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Public Policy as a Determinant of Interest Group Behaviour: The Canadian Labour Congress' Corporatist Initiative, 1976–1978*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Stephen McBride
Stephen McBride
Affiliation:
Lakehead University
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Abstract

The Canadian Labour Congress' abortive corporatist initiative 1976–1978 is examined. Existing interpretations of the episode are reviewed and an alternative posited. CLC policy represented an attempt to extend the existing localized collective bargaining system to the national level in response to the federal government's shift from macro-economic policy management to more direct forms of economic intervention. The initiative's failure is ascribed to a misreading of government intentions and to an inconsistency between proposals for national corporatism and other, noncorporatist, features of the existing collective bargaining system. Emphasis is placed on the state's role, past and present, in shaping interest group behaviour and in establishing or vetoing corporatism.

Résumé

Dans cet article l'auteur examine l'initiative corporatiste avortée du Congès du Travail du Canada de 1976–1978. Les interprétations existantes de cet épisode sont passées en revue et une alternative est avancée. La politique du C.T.C. marque une tentative d'étendre le système de négociation collective locale existant à l'échelle nationale en réponse au changement de la politique d'administration macro-économique du gouvernement fédéral par des formes plus directes d'intervention économique. L'échec de l'initiative est attribuable à une mauvaise interprétation des intentions gouvernementales ainsi qu'à l'incohérence entre les projets visant l'établissement d'un corporatisme national et une autre forme, non corporatiste, du système de négociation collective existant. L'accent est mis sur le rôle passé et présent de l'Etat dans sa manière de modeler le comportement des groupes d'intérêts et d'encourager ou non le corporatisme.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 16 , Issue 3 , September 1983 , pp. 501 - 517
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1983

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References

1 Corporatism may be defined generally as a system in which key interest groups, especially those representative of labour and capital, have a formally structured involvement with the state in policy-making and execution. A more detailed definition is utilized later in the article.

2 See Panitch, Leo, “Corporatism in Canada,“ Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review 1 (1979), 43–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Panitch persuasively argues that while corporatist ideologies are present in Canada, corporatist political structures are not.

3 A representative sample of this literature can be found in two recent anthologies: Schmitter, Philippe C. and Gerhard, Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979)Google Scholar, and Berger, Suzanne (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

4 See Morris, Joe, Towards a Corporate State (Ottawa: Canadian Labour Congress, 1976).Google Scholar

5 See Canadian Labour Congress, Labour's Manifesto for Canada (Ottawa: CLC, 1976).Google Scholar

6 Besides the Manifesto the key public documents are: Canadian Labour Congress. Discussion Paper for the Meeting with the Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet on July 12. 1976 (Ottawa: CLC, 1976);Google Scholar and Carr, Shirley, “Replace Controls with National Forum,” Globe and Mail, March 5, 1977.Google Scholar The account of the CLC proposals presented immediately below is based on these three sources. All quotations are from the Discussion Paper.

7 Some of the most intense pressure originated at the provincial federations of labour. The most comprehensive denunciation of tripartism came from Saskatchewan. See Minutes and Proceedings, Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, October 12–15, 1977, 13–15.Google Scholar The CLC's ongoing participation in consultative tripartite meetings was heavily criticized at the 1978 CLC convention. See the debate in CLC, Report of Proceedings 1978, 49–52.Google Scholar

8 “Slipping in the Back Door: Tripartism Today–Corporatism Tomorrow?” and “The Labour Movement, Corporatism and the Economic Crisis,” Canadian Dimension 15 (December 1980), 30–44.Google Scholar

9 According to one Ontario Federation of Labour official, Morris has the nickname “Jetlag Joe” in labour circles. The same official considered that the prominence which European tripartite structures gave to European national labour leaders, in contrast to the relatively low profile of the CLC president, heightened the attraction of these models to Morris.

10 A point made by Desmond Morton, “Labour's New Political Direction: Is the CLC Serious?” Canadian Forum 57 (1977), 11–13.Google Scholar

11 The traditionally close relationship is acknowledged to have become quite frigid in the 1976–1978 period as a result of provincial NDP government's acquiescence in the federal government's anti-inflation policy. Though the federal NDP consistently criticized wage controls, the party's weakness at the federal level contributed to a cooler relationship.

12 See United Electrical Workers, Which Path for Labour in the Fight for Jobs and Independent Canadian Economy... Collaboration or a Militant Class Struggle Fightback? (Toronto: 1979).Google Scholar

13 In mid-1978 CLC representatives participated in 23 sectoral consultative task forces established to make recommendations to the provincial and federal governments. In addition, a high level CLC delegation served on a Second Tier Committee established “to identify and make recommendations about'factors and policies that cut across sector lines.” The report noted that this was “the first time business and labour, under government auspices, have jointly worked on major economic problems and come up with specific recommendations.” A Report by the Second Tier Committee on Policies to Improve Canadian Competitiveness (Ottawa: Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 1978)Google Scholar, 5. That Report recommended continuing consultations of this type (32–33).

14 Canadian Dimension 15 (December 1980), 30.Google Scholar

15 Kwavnick, David, Organized Labour and Pressure Politics: The Canadian Labour Congress, 1956–68 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), 29.Google Scholar

16 The proposed constitutional amendments would have changed the basis of representation at CLC conventions from delegates from local unions to delegates from affiliates (see CLC, Report... 1976, 39–42). Opponents of tripartism interpreted the proposals as an attempt to shift control of the CLC away from the rank-and-file and further towards the leadership level of affiliated unions and the CLC (see ibid., 46–51 for the debate). Such a shift would help to fulfill one of the preconditions for the CLC's participation in a fully fledged tripartite system.

17 Giles, Anthony, “The Canadian Labour Congress and Tripartism,” Relations Industrielies 37 (1982), 93–125CrossRefGoogle Scholar refers to “leadership logic” as a determinant of the CLC's corporatist initiative. By this he means “the constellation of personal and institutional interests, as shaped by societal constraints on trade union action.” This concept seems to encompass the first and third explanations presented above.

18 For a critical review of some of the literature which advances this case see Panitch, “Corporatism in Canada.”

19 See Gerhard Lehmbruch, “Concluding Remarks: Problems for Future Research on Corporatist Intermediation and Policy Making,” in Lehmbruch, Schmitter (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, 304.Google Scholar

20 Bob Jessop, “Corporatism, Parliamentarism, and Social Democracy,” in ibid., 207.

21 21 See Panitch, , “Corporatism in Canada,” 78–85, and Gordon DiGiacomo, “Institutional Barriers to the Development of Tripartism in Canada” (unpublished master's research essay, Carleton University, 1977), 44–48 and 155–56.Google Scholar

22 To the extent that the political culture explanation stresses the diffusion of corporatist ideologies throughout the Canadian political culture and thus affects organized labour's policies, it qualifies as an exception. To the extent that the emphasis is placed on the corporatist aspects of the social democratic ideology held by most Canadian labour leaders it retains an internal orientation. The other partial exception is Giles's mention of “macro-societal forces and developments” (“The Canadian Labour Congress and Tripartism,” 94), and the CLC leaders' anticipation of the future direction of public policy (liberal-corporatism) as determinants of the CLC's corporatist initiative (ibid., 106–08). The core of Giles's explanation, however, is based on what he terms the “leadership logic” of the Congress (ibid., 107).

23 Berger, , Organizing Interests in Western Europe, 14–16.Google Scholar Schmitter too, in his “Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe,” in Lehmbruch, Schmitter (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation,Google Scholar alludes to the possibility that interest groups may be “the product of, rather than the producers of, public policy” (92).

24 Asa result of a decision by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the Snider Case.

25 See Woods, H. D., Labour Policy in Canada (2 ed.; Toronto: Macmillan, 1973), 93.Google Scholar This comment is perhaps less true of legislation covering public sector employees where some divergence can be observed (169–71).

26 MacDowell, Laurel Sefton, “The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System During World War II,” Labour: Journal of Canadian Labour Studies 3(1978), 175–96.Google Scholar

27 Ibid., 189–90,193. Mackenzie King attributed the defeats to “the resentment of labour at the wage stabilization policy of the government and even more to what he felt sure was the failure of some of his colleagues in the Government to show sympathy for the aspirations of organized labour for increased recognition” (Pickersgill, J. W., The Mackenzie King Record, 1939–44 Vol. 1 [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960], 570–71).Google Scholar

28 Schmitter, Philippe C., “Still the Century of Corporatism?” in Schmitter and Lehmbruch, (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, 13.Google Scholar In contrast, “pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories” (15).

29 In some jurisdictions, such as Ontario, compulsory dues contributions, or the equivalent sum donated to charity, must now be granted by the employer, if the union so demands.

30 Schmitter recognizes that representation in the sense of accurate and faithful representation of the demands and preferences of the members may not be the main activity of interest groups. The term intermediation is employed elsewhere to indicate that interest associations “not only may express interests of their own, fail to articulate or even to know the preferences of their members, and/or play an important role in teaching their members what their interests 'should be,' but also often assume or are forced to acquire private governmental functions of resource allocation and social control” (Lehmbruch, Schmitter [eds.], Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, 93).Google Scholar

31 Charles W. Anderson, “Political Design and the Representation of Interests,” in ibid., 271–98, especially 291–92.

32 Porter, John, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 310–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

33 In 1978 the unions affiliated to the CLC represented 67.2 per cent of total union membership. The CLC has a decentralized power structure with the affiliated unions retaining considerable autonomy (Smucker, Joseph, Industrialization in Canada [Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1980], 212–13).Google Scholar

34 Dodge, William, “CLC Proposals for Co-operation,” Canadian Labour 8:3 (1963), 5–8Google Scholar. See also , “Labour-Management Relations Today,”, DodgeCanadian Labour 9:2 (1964), 13–14.Google Scholar

35 Labour's Manifesto, 9 (emphasis added).

36 Ibid., 12.

37 See the Programme of Action resolution adopted at the 1976 CLC Convention in CLC, Report... 1976, 25.Google Scholar

38 Ibid., 39–42, 46–51, and CLC, Report... 1978, 52–59.

39 For a useful discussion, see Ed Finn, , “Tripartite Consultation at the National Level,” Labour Gazette 78 (1978), 65–70Google Scholar. In terms of the distinction between internal factor and external factor explanations advanced earlier in the article, all but one of these, poor economic conditions, rely on internal factors.

40 I am grateful to Professor Henry Jacek for this insight.

41 There its role is largely confined to the provision of conciliation and mediation services and sometimes acting, through back-to-work legislation, as compulsory arbitrator of last resort.

42 In Kwavnick, Organized Labour and Pressure Politics, chapter 9 documents the inability of the CLC to influence government policy outside of a narrow range of directly labour-related policy areas on which the government chose to regard the CLC's representations as legitimate.

43 In the Manifesto controls were viewed as “the launching pad for the future” with some form of corporatism being virtually inevitable. The big question for labour then became what form of corporatism it would be: liberal, in which organized labour would function as a social control agency; or social, in which labour would exert real power. The phrase “social corporatism” was changed to “social democracy” at the Convention (CLC, Report.. .1976,22).

44 Malles, Paul, “The Road to Consensus Policies: Challenges and Realities“ (Ottawa: The Conference Board in Canada: Occasional Paper No. 4, September, 1976), 4Google Scholar. It was precisely this interpretation, of course, which also fuelled labour opposition to the proposals.

45 See Munro, John, “Federal Proposals to Improve Labour-Management Relations,” Labour Gazette 77 (1977), 358.Google Scholar

46 In March 1977, Dennis McDermott, subsequently to succeed Morris as CLC president, downplayed the mechanics of tripartism while emphasizing labour's demand for “serious, day-to-day legitimate input into the decision making process” (Macleans, March 21, 1977, 9).

47 Provision for such formalized input from labour and business is continuing. See “Labour, Business Will Get a Voice in Mega-projets, Ottawa Says,” Toronto Star, May 21, 1982.Google Scholar

48 CLC, Report... 1978, 4.Google Scholar

491 This represents a reversal of a general interpretation of the thrust of Labour's Manifesto for Canada. See Morton, “Labour's New Political Direction.”

50 Lehmbruch, Gerhard, “Liberal Corporatism and Party Government,” in Lehmbruch, Schmitter (eds.). Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, 169.Google Scholar

51 A senior NDP official interviewed laid much stress on the revitalization of local union structures and enhanced upward and downward communication which had, in his opinion, resulted from the parallel campaign strategy. This phenomenon, however, is probably unevenly developed with some unions being hardly affected.

1 Most recently, on November 21, 1981, a CLC organized demonstration against high interest rates drew 100,000 people to Ottawa to hear speakers from organized labour and a wide variety of other organizations denounce government policy.

53 See Berger, , Organizing Interests in Western Europe, 16.Google Scholar In terms of the debate referred to by Berger, this article tends to support Offe's argument rather than that of Schmitter. But for a recognition by Schmitter of the role of public policy in shaping interest group behaviour see Lehmbruch, Schmitter (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, 92.Google Scholar

54 Ibid., 20–22.