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The Spinning Wheel, the Stone Axe, and Sovereignty*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009
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- Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , March 1974 , pp. 70 - 85
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- Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1974
References
1 Blackburn v. Attorney General (1971) 2 All e.r. 1380.
2 The political problem of national sovereignty and the rule of law is inescapable and can lead in quite opposite directions. For example, according to Charvin, R. in “La République Démocratique Allemande et le droit international général,” Revue général de droit international public, LXXV (1971), 1014–59Google Scholar, the German Democratic Republic seems to play a role in the international community and to promote the development of an international law that questions the classical view of sovereignty. On the other hand, for Zuleeg, M. in “Die Kompetenzen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften gegenüber den Mitgliedstaaten,” Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart, xx (1971), 1–64Google Scholar, the European Communities are not a state, member states remain sovereign, and there is no partition of sovereign rights because sovereignty is indivisible, therefore “Community law” is more psychological than juridical in effect. As I shall point out later, however, there is also a case for the view that if sovereignty is indivisible the exercise of sovereign rights is not.
3 For a useful brief statement of the classical notion of sovereignty see Cranston, Maurice and Lakoff, Sanford A., A Glossary of Political Ideas (New York, 1969)Google Scholar, s.v. “Sovereignty,” 157–9: “Sovereignty has this intimate relationship with independence because sovereignty is the ultimate source of law and authority in a political society… Republicans, including Jean-Jacques Rousseau, argued that sovereignty belonged to the people. One striking feature of this development is that the republican theorists transferred to the people not the traditional notion of sovereignty-limited-by-law but the new idea of absolute sovereignty.”
4 For Danish cases similar in purpose to Mr Blackburn's, see (1973) c.m.l.r., Tegen v. the Prime Minister (Eastern Court of Appeal, Denmark, 4 December 1972), 1–4, and ibid., Aggergren v. The Queen and the Prime Minister (Eastern Court of Appeal, Denmark, 4 December 1972), 5–6.
5 The sovereignty of parliament is much debated among political theorists and legal scholars, with far from clearcut results. See for example Marshall, Geoffrey, Constitutional Theory (Oxford, 1971)Google Scholar; Rousseau, Charles, Droit international public (Paris, 5th ed., 1970)Google Scholar; Larson, Arthur, Jenks, C. Wilfred, et al., Sovereignty within the Law (London, 1965).Google Scholar For the general problem of sovereignty in international organizations a recent work is Ninčié, Djura, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Charter and in the Practice of the UN (The Hague, 1970).Google Scholar For the relation of national courts and the European Communities, Brinkhorst, L.J. and Mitchell, J.D.B., European Law and Institutions (Edinburgh, 1969)Google Scholar, is suggestive. Legislative power and sovereignty is discussed by Mitchell, J.D.B., Constitutional Law (London, 2d ed., 1968)Google Scholar, chap. 4.
6 As reported in the International Herald Tribune, 1 November 1971, 5.
7 The office of official publications of the European Communities issued a very convenient compendium, as of 1 January 1971, in each of the four official languages: Traités instituunt les Communautés européenes: Traités portant révision de ces traités: Documents annexes.
8 Dehousse, Jean-Maurice, “Essai sur le concept de supranationalité,” in Chronique de politique étrangère, XXII (March 1969), 183–204Google Scholar, suggests that since ideas need a word for expression, and once a word is used it usually acquires a meaning, examines some of the concepts the term supranational reveals, or hides. See Reuter, Paul (one of the drafters of the Treaty of Paris), La Communauté européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier (Paris, 1953)Google Scholar; also Delvaux, Louis, “La notion de supranationalité dans le traité du 18 avril 1951, créant la Communauté européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier,” in Annales de Droit et de Science politique, XVII (1957), 185–200.Google Scholar
9 cjec, 5 February 1963 (Van Gend and Loos/Netherlands Fiscal Administration 26–62) Rec. 1963, p. 23.
10 cjec, 15 July 1964 (Costa/enel; 6–64) Rec. 1964, pp. 1158, 1160.
11 For example cjec, 14 December 1971 (Commission/France 7–71) Rec. 1971: “les Etats membres ont convenu d'instituer une Communauté de durée illimitée, dotée d'institutions permanentes investies de pouvoirs réels, issus d'une limitation de compétences ou d'un transfert d'attributions des Etats à cette Communauté” (motif 19).
12 The extent to which organs of the United Nations take binding decisions in the same way as organs of the European Communities is perhaps debatable. See Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford, 1966)Google Scholar, on “Membership of Organizations,” 253, and authorities there noted: “The institutional aspects of organizations of states result in an actual, as opposed to a formal, qualification of the principle of sovereign equality. Thus an organization may adopt majority voting and also have a system of weighted voting; and organs may be permitted to take decisions, and even to make binding rules, without the express consent of all or any of the member states. Of course it can be said that on joining the organization each member consented in advance to the institutional aspects, and thus in a formal way the principle that obligations can only arise from the consent of states and the principle of sovereign equality are satisfied.” The main point of difference between the un and the European Communities which I wish to stress is that in the un compliance – or non-compliance – by a member state is an affirmation of a sovereign right in each instance. I believe each member state understands this to be the basis of its participation in the organization; the reservation of sovereignty, if not stated, is implied. In the European Communities, the reservation to decide on compliance or non-compliance is not made, and decisions of the European Communties’ organs take effect without further affirmation by the member states as such; see below p. 83, n. 39.
13 cjec, 18 February 1970 (Commission/Italy 38–69) Rec. 1970, 57.
14 cjec, 17 February 1970 (Commission/Italy 31–69) Rec. 1970, 41.
15 cjec, 31 March 1971 (Commission/Council 22–70) Rec. 1971, 288–9.
16 Ibid., 270.
17 Ibid., 282–3.
18 “On all questions which assume a particular interest for the common market, the Member States, after the end of the transitional period, will no longer follow any but a common action in the sphere of international economic organizations. To this end, the Commission submits to the Council, which acts by qualified majority, proposals relative to the scope and the implementation of such common action.”
19 The doctrine of “implied powers” is discussed in Nicolaysen, Gert, “Zur Theorie von den implied powers in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften,” Europarecht (Jahrbuch des Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft für Europarecht, i, 1966).Google Scholar Advocate general Lamothe, whose opinion rejected the “implied powers” argument, died early in 1972. During an interview on 17 March 1972 Judge P. Pescatore told the author that from conversations between Pescatore and Lamothe shortly before the latter's death he (Pescatore) believed Lamothe had perhaps changed his mind on the point since the court reported its decision on case 22–70.
20 cjec, 31 March 1971 (Commission/Council 22–70) Rec. 1971, 292, 294.
21 In eec Commission, Neuvième rapport général sur l'activité de la Commaunauté (ler avril 1965–31 mars 1966), n.p., 1966, 411–12, the Commission reports that the paucity of resorts to article 169 of the treaty is cause for felicitation, as demonstrating that dialogue between the Commission and the member states has borne fruit, and in most instances permits resolution of what the Commission considers violations of the treaty without resort to the Court.
22 Jenks, Wilfred, A New World of Law? A Study of the Creative Imagination in International Law (London, 1969), 132.Google Scholar
23 pcij, 1931 Series a/b no. 41, p. 57.
24 What is Justice, 286, quoted in Jenks, New World of Law, 135.
25 Giraud, “Le rejet de l'idée de souveraineté,” in Melanges Scelle, i, 252, quoted in Chaumont, Charles, “Recherche du contenu irréductible du concept de souveraineté internationale de l'état,” in Hommage d'une génération de juristes au Président Basdevant (Paris, 1960), 115Google Scholar, n.2.
26 There is a considerable literature on the growth of European Communities law and its standing in the courts of the member states: see Stein, Eric, “Toward Supremacy of Treaty-Constitution by Judicial Fiat: on the Margin of the Costa Case,” Michigan Law Review, LXIII (Jan., 1965), 491–518CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Erades, L., “International Law, European Community Law, and Municipal Law of Member States,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, XV (1966), 117CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pescatore, Pierre, “L'application directe des traités européens par les juridictions nationales: la jurisprudence nationale,” Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, V (1969, no. 1), 697–723Google Scholar; Pescatore, , Droit international et droit communautaire – essai de réflexion comparative (Nancy, 1969)Google Scholar; Pescatore, , L'ordre juridique des communautés européennes: étude des sources du droit communautaire (Liège, 1971)Google Scholar; Pescatore, , Conclusion et effet des Traités internationaux selon le droit constitutionnel, les usages, et la jurisprudence du Grande-Duché de Luxembourg (Luxembourg, 1964)Google Scholar; Eynard, S.F., “L'article 169 du Traité de Rome: douze ans d'application de la procédure d'infraction à l'égard des Etats membres de la c.e.e.,” Rivista di Diritto Europeo (April–June 1970), 99–125Google Scholar; Wagner, Heinz, Grundbegriffe des Beschlussrechts der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Cologne, 1965)Google Scholar; Donner, A.M. (member of the Court of Justice since 1958), “Les rapports entre la compétence de la cour de justice des communautés européennes et les tribuneaux internes,” in Académie de droit international Recueil des cours (Leyde, 1965)Google Scholar; Chevallier, Donner R.M., et al. Le juge national et le droit communautaire (Leyden-Brussels, 1966)Google Scholar; Donner, , The Role of the Lawyer in the European Communities (Edinburgh, 1968).Google Scholar
27 Salmon, Jean J.-A. and Suy, Erik, “La primauté du droit international sur le droit interne,” in L'adaptation de la Constitution Belge aux réalités internationales (Brussels, 1966), 73–4Google Scholar, n.13, lists the pertinent articles.
28 Texts in Michel Waelbroeck and Yves Van Der Mensbrugghe, “L'attribution de compétences constitutionelles à des institutions de droit international public,” in ibid., 65, 57, 58. The same authors give extensive citations to debates in the chambers of the Belgian parliament, 39ff.
29 Cmnd. 4715, “The United Kingdom and the European Communities,” July 1971, 3, par. 12.
30 Ibid., 5, par. 18.
31 Ibid., 8, par. 29.
32 As reported in the New York Times, 10 September 1965, 2.
33 There is a good summary of the traditional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and modern arguments for and against it in Marshall, Constitutional Theory, 35–43, “Indivisibility and illimitability of sovereignty,” and 43–53, “Sovereignty and entrenchment.”
34 Dubouis, Louis, “Les institutions communautaires depuis la ‘fusion des exécutifs’ ler juillet 1967–31 décembre 1968,” in Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, V (1969), 69–91.Google Scholar
35 See Aperçu des travaux de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes en 1971 (Luxembourg, 1971) for a tabulation of resort to prejudicial referrals from the Member States to the Court of Justice.
36 “Avis de la Commission au Conseil concernant les demandes d'adhésion du Royaume-Uni, de l'Irlande, du Denmark et de la Norvège,” Bulletin de la CEE (1967), no. 11, and Supplement.
37 See Lagrange, Maurice, “Les obstacles constitutionels à l'intégration européenne,” in Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, V (1969), 240–54.Google Scholar
38 See Rousseau, Charles, “La constitution de 1958 et les traités internationaux,” in Hommage d'une génération de juristes au Président Basdevant (Paris, 1960), 463–72.Google Scholar
39 The point could be made that, given a distinction between political and legal aspects of sovereignty, parliament could enact legislation which violated the treaty of accession to the European Communities and said legislation would be perfectly valid domestically. Whatever action might be taken by the aggrieved institutions of the European Communities, Acts of Parliament are binding on Her Majesty's subjects. In rebuttal I believe one might argue that in any constitutional system agencies may do things that are contrary to the constitution, with effects binding on citizens (or subjects) until such actions are nullified or suspended by other authorities (courts, or whatever) constitutionally charged to do so. This aspect of constitutional systems is not altered by adopting a new constitution (for example, the Treaty of Rome). In that case there is simply a new agency to declare on the legality of measures taken by other agencies. For example, the Congress of the United States can and does pass legislation that is legally binding on all citizens – until the Supreme Court, in an action brought for the purpose, pronounces on the constitutionality of a measure. When subjects (or citizens) are confronted with two binding, but conflicting, obligations, a constitutional regime must provide a mechanism for adjudication. The thesis here is that the European Communities have a law that is binding not only on member states but their citizens: see (1973) c.m.l.r., s.a.f.a. v. Amministrazione delle Finanze (Court of Appeal of Milan 12 May 1972), 156–7, “that is, regulations are interpolated automatically into the internal legal systems without any necessity for a specific measure of the member-States and constitute genuine legal provisions directly binding on all those to whom they are addressed, including the citizens of the member-States… Here finally, Community law is placed above and outside the internal legal systems of the individual member-States which, signing the Treaty of Rome and receiving it into their own legal systems, have renounced their sovereign powers in these particular sectors.” This language, from a national court, is the the same as that used by the Court of Justice. The courts in other member states have acted similarly. To be sure, British courts might hold otherwise. But to do so would, in effect, be to say that the United Kingdom is not a part of the European Communities.
40 “Le droit britannique et l'entrée de la Grande Bretagne dans le Marché commun,” (Congrès international de Rouen, Novembre 1967, “Les problèmes juridiques que poserait l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans le Marché commun”) in Bulletin des juristes européens (1969, no. 29–30), 68.
41 cjec, 5 May 1970 (Commission/Belgium 77–69) Rec. 1970, 247.
42 Ibid.
43 cjec, 18 November 1970 (Commission/Italy 8–70) Rec. 1970, 961–73. A recent reiteration of this principle was given by Advocate General Roemer, Karl, who “recalled that, according to the decisions of the Court itself, a Member State was not entitled to plead its own internal legislation or practices to justify failure or delay in implementing Community obligations by allowing the period for implementation appointed by the Directive to expire without adopting the measures provided for therein.” Proceedings of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (Week of 28th May to 1st June, 1973)Google Scholar, no. 12/73, Case 79–72 Commission v. Italy.