Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-30T06:20:07.197Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Rex Brynen
Rex Brynen
Affiliation:
McGill University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The article argues that in many Arab countries the political economy of regional petroleum wealth has served to inhibit democratization. In the particular case of Jordan, petrodollar foreign aid and workers' remittances long served as a critical aspect of political stability, supporting regime neo-patrimonialism and blunting pressures for greater participation. Equally, the decline of those revenues in the late 1980s spurred the eventual collapse of the foundations upon which the old economic and political order had been built. With this came the need to negotiate a new social contract, resulting in a far-reaching process of political liberalization and partial democratization after April 1989.

Résumé

Cet article soutient que dans plusieurs pays arabes une économie politique créée par la richesse pétrolière a entravé l'ouverture démocratique. Dans le cas de la Jordanie, la stabilité politique a longtemps dépendu de l'aide extérieure tirée des pétrodollars et des rentes ouvrières, qui maintinrent le régime néopatrimonial et étoufferent les pressions en faveur d'une participation élargie. Vers la fin des années quatre-vingt, la chute de ces revenus suscita l'écoulement éventuel des fondations autour desquels fut bâti l'ordre économique et politique. La négociation d'un nouveau contrat social s'imposa ainsi, déclenchant un vaste processus de libéralisation politique et de démocratisation partielle après avril 1989.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 25 , Issue 1 , March 1992 , pp. 69 - 98
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1992

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Since this article was first written, Michael Hudson has provided a useful overview of the Egyptian, Jordanian, Algerian and Yemeni cases. See Hudson, , “After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World,” Middle East Journal 45 (1991), 407–426Google Scholar.

2 O'Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Philippe C. and Whitehead, Laurence, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

3 Diamond, Larry, Linz, Juan J. and Lipset, Seymour Martin, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries, Vol. 2: Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), 212Google Scholar.

4 For an overview of the concept, see Beblawi, Hazem and Luciani, Giacomo, The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm, 1987)Google Scholar. See also Delacroix, Jacques, “The Distributive State in the World System,” Studies in Comparative International Development 15 (1980), 3–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Giacomo Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework,’ and Beblawi, Hazem, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in Luciani, and Beblawi, , eds., The Rentier State, 65–84Google Scholar, 85–98, respectively.

6 Skocpol, Theda, “Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution,” Theory and Society 11 (1982), 269CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In the Iranian case, however, the increasing autonomy of the state appears to have come at the cost of societal alienation from the Shah's regime.

7 These typically include free education, free health care, free or subsidized utilities and subsidized housing. To give a sense of the magnitude of these expenditures, it is worth noting that in 1983 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirate (with a combined population of only 13.2 million) spent $16.3 billion on health care and education, a total greater than that of China (population 1,020 million; expenditures $12.7 billion), double that of India (population 736 million; expenditures $7.8 billion) and exceeding all of sub-Saharan Africa combined (population 433 million; expenditures $11.3 billion) (Sivard, Ruth, World Military and Social Expenditures 1986 [Washington: World Priorities, 1986], 33–39Google Scholar).

8 Flynn, Peter, “Class, Clientalism and Dependency: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependence and Control,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 12 (1974), 148CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 The economic vulnerability of rentier regimes to economic pressures exercised by their citizenry is frequently further diminished by extensive reliance on a politically quiescent expatriate labour force in the petroleum sector, and by extreme intolerance of independent trade union activity in either the petroleum sector or government service.

10 Tilly, Charles, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Evans, Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Skocpol, Theda, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 183Google Scholar.

11 Luciani, Giacomo, “Economic Foundations of Democracy and Authoritarianism: The Arab World in Comparative Perspective,” Arab Studies Quarterly 10 (1988), 463Google Scholar. A reverse but parallel argument of sorts has also been made by some rational-choice theorists, who suggest that the development of representative institutions serves to enhance the efficiency of revenue collection by revenue-maximizing states. See Bates, Robert and Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald, “A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government,” Politics and Society 14 (1985), 53–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Levi, Margaret, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988)Google Scholar.

12 Kuwait provides a dramatic example of the level of capital surplus that some of these states have been able to attain: after Iraq's invasion in August 1990, the Kuwaiti government-in-exile's access to over US$80 billion in foreign investments allowed it to provide financial support for Kuwaiti refugees and underwrite Arab and Western military expenditures. During this period, and without any territory whatsoever under national control, Kuwait's GNP/capita stood at over US$3,000—a fraction of its pre-invasion level, but still many times greater than most third-world countries.

13 Interviews with Ibrahim Bakr (former head of Jordanian Bar Association), Amman, August 20, 1989, and Layla Sharif (senator and former minister of information), Amman, August 22, 1989.

14 “Taqrir khas: ajhiza al-amn wa-idwat al-qama' fi al-urdun” [Special Report: The Security Apparatuses and Means of Repression in Jordan], Shu'un filastiniyya 35 (1974), 153–162Google Scholar; Brand, Laurie, Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 180–185Google Scholar; and Amnesty International, Human Rights Protection After the State of Emergency (New York: Amnesty International, 1990), 4–10Google Scholar.

15 Fakhoury, Na'man Issa, An Analytical Study of Jordan's Balance of Payments. 1950–68 (Amman: Central Bank of Jordan, 1974), 75Google Scholar; Odeh, Hanna S., Economic Development of Jordan 1954–71 (Amman: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1972), Appendix 2Google Scholar; and Ministry of Planning, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1986–90 (Amman: National Press, 1986), 2–7Google Scholar.

16 Ministry of Planning. Five Year Plan, 1986–90, 8–10, and Mazur, Michael P., Economic Growth and Development in Jordan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), 96–98Google Scholar.

17 Ministry of Planning, Five Year Plan, 1986–90, 15–25; Jaber, Kamel Abu, Buhbe, Matthes and Smadi, Mohammad, eds., Income Distribution in Jordan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), Appendix BGoogle Scholar; International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics (various); and Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Report (various). Because some workers' remittances are transferred in the form of goods or through non-official channels, official figures likely underestimate by 20 per cent or more the contribution made to the economy (Looney, Robert E., “Worker Remittances in the Arab World: Blessing or Burden?” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 12 [1990], 29Google Scholar).

18 For an overview of Jordanian tax policy, see Askari, Hossein, Cummings, John T. and Glover, Michael, Taxation and Tax Policies in the Middle East (London: Butterworth, 1982), 148–151, 272–76Google Scholar. See also Table 5.

19 As Paul Jureidini and R. D. McLaurin have noted, “there can be no question, given the close relationship of the government and the tribes, that the latter receive significant tangible and intangible benefits from the government. Tangible benefits primarily include financial support and also weapons and infrastructural development supports such as land, roads, wells, clinics and schools. Government provision of these assets has frequently been handled on a direct basis, often taking the form of direct payments—such as an envelope from the king—to tribal leaders…. Payments are also provided to shaykhs from Jordanian intelligence services, the interior ministry, and the prime minister. Moreover, the army has in the past provided bounties or rewards to tribes both for recruitment and in recognition of the performance of tribe members” (Jordan: The Impact of Social Change on the Role of Tribes, CSIS Washington Papers 108 ‘New York: Praeger, 1984’, 39Google Scholar).

20 Mazur, Economic Growth and Development in Jordan, 235.

21 The most prominent examples are the mustawzirin (literally, “those who would be ministers”)—the small circle of East Bank and Palestinian notables from whom cabinet members are traditionally drawn. However, despite the importance of public sector employment for segments of Jordan's generally highly educated labour force, a cohesive and semi-autonomous technocratic-bureaucratic class has yet to emerge.

22 Cunningham, Robert B., The Bank and the Bureau: Organizational Development in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1988), 123–124Google Scholar.

23 Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1986, 34.

24 Abu Jaber, Buhbe and Smadi, eds., Income Distribution in Jordan, Tables 6A.3–4, and Cunningham, The Bank and the Bureau, 113.

25 Jordan's 1986–1990 development plan, for example, called for JD951,964 (35 per cent of regional investment spending) to be spent in predominantly Transjordanian governates of Tafilah, Karak and Ma'an, which together represent only 10 per cent of the population (Ministry of Planning, Five Year Plan, 1986–90, Table 12).

26 Vatikiotis, P. J., Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921–1957 (New York: Praeger, 1967)Google Scholar; Hiatt, Joseph, “State Formation and the Incorporation of Nomads: Local Change and Continuity among Jordanian Bedouin,” in Skalnik, Peter, eds., Outwitting the State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1989), 72–73Google Scholar. Because of conscription and the need for technical skills, Palestinians today make up a significant proportion of the armed forces. However, the ranks of most elite and combat units (and most senior NCOs and officers) continue to be filled by personnel of Transjordanian (especially bedouin) origins (Juredini and McLaurin, Jordan: The Impact of Social Change, 18–22, 61–65).

27 In part because of the expansion of social welfare services and state employment, economic equality in Jordan did not increase significantly after the 1973–1974 oil boom. In 1980, the top 20 per cent of families received 44.2 per cent of income, while the poorest 20 per cent of families received 6.0 per cent—ratios typical of many Arab and other third-world states, and very much smaller than those generally found in Latin America (Haddad, Adeeb, “Jordan's Income Distribution in Retrospect,” in Jaber, Abu, Buhbe, and Smadi, , eds., Income Distribution in Jordan, 26Google Scholar).

28 Jordan Times, June 14, 1989, 6, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Near East and South Asia (hereafter FBIS-NES)

29 Ministry of Planning, Five Year Plan, 1986–90, 75–116.

30 Day, Arthur R., East Bank/West Bank: Jordan and the Prospects for Peace (Washington: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), 80–82Google Scholar, and Satloff, Robert B., Troubles on the East Bank: Challenges to the Domestic Stability of Jordan, CSIS Washington Papers 123 (New York: Praeger, 1986), 72–74Google Scholar.

31 Andoni, Lamis, “Jordan,” in Brynen, Rex, ed., Echoes of the Intifada: Regional Repercussions of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 176Google Scholar.

32 In 1983 Jordan's Civil Service Commission warned that “the government is unable to absorb the great number of people who are committed to serve in government departments in accordance with previously arranged commitments and arrangements.” In 1987, it received almost 33,000 applications (including 10,000 from university graduates) for just 8,000 government jobs (Middle East Economic Digest, January 30, 1988, 4, and Satloff, Troubles on the East Bank, 30).

33 Middle East Economic Digest, November 18, 1988, 4–5, and February 24, 1989, 2–3.

34 The reduction in debt service payments for 1989 in Table 6 shows the effects of rescheduling agreements negotiated under the 1989 IMF programme. For purposes of comparison it might be noted that in 1986—one year before it suspended repayments—Brazil's outstanding foreign debt of $83.6 billion represented 31.1 per cent of GNP, with its debt service payments of US$7.4 billion equal to 29.4 per cent of exports.

35 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Jordan 3 (1989), 12–13Google Scholar.

36 Andoni, “Jordan,” 176

37 Amman Television Service, April 14, 1989; Amman Domestic Service, July 24, 1989 (FBIS-NES); Jordan Times, June 14, 1989, 6; and Central Bank of Jordan, Twenty-Sixth Annual Report 1989, 68–73.

38 al-Ra'y (Amman) April 16, 1989, 1, 6 (FBIS-NES). The increase in fuel-oil prices was a particular blow to farmers and to Transjordanian truck drivers, who received no corresponding increase in transport fees.

39 Radio Monte Carlo, April 19–20, 1989 (FBIS-NES); Andoni, Lamis, “The Five Days That Shook Jordan,” Middle East International, April 28, 1989, 3–4Google Scholar; and Middle East Times, June 6–12, 1989, 4.

40 Amman Television Service, April 22, 1989 (FBIS-NES), Middle East Reporter, April 29, 1989, 8. The prince appeared to display particular annoyance with the political role assumed by Jordan's professional associations.

41 Text of King Husayn's royal designation letter to Sharif Zayd bin Shakir, April 27, 1989.

42 Jordan Times, May 15, 1989 (FBIS-NES). Some close to the regime spoke at this time of a model similar to that adopted by Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt with his dissolution of the Arab Socialist Union into three official platforms—an official governing centrist party, with official “loyal oppositions” to the left and right (interviews, Amman, July 1989).

43 Interview with Husayn, King, al-Ra'y, July 17, 1989, 6Google Scholar (FB1S-NES). Article 18E of the law allowed the security services to bar candidates from running, while other provisions restricted public meetings and press access.

44 Andoni, Lamis, “Poor Prognosis,” Middle East International, June 9, 1989, 10–11Google Scholar, and Jordan Times, August 5, 1989, 1. Some aid donors (notably Saudi Arabia) expressed misgivings at the process of political liberalization underway in Jordan, further complicating the Kingdom's search for enhanced economic security. Interviews with senior government officials, Amman, August 1989 and August 1991.

45 Interview with Finance Minister Basil Jardanah and Central Bank of Jordan governor Muhammad Sa'id al-Nabulsi, Amman Domestic Service, July 24, 1989 (FBIS-NES), and Jordan Times, July 25, 1989, 1.

46 This point was made explicitly by one former prime minister and several close advisors to the King, interviewed in Amman in July-August 1989. See also New York Times, October 26, 1989, A10.

47 Jordan Times, August 17–18. 1989.

48 Two aspects of the current electoral system have attracted particular criticism. The first is the overrepresentation of rural (conservative and predominantly Transjordanian)constituencies. A second complaint concerns the reservation of special seats for the bedouins and for the Christian and Circassian minorities (Duclos, Louis-Jean, “Les élections législatives en Jordanie,” Maghreb-Machrek 129 [1990], 52–53, 74–75Google Scholar, and Jaber, Kamel S. Abu and Fathi, Schirin H., “The 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections,” Orient 31 [1990], 72–74Google Scholar).

49 Not all potential electors bothered to register; if non-registrants were included, the voter turnout would fall to 39 per cent. These figures are remarkably low considering that the elections were the first since 1967 and the fairest in the country's history. Perhaps this (together with equally low turnouts in later local council and student union elections) can be seen, in part, as indicative of a continuing legacy of depoliticization left by years of rentier politics in Jordan.

50 The fluidity of political affiliations makes it difficult to be more precise. For a detailed breakdown of election results, see Abu Jaber and Fathi, “The 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary Elections,” 83–83; Duclos, “Les élections législatives en Jordanie,” 75; and Amr, Wafa, “Palestinian Participation in Jordan's Parliamentary Elections,” The Return 2 (1990), 21Google Scholar. Between nine and twelve of the newly elected members were of Palestinian origin.

51 Specifically, the Charter declares Jordan to be a “democratic state,” governed by “law and political pluralism.” It provides that “Jordanians enjoy the right to establish and belong to political parties” based on the principles of “pluralism of thought… democratic competition and legitimate means.” The only restrictions placed on parties concern external funding and political activity within the armed forces (Mashru'a al-mithaq al-watani al-urduni [Plan of the Jordanian National Charter] [Amman: Military Press Directorate, 1990], chap. 2Google Scholar).

52 Masiri's parliamentary confirmation in July 1991 proved to be a closer vote than first expected, requiring active lobbying of deputies by the King. Four months later Masri resigned, after constant criticism from Islamist and traditionalist deputies, as well as opponents of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Zayd bin Shakir was subsequently confirmed as his replacement in December. All of these events provided further confirmation of the enhanced political importance of the parliamentary process (Jordan Times, July 7, 1991, 4).

53 See, for example, Alfred Stepan, “Paths towards Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations,” and Kaufman, Robert, “Liberalization and Redemocratization in South America: Perspectives from the 1970s,” in O'Donnell, , Schmitter, and Whitehead, , eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, part 3, 64–84Google Scholar, 90–93; part 4, 15–21.

54 Terry Lynn Karl, for example, suggests a parabolic relationship between economic performance and the prospects for democratization whereby protracted austerity (or plenty) contributes to political openings, but the onset of sudden acute economic scarcity has the opposite effect (“Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics 23 [1990], 16).

55 Remmer, Karen L., “The Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMF Standby Programs in Latin America, 1954–1984,” Comparative Politics 19 (1986), 9–10CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Bienen, Henry and Gersovitz, Mark, “Economic Stabilization, Conditionality, and Political Stability,” International Organization 39 (1985), 729–754CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

56 Bienen, Henry and Gersovitz, Mark, “Consumer Subsidy Cuts, Violence, and Political Stability,” Comparative Politics 19 (1986), 25–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57 Waterbury, John, “The Political Management of Economic Adjustment and Reform,” in Nelson, Joan M. et al. , Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1989)Google Scholar.

58 Aristotle, The Politics, book 6, chap. 5. For more contemporary evaluations of this argument, see Nehru, B. K., “Western Democracy and the Third World,” Third World Quarterly 1 (1979), 53–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Huntington, Samuel, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” Political Science Quarterly 99 (1984), 198–202CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

59 Tlemçni, Rachid and Hansen, William, “Development and the State in Post-Colonial Algeria,” Journal of Asian and African Studies 24/1–2 (1989), 124–130Google Scholar; Tlemçani, Rachid, “Chadli's Perestroika,” Middle East Report 163 (1990), 14–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kapil, Arun, “Algeria's Elections Show Islamist Strength,” Middle East Report 166 (1990), 31–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

60 Palestinians also report increasing difficulties securing work permits or renewals throughout the Gulf; as a result, up to 34,000 a month returned to Jordan during the summer of 1991 (New York Times, September 19, 1991, A18).

61 On the regional political and economic repercussions of the Gulf crisis, see also Brynen, Rex and Noble, Paul, “The Gulf Crisis and the Arab State System: A New Regional Order?” Arab Studies Quarterly 13 (1991), 126–130Google Scholar.