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The “Iron Law of Oligarchy” in the Athenian Polis … and Today*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

C. Fred Alford
C. Fred Alford
Affiliation:
University of Maryland
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Abstract

This article shows how Athens in the late fifth and early fourth centuries mitigated Robert Michels' famous “iron law of oligarchy.” It is argued that Athens' success es related to its practice of universal male citizen participation in the administration of the city. At several points a comparison is drawn between how the International Typographical Union (ITU), studied in Lipset, Trow, and Coleman's Union Democracy, mitigated the “iron law,” and how Athens did so. The purpose of this article, however, is not to draw as many comparisons as possible. It is rather to suggest that the very possibility of comparison implies that the lessons of Athens are still relevant, if properly interpreted. This last clause is important, for it is argued that the way in which mass participation mitigated the iron law at Athens was subtle, and easily misinterpreted, perhaps especially by those who are eager to see greater participation in contemporary Western democracies.

Résumé

Cet article montre comment Athènes à la fin du cinquieme siècle et au début du quatrième a mitigé la célèbre « loi de fer de l'oligarchie » de Robert Michel. On soutient que le succès d'Athènes est lié à sa pratique d'une participation universelle des citoyens mâles dans l'administration de la cité. À plusieurs endroits de cet essai, l'auteur compare comment le « International Typographical Union » (ITU), étudiée dans Union Democracy de Lipset, Trow et Coleman a mitigé la « loi de fer » et comment Athènes l'a fait. Cependant, le but de cet article n'est pas de tirer autant de comparaisons que possible. C'est plutôt de suggérer que la possibilité même de comparaison implique que les leçons d'Athènes sont encore pertinentes, si on les interprète correctement. Cette demière proposition est d'autant plus importante que la manière dont la participation de masse mitigeait la loi de fer à Athènes était subtile et aujourd'hui facilement mal interprétée, peut-être surtout par ceux-là qui désirent ardemment voir une plus grande participation dans les démocraties occidentales contemporaines.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 1985 , pp. 295 - 312
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1985

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References

1 Seymour Lips, Martin et, Trow, Martin, and Coleman, James S., Union Democracy (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956).Google Scholar The authors of this classic study consider the ITU explicitly from the perspective of how it avoided Michels' iron law.

2 Among works pertinent to the political theory of the democrats are several of the tragedies (Aeschylus' Suppliants and Eumenides, Sophocles' Antigone, and Euripides' Suppliants), and comedies (Aristophanes' Knights and Wasps); Herodotus' History (the “constitutional debate”); Thucydides' History (not merely Pericles' funeral oration, but also the speech of Athenagoras, and the description of the oligarchic coup of 411); the Constitution of the Athenians by the “old oligarch” (pseudo-Xenophon); the early dialogues of Plato (especially the Apology and Protagoras), and Xenophon's Memorabilia. What we lack are not statements pertinent to the democracy, but rather a systematic defence of democratic political theory. The difference is revealed by the difficulty of interpreting some pertinent statements. Just one example: Aeschylus' Eumenides has been read as a protest against the democrats' attack on the aristocratic Areopagus. However, an interpretation which suggests that Aeschylus supported the democrats' reforms seems equally plausible. See Bonner, Robert, Aspects of Athenian Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1933), 9.Google Scholar

3 Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).Google Scholar

4 Cassinelli, C. W., “The Law of Oligarchy,” American Political Science Review 47 (1953), 783.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Michels, Robert, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), 27–45; 417–19.Google Scholar

6 Ibid., 418.

7 Cassinelli, “Law of Oligarchy,” 773.

8 May, John D., “Democracy, Organization, Michels,” American Political Science Review 59 (1965), 420, 422, 429.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Michels, Political Parties, 27–30.

10 Lipset, et al., Union Democracy, 77.

11 Ibid., 404–06; Michels, Political Parties, 187–89.

12 The male citizen population of Athens was about 38,000 (see n. 27). Of these, about 40 per cent were of hoplite status or above; that is, their wealth was valued at at least 20 minae (2,000 drachmae), not an especially large amount. See Jones, A. H. M., Athenian Democracy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), 81–87.Google Scholar See too Inscriptiones Graecae, II-III2, 1926. Thus, at least 60 per cent and probably closer to 75 per cent of the citizens, could be considered democrats. There was great class consciousness at Athens. Income and position on the issues were highly correlated.

Those who were not democrats were generally called oligarchs. This could be confusing in the present context. If there seems a chance of confusion, the phrase “in Michels' sense” will be used to modify the terms oligarch or oligarchy, when appropriate.

13 Constitution of Athens, 24Google Scholar (hereafter cited as CA). Though this particular chapter is often regarded as problematic, the work as a whole is generally seen as reliable, especially for the period under consideration here. See Moore, J. M., Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 145.Google Scholar

14 Aristotle puts the last figure at 700 imperial magistrates (officials of Athens' colonies), but it is generally agreed on linguistic grounds alone that this is a corrupt figure, as well as being improbably high (Jones, , Athenian Democracy, 136Google Scholar). See too Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aristotles und Athen, 2 vols. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1983Google Scholar), vol. 2, 202–03: he estimates 300 imperial magistrates, and this figure seems generally accepted. See Zimmern, Alfred, The Greek Commonwealth (5th ed. rev.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931), 175.Google Scholar

15 Moore, Aristotle and Xenophon, 249. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff and Zimmem both easily arrive at a figure of well over 1,000 paid offices, not including jury duty, military service, or attendance in the assembly. They count dock guards and the like because they are addressing a slightly different issue: not how many magistrates per se, but how many paid positions. See Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aristotles und Athen, vol. 2, 201–11; Zimmern, The Greek Commonwealth, 114–11. A different counting procedure (for example, excluding deme magistrates) accounts for Jones's vastly lower estimate of 350 domestic magistrates (Athenian Democracy, 136).

16 CA, 47–50.1.

17 Glotz, Gustave, The Greek City, trans. Mallison, N. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1965), 189Google Scholar, gives the inscription sources.

18 CA, 47–54, 60.

19 Wycliffe Headlam, James, Election by Lot at Athens (2nd ed. rev.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933)Google Scholar, chap. 6.

20 C4. 53.

21 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, , Aristotles nnd Athen, vol. 2, 203;Google Scholar Pseudo-Xenophon, Constitution of the Athenians, 3, 4.Google Scholar

22 Traill, J., “The Political Organization of Attica,” Hesperia 14 (1975)Google Scholar, supplement, 34–37.

23 Headlam, Election by Lot, 166–67.

24 Demosthenes, “The Embassy,” 249.

25 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, , Aristolles und Athen, vol. 2, 203.Google Scholar

26 Demosthenes, “The Crown,” 261.

27 Jones, Athenian Democracy, 176–77, and appendix; Glotz, , The Greek City, 27;Google Scholar and Gomme, A. W., The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C. (Chicago: Argonaut, 1967), 29.Google Scholar Wilamowitz-Moellendorff s estimate of the population (in Aristotles und Athen, vol. 2, 208Google Scholar) is somewhat higher. See too Thucydides' History, 2.13. The proverbial figure for the Athenian polis was 20,000–30,000 male citizens, but this seems too low; see Demosthenes, “Against Aristogeiten, 1,” 51, and also Zimmern, The Greek Commonwealth, 174–75.

28 Fourth-century population figures were lower, probably due to the plague rather than losses during the Peloponnesian War. Especially relevant is the death rate during the entire period under consideration, which both Jones and Gomme estimate was uniformly high from ages 20 to 60. Of 500 men of 20, not many more than 100 survived to 60 years of age (Jones, Athenian Democracy, 82–83; Gomme, The Population of Athens, 67–70).

29 Xenophon, Memorabilia, 1.2.35.

30 See n. 12.

31 See Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, , Aristotles undAthen, vol. 2, 201–12Google Scholar, on the number of magistrates.

32 Zimmern, , The Greek Commonwealth, 164.Google Scholar

33 Giotz, , The Greek City, 183Google Scholar.

34 C4.62.I.

35 CA, 8.1; 55.1. See Victor Ehrenberg, “Losung,” in Pauly's Real-encyclopâdie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, vol. 13Google Scholar (Stuttgart: Metzlersche, J. B. Verlags- buchhandlung, 1926), 1474.Google Scholar

36 Staveley, E. S., Creek and Roman Voting and Elections (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 108–17.Google Scholar Aeschines' accusation that Demosthenes was appointed to the Council by means of bribery is classic, in “The Treaty,” 3.

37 CA, 7.1. See Lysias, “Against Agoratus,” 20; “Against Philon,” 33. Johannes Sundwall calculates that if the composition of the council had been due to mere chance, only about 6 percent of its members would have been wealthy. In fact, about 12 per cent appear to have been wealthy, and roughly the same percentage well-to-do. He estimates that about 375 out of 500 members in any one year were men of means (Epigraphische Beiträge zur Sozial-politischen geschichte Athens im zeitalter Demosthenes [Leipzig: Druck von G. Kreysing, 1906], 1–18). Also see Headlam, Election by Lot, 200.

38 Sundwall, Epigraphische Beiträge, 35ff.; Headlam, Election by Lot, 206. Most assume that ordinary magistrates were paid about one drachma (six obols) per day, which was roughly the wage of a labourer in the late fifth century. See Jones, Athenian Democracy, 135; Inscriptions Graecae, II-III2, 1672–73; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, , Aristotles nnd Athen, vol. 2, 203.Google Scholar

39 Michels, Political Parties, 27–30.

40 Mitzman, Arthur, Sociology and Estrangement (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1973), 323–25.Google Scholar

41 Cleon swayed the assembly (for example, in the Mytilene debate) long before he displayed military skill sufficient to be elected general (Thucydides, History, 5.2). Some have found this separation of leadership from office difficult to believe, and have suggested that the 10 generals constituted a secret government of Athens. In Athenian Democracy, however. Jones shows how weak the evidence for this claim really is (124–29). On the office of general, see CA, 61.2.

42 In Plato's Gorgias, Socrates compares the leaders of Athens to a baker who gives the people delicious sweets, when what they really need is a tough physical trainer (518–19). Compare with The Republic, 488b-493e.

43 Gomme, A. W., “The Working of the Athenian Democracy,” in his More Essays in Greek History and Literature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 115.Google Scholar

44 CA,62.3

45 Jones, , Athenian Democracy, 118;Google ScholarRhodes, P. J., The Athenian Bottle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 61–66.Google Scholar

46 Michels, Political Parties, 37.

47 Lysias, “Against Nicomachus,” 29; Glotz, The Greek City, 221; CA, 47–50.1.

48 Headlam, Election by Lot, 94–95; Staveley, Greek Elections, 40.

49 Lipset et al., Union Democracy, 216.

50 Ibid., 214.

51 Archons were paid less (four obols per day) than councilmen, who were not paid terribly well (five or six obols per day for those whose prytany was in charge). From this pay the archons maintained a herald and flute player (CA, 62.2).

52 Lipset et al., Union Democracy, 215–16.

53 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Barber briefly discusses the Athenian lot system as an institution which could be employed today to enhance participation (280, 290–93).

54 Enter Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1965), 65.Google Scholar

55 The Greeks (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1957), 106–07.Google Scholar

56 Lipset et al., Union Democracy, 394. Albeit, the dice are progressively loaded in their example.

57 Ibid., 413.

58 Democracy Ancient and Modern (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973), 36.Google Scholar