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The CPSU in Transition from Brezhnev to Gorbachev*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Bohdan Harasymiw
Bohdan Harasymiw
Affiliation:
University of Calgary
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Abstract

Leadership succession in the Soviet Union has always had some impact on the composition of the ruling Communist party, which is otherwise determined normally by the force of social status. As the CPSU constitutes the pool from which the Soviet political elite is drawn, changes in that pool brought about by the succession of Gorbachev are bound to have implications for the future. Apparently unable at the beginning of his term to stem the intake of new members, Gorbachev has made dramatic use of expulsions to regulate the composition of the party. In their overall effect, his policies have shown a remarkable continuity with the Brezhnev period. This includes the enhancement of workers’ and peasants’ chances of being drawn into full-time political roles at the expense of white-collar persons. The net effect is likely to be a widening of the gap between the party and the intelligentsia, who are effectively excluded from membership in the political elite.

Résumé

La succession à la direction du Parti communiste de l'U.R.S.S. à l'occasion de la mort de Brejnev suscite toujours un espoir de transformation du Parti. Malgré des promesses de changements « révolutionnaires », le nouveau secrétaire général, monsieur Gorbatchef poursuit une politique semblable à celle de son prédécesseur. En effet, si le statut social détermine l'appartenance au Parti communiste comme en témoigne le membership de gens ayant un niveau supérieur d'éducation ou une profession prestigieuse, en même temps, la sélection des membres à qui on attribue un rôle politique se fait à l'inverse sur la base de l'« origine sociale ». Cette politique consiste à favoriser les paysans et les ouvriers. En poursuivant ainsi la politique de Brejnev, Gorbatchef contribue à faire avancer le jour de la lutte ouverte entre le Parti, qui détient le pouvoir politique, et l'intelligentsia qui en est privée.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 21 , Issue 2 , June 1988 , pp. 249 - 266
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1988

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References

1 Harasymiw, Bohdan, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (London: Macmillan, 1984), 42, 85–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Ibid., 151. Following common usage in comparative politics, the term “political elite” is used here to mean persons in full-time political roles. In the Soviet case, this applies to everyone enrolled in the CPSU's patronage lists or nomenklatura. “Activists” are engaged in politics only part-time. For present purposes, the term refers to any of the part-time and volunteer duties commonly carried out by Soviet citizens, such as primary party organization secretary, member of an elected party committee or council (soviet), and officer of a mass organization or its executive body. The “pool of eligibles” refers to those particular elements of society (and not all are equally eligible) from whom the activists and eventually the elite are chosen.

By and large, the membership of the CPSU is synonymous with the political “eligibles” of that country. Members of the Soviet political elite who are not Communists have been exceptionally rare. Of course, not everyone can become a party member, hence the significance of the “eligible” stage of Soviet political recruitment. I have adapted these concepts principally from Prewitt, Kenneth, The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970)Google Scholar, and Marvick, Dwaine, “Continuities in Recruitment Theory and Research: Toward a New Model,” in Eulau, Heinz and Czudnowski, Moshe M. (eds.), Elite Recruitment in Democratic Polities: Comparative Studies Across Nations (New York: Wiley, 1976), 29–44Google Scholar, where they are applied to the American context.

3 Georgii Razumovskii, a Central Committee Secretary and associate of Gorbachev, reported in May 1987 that “in the past two years ... nearly 40 per cent of first and about one half of all secretaries of union republic Communist Party CCs, of kraikomy and obkomy, approximately a third of the chairmen of oblast’ and krai executive committees and chairmen of union and autonomous republic Councils of Ministers, and more than half of ail-Union ministers and chairmen of state committees were changed. The complement of party raikom and gorkom secretaries was renewed by nearly one half.” See Partiinaia zhizn’ (1987), No. 12, 12.

4 “KPSS v tsifrakh,” Partiinaia zhizn’ (1983), No. 15, 14–32;Google Scholar (1986), No. 14, 19–32; and(1987), No. 21, 6–20. The data are for January 1 of each year.

5 The literature on Soviet social stratification, including Soviet sociological studies, is too vast to cite in a single footnote. A useful summary may be found in Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, “Social Trends,” in Byrnes, Robert F. (ed.), After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), 186–249Google Scholar, esp. 200–09. Interviews with Soviet emigrés have also confirmed the resemblance between social stratification in the USSR and in other industrial societies. Most recently, James R. Millar and Peter Donhowe rank 15 occupations in descending order as follows: lawyer, doctor, literary worker, professor, economist, chemical engineer, army officer, teacher, driver, mail carrier, tractor driver, field hand, sales clerk, and bookkeeper (“Life, Work, and Politics in Soviet Cities—First Findings of the Soviet Interview Project,” Problems of Communism 36 [January-February 1987], 53). Millar and Donhowe sum up one of the project's conclusions: “Max Weber's explanation of class, or social stratification, as a function of wealth, power, and prestige seems to offer a better explanation of actual status rankings in the USSR than does Karl Marx's analysis, which saw social classes as being derived solely from relationships to means of production” (53–54).

6 Hammer, Darrell P., “The Dilemma of Party Growth,” Problems of Communism 20 (1970), 16–21Google Scholar.

7 Rigby, T. H., Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R., 1917–1967 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 513Google Scholar.

8 According to Darrell Hammer, “growth in party membership is a dynamic process which is not entirely within the party leaders’ own control” (“The Dilemma of Party Growth,” 21).

9 Harasymiw, , Political Elite Recruitment, 88–89Google Scholar. See also Miller, John H., “The Communist Party: Trends and Problems,” in Brown, Archie and Kaser, Michael (eds.), Soviet Policy for the 1980s (London: Macmillan, 1982), 19–20Google Scholar.

10 The procedure for joining the CPSU is spelled out in Hill, Ronald J. and Frank, Peter, The Soviet Communist Party (3rd ed.; Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 20–25Google Scholar. An innovation introduced by the Twenty-seventh Congress in 1986 is the stipulation in the Party Rules that admissions be considered and decided at open rather than closed party meetings (Partiinaia ihizn’ [1986], Nos. 6–7, 149). “Open” in this case means open to non-party people as well as Communists. The intention of this change in procedure seems to have been to broaden the information basis for such admissions, as well as perhaps to reinforce bonds between the general public and the party, and thus to stem the flow and improve quality. Official Soviet press commentaries on this aspect of admissions policy indicate that this measure is not fully effective either in making the process less mechanical or the candidates of better quality. See Pravda, September 22, 1987, 1; and Zaria Vostoka, August 23, 1987. 1.

11 See, for instance, Harasymiw, , Political Elite Recruitment, 63Google Scholar. Table 4.2.

12 Miller, , “The Communist Party,” 8–12Google Scholar.

13 These data are drawn from Harasymiw, , Political Elite Recruitment, 68;Google Scholar “KPSS vtsifrakh” (1983), 19; and Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR, 1922–1982: lubileiniistatisicheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: “Finansy i statistika,” 1982), 315–21Google Scholar (citedhereafter as Narkhoz [year]).

14 “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1987), 8; Narkhoz za 70 let (1987), 300–09Google Scholar.

15 ” KPSS v tsifrakh” (1983), 19; (1986), 22, and (1987), 9. In 1984, women comprised 50.5 per cent of the Soviet labour force. See Narkhoz 1984, 408, 414–15Google Scholar.

16 “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1983), 20; Ibid. (1986), 22; and Ibid. (1987), 9.

17 “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1983), 17; and (1986), 20.

18 “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1987), 7.

19 “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1983), 17; (1986), 20; and (1987), 7.

20 Partiinaia zhizn’ (1987), No. 12, 12. The figure of 126,000 represents, nevertheless, a mere 0.65 per cent of the CPSU's membership.

21 Partiinaia zhizn’ (1981), No. 14, 19Google Scholar.

22 Indeed, there seems to be a 10-year cycle in the fluctuating level of expulsions from the party. When compared to the growth rate of the party, with which one would expect the level of expulsions normally to fluctuate, the differences are so erratic as to suggest this activity must be the result of conscious decision.

23 “ KPSS v tsifrakh” (1983), 15; and (1986), 19,21; Partiinaia zhizn (1987), No. 12,12. In calendar year 1986, the total membership of the party increased by 1.4 per cent (Table 3).

24 While the growth rate of the Soviet labour force has declined from 5.3 per cent per annum in the 1960s to 0.5 in 1983–1984, this has been a secular decline. Most recently, in fact, the rate improved to 0.6 percent in 1984–1985. See Vestnik statistiki (1986), No. 8, 64Google Scholar; and Komnumist (1987), No. 1, 124Google Scholar.

25 “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1986), 22; Narkhoz 1922–1982, 30,48; Narkhoz 1984,7; Partiinaia zhizn’ (1987), No. 12, 12; and Vestnik statistiki (1986), No. 8, 64.

26 “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1983), 22; and (1986), 23; Narkhoz 1922–1982, 42; and Narkhoz 1984, 29.

27 Harasymiw, , Political Elite Recruitment, 95;Google ScholarPartiinaia zhizn’ (1987), No. 12, 12; and Vestnik statistiki (1986), No. 8, 64.

28 This priority has been expressed, for example, in L. Shishov, “O regulirovanii rosta i formirovanii riadov KPSS,” Kommunist Estonii (1985), No. 5, 13; V. Karaliun and Rumba, E., “Ukreplenie rabochego iadra partii,” Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii (1986), No. 5, 66–67;Google Scholar and Belykh, N., “Bol'she vnimaniia otboru v partiiu, vospitaniiu molodykh kommunistov,” Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii (1986), No. 10, 49–50Google Scholar.

29 According to Hill and Frank (The Soviet Communist Party, 22), “the applicant... prepares an application form.... This contains such information as full name, date and place of birth, mother tongue, parents’ current occupation, educational institutions attended and qualifications attained, any significant medals and other awards, languages spoken, military service record, occupational record, and whether he has lived abroad. Other details, such as social class, are added by the committee secretary.” It is not certain, therefore, that data on the social origins of party members are accurate.

30 Miller, John (“The Communist Party,” 8–14Google Scholar) makes the error of ignoring the second of these factors, and of assuming the growth rate to be equivalent to recruitment or intake alone. He makes the same mistake regarding occupations. Obviously, people can change their educational qualifications as well as occupations after joining the party. Miller's conclusions, therefore, have to be treated with caution on this score.

31 Lane, David, Politics and Society in the USSR (revised ed.; Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978) 413–16;Google Scholar and Barghoorn, Frederick C. and Remington, Thomas F., Politics in the USSR (3rd ed.; Boston: Little, Brown, 1986), 110–11Google Scholar.

32 This rather sizeable discrepancy may very well have been one of the consequences of Brezhnev's “exchange of party cards.” That is, the purge may quite likely have hit hardest at those party members with less than higher education. Expulsion from the party may be just as much a class phenomenon as recruitment into it, if not more so.

33 “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1983), 26; and (1986), 25. Comparison could not be extended to 1987 because of the collapsing of several categories in the latest data. See “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1987), 13.

34 “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1986), 26. Not only is the succession process weeding out ratherthan adding to the party's ranks from the “leading sectors” of the economy, but the sectoral growth of the CPSU was not, as of 1983, keeping pace with the corresponding dynamics in the economy. For instance, if the various sectors of the economy are rank-ordered according to their rates of growth between 1975 and 1983, and the same is done for employed Communists for 1976–1983, the measure of statistical correlation is insignificant.

35 Of employed Communists, 9.1 per cent were functionaries in 1986; 9.2 percent in 1987. See “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1986), 25; and (1987), 13.

36 “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1981), 18; (1983), 23; and (1986), 24.

37 Gorbachev mentioned the purge in Uzbekistan in his address to the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. See Pravda Ukrainy, January 28, 1987, 2.

38 No significant correlation, positive or negative, exists between the rank-ordering of major nationalities in terms of (1) rate of growth within the CPSU in 1983–1986, and (2) level of education of persons in the labour force as of 1985. See “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1983), 23; and (1986), 24; and Vestnik statistiki (1986), No. 7, 67.

39 “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1986), 24; and (1987), 12.

40 “KPSS v tsifrakh” (1986), 29.

41 Ibid.

42 For a definition of the concept of “the structure of political opportunities,” see Schlesinger, Joseph A., Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 11Google Scholar.

43 Colton, Timothy J., The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union (revised ed.; New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), chap. 3Google Scholar.

44 Pravda, June 18, 1987. For a follow-up report, see Pravda, July 11, 1987.