Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2plfb Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T03:55:15.588Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Roles and Activities of Business Interest Associations in Canada*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

William D. Coleman  and
Henry J. Jacek
William D. Coleman
Affiliation:
McMaster University
Henry J. Jacek
Affiliation:
McMaster University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This article is devoted to a study of business interest associations in Canada in the light of the basic question: Why do they exist? The purpose is to demonstrate that business interest associations might be profitably considered distinct from other types of pressure groups. When their organization and activities are considered at length, it also becomes clear that these groups have an importance for their members that is not often perceived. These arguments are developed by drawing upon a case study of business associations representing selected sectors of the Canadian food processing industry.

Résumé

Cet article est voué à l'étude des associations d'affaires au Canada à la lumière d'une question fondamentale: Pourquoi existent-elles? Le but de cet article est ainsi de démontrer que les associations d'affaires pourraient être avantageusement considérées comme distinctes des autres formes de groupes de pression. Lorsque nous considérons leur organisation et leurs activités dans leur ensemble, il devient aussi clair que ces groupes ont une importance particulière pour leurs membres, qui n'est pas fréquemment perçue. Ces arguments sont developpés à partir d'une étude de cas des associations d'affaires représentant des secteurs choisis de l'industrie canadienne de transformation alimentaire.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 16 , Issue 2 , June 1983 , pp. 257 - 280
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1983

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 This figure was developed based on research in our project entitled “Interest Intermediation in Canada” and funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, grants 410-78-0716 and 410-80-0280.

2 The classic study of this genre is Clark, S. D., The Canadian Manufacturers Association (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1939)Google Scholar. Also see Dawson, Helen Jones, “The Canadian Federation of Agriculture,” Canadian Public Administration 3 (1960), 139–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bucovetsky, M. W., “The Mining Industry and the Great Tax Reform Debate,” in éPross, A. Paul (ed.), Pressure Group Politics in Canada (Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1975), 87–114Google Scholar; and Berry, Glyn R., “The Oil Lobby and the Energy Crisis,” Canadian Public Administration 17 (1974), 600–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Claus Offe and Wiesenthal, Helmut, “Two Logics of Collective Action,” Political Power and Social Theory 1 (1979), 67–115Google Scholar; and Clement, Wallace, The Canadian Corporate Elite (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 360.Google Scholar

4 It is difficult to summarize this literature. A good start may be obtained from Philippe Schmitter and Lehmbruch, G. (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979)Google Scholar, and Berger, Suzanne (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism and the Transformation of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

5 Truman, David, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951)Google Scholar; Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), chap. 6Google Scholar; Wilson, James Q., Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973), chap. 8.Google Scholar

6 Offe and Wiesenthal, “Two Logics”; Panitch, Leo, “Trade Unions and the Capitalist State,” New Left Review 125 (1981), 21–45.Google Scholar

7 Panitch, 26.

8 Olson, The Logic of Collective Action.

9 These sectors differ not only in size but in degree of activity on export markets, problems with import substitution, concentration, degree of foreign control and profitability.

10 United Nations, Indexes to the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (New York, 1971).Google Scholar

11 The five excluded associations are: Alberta Egg and Poultry Association, L'Association des abattoirs avicoles du Québec, British Columbia Poultry Processors Association, Manitoba Egg and Poultry Association, Saskatchewan Egg and Poultry Association.

12 Canadian Meat Council, Constitution and By-laws, Article 410.

13 These firms feel the Council does not adequately represent Western interests. They argue that the current Crow Rate works to the detriment of meat processing firms in the West and that the Council has not worked energetically enough to have the rate revised.

14 The eight provincial associations are clearly associations in their own right. They have their own constitutions, staff, facilities and collect their own dues. The national association does not involve itself in specifically provincial matters.

The 18 firms which are direct members of the association may be subdivided into three types: those in Atlantic Canada which do not have their own association; those food manufacturers that do not themselves process poultry at a primary level, but use the primary processed product in a further processed commodity (for example, soups); and egg manufacturers in provinces where the egg processors association represents only egg graders (interview, D. G. McKenzie, Executive Vice-President, CPEPC, 15 January 1982).

15 Those excluded are: Atlantic Dairy Council, Saskatchewan Dairy Association, British Columbia Dairy Council and the Ontario Cheddar Cheese Association.

16 These events are explained in somewhat greater detail by McCormick, Veronica, A Hundred Years in the Dairy Industry (Ottawa: Dairy Farmers of Canada, 1968), 183–85.Google Scholar

17 A good detailed summary of these events can be found in Lane, Stewart H. and Fox, Glenn C., A Synopsis of Economic Research on the Ontario Dairy Industry 1950-1980 (Guelph, Ontario: School of Agricultural Economics and Extension Education, University of Guelph, 1981), 54–61Google Scholar. For a useful discussion of supply-management in the dairy industry, see Barichello, Richard R., The Economics of Canadian Dairy Industry Regulation (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981)Google Scholar, and Broadwith, , Hughes, and Associates, “The Ontario Milk Marketing Board: An Economic Analysis,” in Ontario Economic Council, Government Regulation: Issues and Alternatives (Toronto, 1978), 67–102Google Scholar. For the relationship with the processing industry, see Anderson, Robert D., Government Regulation of the Canadian Dairy Processing, Distributing, and Retailing Sector, Working Paper No. 25, Regulation Reference (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1981).Google Scholar

18 These cooperative firms have a very informal, unstructured organization of their own, the Conseil de la cooperation laitière du Québec.

19 These regional groups are the Ontario Food Processors Association, the Western Food Processors Association and the Association des manufacturiers alimentaires du Québec.

20 Shapiro, R. G. and Hughes, D. R., An Analysis of the Effects of Government Regulations on the Canadian Fruit and Vegetable Processing Industry, Economic Council of Canada, Regulation Reference Working Paper No. II, (Ottawa, 1980), 6.Google Scholar

21 Report of Commissioner, Combines Investigation Act, Department of Justice. Government of Canada, Flour Milling Industry: Investigation into an Aleged Combine in the Manufacture, Distribution and Sale of Flour and Other Grain-Mill Products (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1949).Google Scholar

22 GPMC, By-laws, n.d., 1.

23 These branches do not have their own staff and are not autonomous organizations in their own right. They are: Atlantic Frozen Food Council, Quebec Frozen Food Association, Ontario Frozen Food Association, Manitoba Frozen Food Association, Alberta Frozen Food Association and Pacific Frozen Food Association.

24 See, for example, Pross, , Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian PoliticsGoogle Scholar; Presthus, Robert, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973)Google Scholar, and Elites in the Policy Process (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974)Google Scholar; Kwavnick, David, Organized Labour and Pressure Politics (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972)Google Scholar; Lang, Ronald, The Politics of Drugs (Westmead, England: Saxon House, 1974)Google Scholar; Stanbury, W. T., Business Interests and The Reform of Canadian Competition Policy, 1971-1975 (Toronto: Methuen, 1977)Google Scholar; and Gillies, James, Where Business Fails (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1981), especially 66-73.Google Scholar

25 Stanbury, W. T., “Lobbying and Interest Group Representation in the Legislative Process,” in Neilson, William A. W. and MacPherson, James C. (eds.), The Legislative Process in Canada: The Need for Reform (Toronto: Butterworth, 1978)Google Scholar, chap. 6. For further elaboration see Thompson, Fred and Stanbury, W. T., The Political Economy of Interest Groups in the Legislative Process in Canada (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1979).Google Scholar

26 A discussion of various alternatives to, and variations of, associative action may be found in McKie, Craig, “Some Views on Canadian Corporatism,” in Beattie, Christopher and Crysdale, Stewart (eds.), Sociology Canada: Readings (2nd ed.; Toronto: Butterworths, 1977), 226–40.Google Scholar

27 For this perspective on regulation, see Stigler, George, The Citizen and the Slate: Essays on Regulation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975)Google Scholar. Also see Economic Council of Canada, Reforming Regulation (Ottawa, 1981)Google Scholar. and Stanbury, W. T. and Thompson, Fred, Regulatory Reform in Canada (Ottawa: Institute for Research in Public Policy, 1982).Google Scholar

28 A full discussion of the regulatory legislation affecting this industry is contained in Shapiro and Hughes, An Analysis of the Effects of Government Regulations on the Canadian Fruit and Vegetable Processing Industry.

29 Hiscocks, G. A and Bennett, T. A., “Marketing Boards and Pricing in Canada,” Canadian Farm Economics 9, no. 3 (1974), 15–22.Google Scholar

30 Stonehouse, D. Peter, “Government Policies for the Canadian Dairy Industry,” Canadian Farm Economics 14, no. 1-2 (1979), 1–11.Google Scholar

31 The Ontario Creamerymen's Association is also primarily engaged in commercial activity. The price of factory-separated cream is determined by the Ontario Milk Marketing Board and the association consults with it. Farm-separated cream is sold through another marketing agency, the Ontario Cream Producers Marketing Board. The association negotiates prices and terms annually with this board.

32 Prescott, D. M., The Role of Marketing Boards in the Processed Tomato and Asparagus Industries, Economic Council of Canada, Regulation Reference Technical Report No. E/I 5 (Ottawa, 1980), 32–34.Google Scholar

33 See, for example, Moe, Terry, The Organization of Interests (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980)Google Scholar and Manzer, Ronald, “Selective Inducements and the Development of Pressure Groups: The Case of Canadian Teachers' Associations,” this JOURNAL 2 (1969), 103–17.Google Scholar

34 Olson, , The Logic of Collective Action, 34–52.Google Scholar

35 A large group is one where the loss of one dues payer will not noticeably increase the burden for any one other dues payer. Where industries tend to be oligopolistic and the number of firms limited, as is often the case in Canada, this condition related to dues does not hold.

36 The CMC retains on staff a food scientist who is consulted by member firms. The OFMA membership overlaps with the clients of a mutual fire insurance company. The secretary-manager of the OFMA is also the manager of the company.

37 The analysis of the chemical associations is found in William D. Coleman and Henry J. Jacek, “The Political Organization of the Chemical Industry in Canada,” paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax, May, 1981.

38 McKie, “Some Views on Canadian Corporatism,” 226-40.