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Moving Right Along: The Roots of Amateurism in the Canadian House of Commons*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Michael M. Atkinson  and
David C. Docherty
Michael M. Atkinson
Affiliation:
McMaster University
David C. Docherty
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
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Abstract

It has been argued that rapid membership turnover in the Canadian House of Commons robs the institution of a dedicated and experienced group of MPs and produces a Parliament stocked with political amateurs. Both electoral defeat and voluntary retirement have been seen to play a role in the amateurism phenomenon. The authors explore the roots of amateurism and critically examine the argument that a frustrating career structure in the House of Commons encourages voluntary vacancies. Using a random sample of former MPs, the authors find support for both a “frustration” and an “exhaustion” model of career choice. The article concludes that while amateurism—in the sense of short political careers—may be problematic, not all MPs are amateurs and the problem of amateurism cannot be addressed simply by satisfying frustrated ambition.

Résumé

Il a été avancé que la mobilité éle vée à la Chambre des Communes prive cette institution d'un groupe expérimenté et dévoué de députés et crée un Parlement rempli d'amateurs politiques. Les défaites électorales et les retraites volontaires ont été per¸ues comme étant à la source de ce phénomène d'amateurisme. Les auteurs étudient les causes de l'amateurisme et examinent, d'un point de vue critique, l'argument voulant qu'une structure de carrière frustrante à la Chambre des Communes encourage les départs volontaires. Sur la base d'un échantillon d'anciens députés, les auteurs ont trouvé des signes à la fois d'un « modèle de frustration » et d'un « modèle d'épuisement ». La conclusion des auteurs est que bien que l'amateurisme—dans le sens de carriéres politiques courtes—puisse poser des difficultés, tous les députés ne sont pas des amateurs et le problème de l'amateurisme ne peut étre résolu seulement en donnant satisfaction aux ambitions frustrées.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 25 , Issue 2 , June 1992 , pp. 295 - 318
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1992

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References

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39 Of course exhaustion may come rather early in one's career. According to Franks, The Parliament of Canada, 76, the constant travelling, disruption of family life, lack of privacy and high financial costs (MPs often face a drop in salary) all contribute to rapid turnover. In a similar vein John Hibbing argues that in the United States familial sacrifices, the lack of a private life and public disrespect for elected officials have all contributed to the high number of voluntary vacancies in the House of Representatives. See Hibbing, “Voluntary Retirement from the U.S. House: The Costs of Congressional Service,” 60–63.

40 This total does not include 21 individuals who died while serving in the House of Commons during this period.

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