2 at 91–92.

46 See ibid at 161–62.

47 See D Wong, “Sovereignty Sunk? The Position of ‘Sinking States’ at International Law” (2013) 14 Melbourne J Intl L 346 at 355.

48 North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands), Judgment, [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at 32.

49 This fiction has a long legal tradition dating back to Roman law. “Nasciturus pro iam nato habetur, quotiens de commodis ipsius partus quaeritur,” which means that “[t]he unborn is deemed to have been born to the extent that his own benefits are concerned.” Paulus, Digestae (Zagreb: Latina et Graeca, 1989) at 1, 5, 7. See also Sententiae ad filium Iulii Pauli, Liber tertius (Zagreb: Latina et Graeca, 1989) at 126.

50 Thus, for instance, such an analogy is mentioned by Rosemary Rayfuse, Jörgen Ödalen, and Eduardo Jiménez Pineda. See Rosemary Rayfuse, “International Law and Disappearing States: Maritime Zones and Criteria for Statehood” (2011) 41:6 Envtl Pol’y & L 281 at 285; Ödalen, supra note 7 at 356–58; Eduardo Jiménez Pineda, “The Disappearing Island State Phenomenon: A Challenge to the Universality of the International Law of the Sea” (Conference Paper No 11/2018, European Society of International Law Conference Paper Series, 13–15 September 2018) at 13.

51 Jenny Grote Stoutenburg, Disappearing Island States in International Law (Leiden: Brill/Nijhoff, 2015) at 379.

52 Thus, Crawford states: “[T]he necessary prerequisites for independence under a regime of protection are the retention of substantial authority in international affairs (including implementation of international obligations), some degree of control over the exercise of foreign affairs powers, and that metropolitan competences be based on delegation by treaty or other instrument.” Crawford, supra note 2 at 294.

53 Ibid at 46.

54 Grote Stoutenburg, supra note 51 at 404.

55 Ibid at 423.

56 Ibid at 430–31.

57 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “The Concept of Stateless Persons under International Law” (Summary Conclusions, Expert Meeting, Prato, Italy, 27–28 May 2010) at 2, online: <www.unhcr.org/4cb2fe326.html>.

58 Cf Jiménez Pineda, supra note 50 at 11.

59 Cf Grote Stoutenburg, supra note 51 at 272.

60 Ibid at 423.

61 Ibid at 405.

62 Vukas, supra note 20 at 282–83.

63 Shaw, supra note 19 at 190.

64 Jennings & Watts, supra note 2 at 563.

65 See also Institut de Droit international, La reconnaissance des nouveaux États et des nouveaux gouvernements, Session de Bruxelles, 23 avril 1936 (Basel: Éditions juridiques et sociologiques, 1957) at 11.

66 Crawford, supra note 2 at 46. Of a similar opinion is Jiménez Pineda: “[L]and (the territory) is logically one of the statehood’s constitutive elements.” Jiménez Pineda, supra note 50 at 8.

67 Jennings & Watts, supra note 2 at 121.

68 The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) is a coalition of forty-four small island and low-lying coastal developing states from the Pacific, Caribbean, and Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and South China Sea region. It was established in 1990, dealing primarily with the problems of climate change, sustainable development, and ocean conservation. Today, AOSIS represents 5 percent of the world’s population. For more details see “AOSIS,” online: <aosis.org/about/>.

69 Small island developing states (SIDS) are a distinct group of developing countries facing specific social, economic, and environmental vulnerabilities. SIDS were recognized as a special case both for their environment and development at the United Nations (UN) Conference on Environment and Development, which is also known as the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Presently, SIDS represent thirty-nine UN member states and nine associate members non-self-governing territories. UNESCO, UNESCO and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), online: <en.unesco.org/sids/about#list>. For more details on SIDS and their activities, see Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, Small Island Developing States: Small Islands Big(ger) Stakes (New York, 2011). On the development of AOSIS and SIDS, see also Grote Stoutenburg, supra note 51 at 19–29. See also Jiménez Pineda, supra note 50 at 3–4.

70 Jiménez Pineda, supra note 50 at 4.

71 Cf Reed Koenig, “Climate Change’s First Casualties: Migration and Disappearing States” (2015) 29:3 Georgetown Immigration LJ 501 at 517–18.

72 See Jiménez Pineda, supra note 50 at 4.

73 Thus, for instance, Tuvalu has a land mass of twenty-six square kilometres and an exclusive economic zone of 757,000 square kilometres. See ibid at 5–6.

74 See Vidas, D, Freestone, D & McAdam, J, eds, International Law and Sea Level Rise: Report of the International Law Association Committee on International Law and Sea Level Rise (Leiden: Brill, 2018) at 20–27.Google Scholar

75 Jiménez Pineda, supra note 50 at 8.

76 Ibid at 10.

77 Tullio Treves, “L’État du droit de la mer à l’approche du XXI siècle” (2000) 5 Ann dr mer 123 at 123–24. Cf R Casado Raigón, Derecho Internacional (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 2017) at 321. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS].

78 See e.g. Wong, supra note 47 at 383.

79 Ibid at 384. Cf also Jennings & Watts, supra note 2 at 696–97.

80 Jiménez Pineda, supra note 50 at 9.

81 Ibid.

82 “Tuvalu’s Foreign Minister Simon Kofe Gives COP26 Speech Knee-Deep in the Sea to Show Nation on Frontline of Climate Crisis,” online: <www.abc.net.au/news/2021-11-10/tuvalu-minister-makes-cop26-speech-from-sea/100608344>.

83 Susannah Willcox, “Climate Change Inundation, Self-Determination, and Atoll Island States” (2016) 38 Hum Rts Q 1022 at 1033.

84 Vidas, Freestone & McAdam, supra note 74 at 54–55.

85 International Law Commission (ILC), “Sea-level Rise in Relation to International Law: First Issues Paper by Bogdan Aurescu and Nilüfer Oral, Co-Chairs of the Study Group on Sea-level Rise in Relation to International Law,” 72nd Sess, Geneva, 27 April–5 June and 6 July–7 August 2020, UN Doc A/CN.4/740 (13 May 2020) at 80, para 218(e). See also ILC, “Sea-level Rise in Relation to International Law: Second Issues Paper by Patrícia Galvão Teles and Juan José Ruda Santolaria, Co-Chairs of the Study Group on Sea-level Rise in Relation to International Law,” 73rd Sess, Geneva, 18 April–3 June and 4 July–5 August 2022, UN Doc A/CN.4/752 (19 April 2022).

86 See e.g. Shaw, supra note 19 at 424.

87 Jiménez Pineda, supra note 50 at 11.

88 See Koenig, supra note 71 at 519.

89 See Willcox, supra note 83 at 1032.

90 Rayfuse, supra note 50 at 284–85.

91 Crawford, supra note 2 at 55.

92 Shaw, supra note 19 at 460.

93 See McAdam, J, Climate Change Displacement and International Law: Complementary Protection Standards (Geneva: UNHCR, 2011) at 58 Google Scholar.

94 Cf e.g. Rayfuse, supra note 50 at 285.

95 Thus, Shaw states: “Extinction of statehood may take place as a consequence of merger, absorption or, historically, annexation.” Shaw, supra note 19 at 190. See also Jennings & Watts, supra note 2 at 206. Therefore, a merger would not only be a legally inappropriate solution for the preservation of statehood of disappearing island states but also not a very feasible one. Rayfuse provides a very good illustration of how states have already shown their unwillingness to engage in such “wholesale population absorption”: “When, in 2001, Tuvalu approached Australia and New Zealand about the possibility of taking its population in the case of total loss of its territory, Australia flatly refused, while New Zealand agreed only to a 30 year immigration programme to accept up to 75 Tuvaluans per year who must be of good character and health, have basic English skills, have a job offer in New Zealand, and be under 45 years of age.” Rayfuse, supra note 50 at 285.

96 Thus, as Crawford pointed out, “[f]ederation represents a major form of State organization. Internationally it is usual for the central government to have full authority over foreign affairs, although the local States may retain some external competences, usually minor ones. As a result, it is said that: ‘[t]he federal state … constitute[s] a sole person in the eyes of international law.’” Crawford, supra note 2 at 483–84.

97 “The result has been described as a double succession, with neither North nor South Yemen absorbing or annexing the other, but rather becoming extinct and their union generating one new State instead.” Ibid at 706.

98 Cf Shaw, supra note 19 at 207–08.

99 See Grote Stoutenburg, supra note 51 at 402; Duong, supra note 4 at 1248.

100 See Koenig, supra note 71 at 506.

101 See Grote Stoutenburg, supra note 51 at 396.

102 Ibid at 420–23.

103 For the text of the Sydney Declaration and the Commentary, see Vidas, Freestone & McAdam, supra note 74 at 44–66.

104 Ibid at 59.

105 For that reason, unlike some other subjects of international law that, by definition, have been characterized by temporality (for example, liberation movements or insurgents), the appearance of CDNs could face the international community with permanent non-territorial subjects requiring the regulation of their status in international law.

106 See Grote Stoutenburg, supra note 51 at 390–91.

107 Rayfuse, supra note 50 at 284. See also Jiménez Pineda, supra note 50 at 12.

108 Willcox, supra note 83 at 1033.

109 McAdam, supra note 93 at 59–60.

110 N Tzouvala, “New Approaches to International Law: The History of a Project” (2016) 27:1 Eur J Intl L 215 at 221.

111 G Shaffer, “International Legal Theory, International Law and Its Methodology: The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law” (2015) 28:2 Leiden J Intl L 189 at 210.

112 See Statement by His Excellency Anote Tong, President of the Republic of Kiribati, General Debate of the 63rd Session of the UN General Assembly (25 September 2008), online: <www.un.org/ga/63/general_debate/pdf/kiribati_en.pdf>. See also Ödalen, supra note 7 at 234.

113 Quoted in McAdam, supra note 6 at 433.

114 BS Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto” (2006) 8:1 Intl Community L Rev 3 at 24. For more details on the development of the Third World approaches to international law (TWAIL) concept, see e.g. AR Hipollyte, “Correcting TWAIL’s Blind Spots: A Plea for a Pragmatic Approach to International Economic Governance” (2016) 18:1 Intl Community L Rev 34 at 38–43.

115 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 150 (entered into force 22 April 1954) [Refugee Convention].

116 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 10 September 1969, 1001 UNTS 45 (entered into force 20 June 1974).

117 In this context, it is worth mentioning the non-governmental organization (NGO) Living Space for Environmental Refugees (LiSER), which was created in order to promote the official recognition of environmental refugees. See CA Vlassopoulos, “When Climate-induced Migration Meets Loss and Damage: A Weakening Agenda Setting Process?” in B Mayer & F Crépeau, eds, Research Handbook on Climate Change, Migration and the Law (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2017) 376 at 379. LiSER was the very first NGO dedicated to this issue. It was created in 2002 and discontinued in 2011. F Gemenne & K Rosenow-Williams, “Conclusion: The Actors Involved in the Environmental Migration Complex” in K Rosenow-Williams & F Gemenne, eds, Organizational Perspectives on Environmental Migration (London: Routledge, 2016) 255 at 237.

118 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 4 October 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967).

119 See International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 July 2003), arts 2(1), 4 [ICRMW].

120 Koenig, supra note 71 at 503.

121 Ibid at 505–06.

122 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, art 3 (entered into force 21 March 1994).

123 McAdam, supra note 93 at 59–60.

124 Ioane Teitiota v New Zealand, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, Views adopted by the Committee under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No 2728/2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (7 January 2020) at 2 and 12 [Teitiotai].

125 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976); Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).

126 See Teitiotai, supra note 124 at 2, 12. However, it is worth mentioning the Dissenting Opinion of Committee Member Vasilka Sancin. Ibid, Annex 1 at 13–14, paras 5–6.

127 See Refugee Convention, supra note 115, art 38; ICRMW, supra note 119, art 92(1).

128 See ILC, Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, UNGAOR, Supp No 10, 68th Sess, UN Doc A/71/10 (2 May–10 June and 4 July–12 August 2016), art 10. However, at its seventieth session in 2018, the commission decided to include the topic “Sea-level rise in relation to international law” in its long-term program of work. Official Records of the UN General Assembly, UNGAOR, 73rd Sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/73/10 (30 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2018) at 340–41, para 369. See also ILC, Report on Seventy-first Session (29 April–7 June and 8 July–9 August 2019), Supp No 10, UN Doc A/74/10 (20 August 2019) at 340–41, paras 263–73.

129 See e.g. Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Natural Disasters and Similar Emergency Situations, GA Res 45/100 (14 December 1990) at preambular para 3; Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the United Nation, GA Res 46/182 (19 December 1991), Annex, Principle 4.

130 Thus, Koenig mentions the internal relocation of over five hundred thousand residents of Bhola Island in Bangladesh, which, although not an example of a disappearing island state, as a low-lying country is especially susceptible to rising sea levels. According to Koenig, “Bangladeshi scientists believe that as many as 20 million of the 150 million residents will become climate change refugees by 2030, forced to move because they are no longer able to live on their land.” Koenig, supra note 71 at 517–18.

131 See UNHCR, supra note 57 at 5.

132 Willcox, supra note 83 at 1026.

133 Ibid at 1034.

134 Ibid at 1036.

135 For more details, see McAdam, supra note 6 at 447–50.

136 See e.g. PS Mancini, “Della Nazionalità comme fondamento del Diritto delle Genti” in PS Mancini, Diritto internazionale: Prelezione (Naples: Giuseppe Marghieri Editore, 1873) at 42. Cf also R Redslob, Les principes du droit des gens moderne (Paris: Librairie Arthur Rousseau, 1937) at 216.

137 McAdam, supra note 6 at 441.

138 See Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v Nigeria), Provisional Measures, ICJ Doc CR.96/2 (15 March 1996) at 33. See also Vukas, supra note 20 at 283.

139 In this context, see also K Ipsen, Vӧlkerrecht, 7th ed (Munich: CH Beck, 2018) at 373–403.

140 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Final Report and Recommendations of the International Meeting of Experts of Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples, Paris, 27-30 November 1989 (1990) at 7–8.

141 Vukas, supra note 20 at 312.

142 E.g. Atlantic Charter, 14 August 1941, online: <avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp>; Declaration by the United Nations, 1 January 1942, online: <avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade03.asp>.

143 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can TS 1945 No 7 (entered into force 24 October 1945), art 4 [UN Charter].

144 Covenant of the League of Nations Adopted by the Peace Conference at Plenary Session, 28 April 1919, (1919) 13 Am J Intl L Supp 128 (entered into force 10 January 1920), Art 1, para 2 states: “Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.”

145 Mancini, supra note 136 at 37.

146 Yoram Dinstein, “Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities” (1976) 25 ICLQ 102 at 103–04.

147 Thus, as Koenig rationally remarked, “The EEZ rights are a potential source of funding for countries that will not have the means to find it elsewhere. These countries will be dealing with loss and relocation on a massive scale: communities must move, jobs will be displaced, and unfortunately, lives will be lost. Allowing disappearing states to sell or lease the rights of their former EEZ would provide these poor countries with financial support.” Koenig, supra note 71 at 522.

148 This logic can be found in the Roman law doctrine differentiating individuals (personae phisicae) from collective legal entities (personae iuridicae). Thus, Ulpianus said: “Si quid universitati debetur, singulis non debetur; nec quod debet universitas singuli debent.” See e.g. R Sohm, The Institutes of Roman Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892) at 107.

149 Cf Vukas, supra note 20 at 322.

150 Such differentiation can be understood by analogy with the detached legal personality of state and individuals as its population. Although the fundamental rights of states have an influence on individuals, they belong to the state as a collectivity. On the contrary, minority rights as collective rights belong to individuals who, as the members of a minority group, enjoy the right to practice their own religion and culture or, to use their own language, individually as well as in community with other members of their group. Cf Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, GA Res 47/135 (18 December 1992), art 3, para 1.

151 See e.g. H Charlesworth, C Chinkin & S Wright, “Feminist Approaches to International Law” (1991) 85:4 Am J Intl L 613 at 621. See also TM Franck, The Empowered Self: Law and Society in the Age of Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 30–31. However, some authors have foreseen our time as the age of non-state actors. Cf JT Mathews, “Power Shift” (1997) 76:1 Foreign Affairs 50 at 52.

152 M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 557.

153 In this context, some authors point out the need for reconsideration of the “land dominates the sea principle.” See e.g. DD Caron, “Climate Change, Sea Level Rise and the Coming Uncertainty in Oceanic Boundaries: A Proposal to Avoid Conflict” in S-Y Hong & JM Van Dyke, eds, Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea (Boston: Brill/Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 1 at 1, 14.

154 Ödalen, supra note 7 at 233–34.

155 Jiménez Pineda, supra note 50 at 10.

156 Ödalen, supra note 7 at 233.

157 UNCLOS, supra note 77.

158 GA Res 58/314 (1 July 2004).

159 GA Res 64/3 (19 October 2009).

160 GA Res 48/265 (24 August 1994). UN, “List of non-member states, entities and organizations having received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the UN General Assembly,” UN Doc A/INF/73/5/Rev.1 (18 January 2019).

161 GA Res A/RES/3237 (XXIX) (22 November 1974).

162 See Sovereign Order of Malta, “Bilateral Relations,” online: <www.orderofmalta.int/diplomatic-activities/bilateral-relations/>.

163 See Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc A/CONF.62/121 and Corr 1 to 8 (10 December 1982) at 187–89, online: <www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/final_act_eng.pdf>.

164 Tomuschat, supra note 28 at 159.

165 Accord entre le Conseil fédéral suisse et le Comité International Olympique relative au statut du Comité International Olympique en Suisse, 1 November 2000, online: <archive.icann.org/en/psc/annex6.pdf> (entered into force 1 November 2000), arts 2–3.

166 Ibid, art 9. For more details see also J-P Chappelet & B Kübler-Mabbott, The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System: The Governance of World Sport (London: Routledge, 2008) at 107.

167 Shaw, supra note 19 at 424.

168 Cf Burkett, supra note 7 at 363ff.

169 Cancún Adaptation Framework: Pre-event on Early Warning, Third Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva, 9 May 2011.

170 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, Sendai, Japan, 14–18 March 2015, 7 April 2015.

171 Cf Vidas, Freestone & McAdam, supra note 74 at 55.

172 Thus, the UN Charter, supra note 143, art 13(1)(a) states: “The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of … promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification.”