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Public Enterprise as an Expression of Sovereignty: Reconsidering the Origin of Canadian National Railways*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Anthony Perl
Anthony Perl
Affiliation:
University of Calgary
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Abstract

Railway nationalization, the anvil on which national public enterprise was hammered together between 1917 and 1923, forms a misunderstood episode in the development of the Canadian state. This article examines the convergence of domestic politics and international economics that facilitated an unprecedented transformation of Canada's capacity to control its economy. State autonomy was used to create public enterprise as an instrument by which the gains of industrial restructuring could be distributed to favoured domestic financiers while its costs were imposed upon foreign investors. This power to manage the gains and losses arising from industrial change formed a new expression of economic sovereignty, one that ought to be viewed as an important step in the transition from imperial to national governance.

Résumé

La nationalisation des chemins de fer, pierre d'assise du secteur public national entre 1917 et 1923, constitue une étape importante mal comprise dans le développement du Canada. Cet article examine comment la convergence entre la politique domestique et l'économie internationale a facilité une transformation sans précédent de la capacité du Canada à contrôler son économie. Avec l'autonomie de l'état, la création du secteur public a permis la redistribution des gains de la reconstruction économique, favorisant les financiers domestiques, ses coûts retombant sur les investisseurs étrangers. Ce nouveau pouvoir, acquis grâce au changement industriel, a constitué une nouvelle forme de souveraineté économique, un pas important dans le passage du contrôle impérial au contrôle national.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , March 1994 , pp. 23 - 52
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1994

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References

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