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The Mother's Milk of Politics: Political Contributions to Federal Parties in Canada, 1974–1984*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

W. T. Stanbury
W. T. Stanbury
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
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Abstract

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Abstract. This study provides data to answer a number of important questions concerning the financing of the three main political parties at the federal level between 1974 and 1984. It analyzes both the regulated campaign expenditures by parties and candidates and the unregulated party expenditures outside official campaign periods. The main focus is on the importance of different sources of contributions to each party: individuals, corporations, trade unions, and interest groups. New details are provided on large contributions by individuals and corporations, and on the contributions of the largest 500 nonfinancial enterprises in Canada. Finally, the study notes that despite new federal legislation concerning political contributions and expenditures in 1974 the relationship between contributions and influence remains shrouded in secrecy.

Résumé

Ce texte fournit des données pertinentes au financement des trois grands partis fédéraux de 1974 à 1984. On y analyse à la fois les dépenses électorales sujettes à la réglementation et celles qui, se produisant en dehors des campagnes électorales, ne le sont pas. On fait principalement ressortir l'importance relative des sources de financement que sont les personnes, les sociétés, les syndicats et les groupes intermédiates; on s'attarde sur de nouvelles données concernant les « grandes contributions » et les contributions des principales sociétés commerciales et industrielles. Enfin, on note que, malgré la loi de 1974, on ignore toujours les liens entre les contributions électorales et l'influence politique.

Type
Note
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 19 , Issue 4 , December 1986 , pp. 795 - 822
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1986

References

1 This phrase is usually attributed to Jesse Unruh when he was the Democratic speaker of the California legislature.

2 There are also important questions that this study does not address, given its empirical orientation. For example, “what are the motivations of those individuals and corporations who make political contributions??” and “what direct and indirect benefits accrue to those who make such contributions??”

3 Stevenson, Anna B., Canadian Election Reform: Dialogue on Issues and Effects (Toronto: Ontario Commission on Election Contributions and Expenses, 1982), 25.Google Scholar

4 Meisel, John and Loon, Richard Van, “Canadian Attitudes to Election Expenses 1965–1966,” in Paltiel, K. Z. (ed.), Studies in Canadian Party Finance (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), 42.Google Scholar

5 Paltiel, K. Z., “Campaign Financing in Canada and its Reform,?” in Penniman, Howard (ed.), Canada at the Polls: The General Election of 1974 (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), 182.Google Scholar

6 Stevenson, , Canadian Election Reform, 31.Google Scholar

7 Paltiel, K. Z., Political Party Financing in Canada (Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1970).Google Scholar

8 Stevenson, , Canadian Election Reform, 31–32.Google Scholar On the role of party “bagmen,?” see Maclean's, February 4, 1980, 36, and May 15, 1978, 44b-44p.

9 Whitaker, Reginald, The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of Canada, 1930–1958 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977)Google Scholar, 199. Perhaps the extreme application of the contract levy system in Canada was by the Duplessis government in Quebec. See Quinn, Herbert F., “Quebec: Corruption Under Duplessis,?” in Gibbons, K. M. and Rowat, D. C. (eds.). Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), 74–75.Google Scholar

10 Whitaker, , The Government Party, 201.Google Scholar

11 See, for example, Stanbury, W. T., Gorn, G. J. and Weinberg, C. B., “Federal Advertising Expenditures,?” in Doern, G. B. (ed.), How Ottawa Spends: The Liberals, the Opposition Parties and National Priorities (Toronto: Lorimer, 1983)Google Scholar, chap. 6; and Maclean's, June 24, 1985, 11–12.

12 For more detail, see Boyer, J. Patrick, Money and Message: The Law Governing Election Financing Advertising, Broadcasting and Campaigning in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983)Google Scholar, and Bill C-169, amendments to the Election Act enacted in October 1983.

13 “Election expenses?” are very narrowly defined in the Canada Elections Act, and donot cover all the expenditures which a political scientist or journalist would normallycall “campaign expenditures.?” The term does not even cover all the expendituresmade by a party or candidate during the formal campaign period, from the date of theissuance of the writ of dissolution to polling day. This was particularly glaring withrespect to the declared election expenses of parties in 1984. See K. Z. Paltiel's paperto the International Political Science Association meeting in July 1985, entitled “The 1984 Federal General Election and Developments in Canadian Party Finance,?” to be published in Canada at the Polls-1984 (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, forthcoming).

14 Over the last three general elections the three main parties are now spending a highpercentage of the legal limit of campaign expenditures:

15 A note in the NDP 1984 return filed with the CEO indicates that the party spent $301,000 on fund raising in a year in which its contributions from individuals totalled $4.2 million. While the marginal cost of direct-mail fund raising techniques is very low (paper, printing and postage), the average cost probably exceeds 25 per cent of the money raised.

16 In this context, the term corporations (or “businesses?”) includes both large and small publicly-traded and privately-held firms. It also includes “commercial organizations?” such as law, accounting and engineering firms—and it includes federal and provincial crown corporations.

17 In 1984 the NDP reported receiving $51,665 from 280 “business and commercial organizations.?” In 1985 the NDP in Nova Scotia had a public debate over whether the provincial party should even accept donations from small businesses (“Small-business donation plan sparks debate in N.S. NDP,?” Globe and Mail, August 19, 1985).

18 The net after tax cost of a $2,000 donation is $1,500 after the maximum tax credit of $500 is taken into account—not a terribly burdensome amount for upper-middle income Canadians. In 1984, average income per household was $35,853, while 26.8 per cent of households had an income of $45,000 or more. See Statistics Canada, “Income Distributions by Size in Canada, Preliminary Estimates?” (Ottawa: Cat. No. 13–206).

19 It may be that both of the contributions to the Conservatives were from the same individual. The party's return indicates $50,000 from Mr. W. W. Siebens and $50,000 from Mr. W. Siebens. The very large contributions to the NDP were by a widow, Mrs. Irene Dyck, who works as a volunteer for the NDP in Alberta. See Globe and Mail, July 13, 1985.

20 Unpublished data provided by Statistics Canada obtained under CALURA.

21 One of this JOURNAL'S referees correctly points out that the individuals or corporations that do not make political contributions are as interesting a phenomenon as those who do. The data provided here cannot explain why some corporations make contributions and others do not. Work is underway on a multivariate statistical model designed to explain the presence/absence of contributions and their size.

22 See Maclean's, February 7, 1976, 47; May 7, 1979, 25; and Canadian Labour, June 1983, 5.

23 Wearing, Joseph, The L-Shaped Parly: The Liberal Parly of Canada, 1958–1980 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. 1981). 201–05.Google Scholar

24 Downs, Anthony. “An Economic Theory of Political Action on a Democracy,?” Journal of Political Economy 65 (1957), 135–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25 See Jacobson, Gary C.. “Money and Votes Reconsidered: Congressional Elections. 1972–1982,?” Public Choice 47 (1985), 7–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26 At the end of June 1986 the federal government distributed copies of its proposed amendments to the Patent Act, which were seen as a victory for PMAC. See Globe and Mail, June 27, 1986; Vancouver Sun, June 27, 1986: and Toronto Star, June 28, 1986.

27 In 1985 the Conservatives raised $14.5 million as compared with $5.6 million for the Liberals and $10.2 million for the NDP. The parties spent $10 million, $7.2 million and $10.1 million, respectively (“PCs tops in filling coffers,?” Globe and Mail, July 11, 1986).

28 In the 1984 general election 38.3 per cent of Conservative candidates spent at least 95 per cent of their legally allowed limit. The comparable figures for Liberal and NDP candidates were 24.1 and 8.9 per cent, respectively. Tabulated from Chief Electoral Officer, Report Respecting Election Expenses, 1984 (Ottawa: CEO, 1984)Google Scholar

29 See, for example, Globe and Mail, September 28,1985; October 8, 1985; May 3,1985; October 31, 1985.

30 Fora more detailed discussion, see Stanbury, W. T., Business-Government Relations in Canada: Grappling with Leviathan (Toronto: Methuen, 1986)Google Scholar, chap. 10.

31 See Palda, Kristian S., “Does Canada's Election Act Impede Voters Access to Information??” Canadian Public Policy 11 (1985), 537.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32 Noonan, John, Bribes (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 696–98.Google Scholar