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Playing Defence: Early Responses to Conflict Expansion in the Oil Sands Policy Subsystem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 November 2011

George Hoberg  and
Jeffrey Phillips
George Hoberg*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
Jeffrey Phillips*
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
*
George Hoberg, Department of Forest Resources Management, University of British Columbia, Forest Science Centre 2037, 2045-2424 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, [email protected]
Jeff Phillips, [email protected]
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Abstract

Abstract. This article examines how powerful policy actors defend themselves against opponents' strategies of conflict expansion through a case study on the oil sands of Alberta. In response to an escalation of criticism of its performance on environmental regulation and related issues, the government of Alberta has pursued a strategy of engaging in several multi-stakeholder consultations. We argue that in examining subsystem change, it is essential to go beyond an examination of formal institutional mechanisms to examine policy impacts. Thus far, despite a significant pluralisation of consultative mechanisms on the oil sands, there is little or no evidence of a shift in power away from pro-oil sands interests. This strategy of selective opening is designed to bolster the legitimacy of the policy process while maintaining control over decision rules and venues.

Résumé. Cet article étudie le rapport de force et la stratégie de défense des acteurs politiques lorsqu'un conflit dégénère, comme cela s'est produit dans le dossier des sables bitumineux de l'Alberta. Devant une recrudescence des critiques à l'égard de sa performance au chapitre de la réglementation environnementale, le gouvernement de l'Alberta a adopté une stratégie qui consiste à effectuer des consultations avec plusieurs intervenants. Nous soutenons qu'en examinant les changements du sous-système, il est vital d'aller au delà de la simple étude des mécanismes institutionnels pour évaluer l'impact des politiques. En dépit de la pluralité des mécanismes de consultation mis en place, rien ne semble indiquer qu'une partie quelconque du pouvoir ait échappé aux acteurs de l'exploitation des sables bitumineux. Cette stratégie d'ouverture sélective est conçue pour renforcer la légitimité du processus politique tout en gardant le contrôle sur les prises de décision et les centres décisionnels.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 44 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 507 - 527
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association 2011

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