Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
In the first part of this paper [l] there was introduced a hypothetical computing device, the Q-machine. It was derived by abstracting from the process of calculating carried out by a man on his fingers, assuming an adequate supply of hands and the ability to grow fingers at will. The Q-machine was shown to be equal in computing power to a universal Turing machine. That is, the Q-machine could compute any number regarded as computable by any theory of computability developed so far. It may be recalled here that Turing machines were obtained by Turing [2] by abstracting from the process of calculating carried out by a man on some concrete 'symbol space' (tape, piece of paper, blackboard) by means of fixed but arbitrary symbols. Hence the contrast between the Q-machine and the Turing machines is that between arithmetical manipulation of counters and logical manipulation of symbols. In particular, one might say, loosely, that in a Turing machine, as in arithmetic, numbers are represented by signs whereas in the Q-machine, as on a counting frame, numbers represent themselves.