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The Media's Persuasive Effects: The Priming of Leadership in the 1988 Canadian Election*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Matthew Mendelsohn
Matthew Mendelsohn
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia
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Abstract

This article examines the effect of the media during the 1988 Canadian election. Using National Election Study data, three questions are investigated: do those with different patterns of media exposure change their vote intentions at different times; do those with higher media exposure remain more stable in their vote intentions, and do the media prime leadership? The article argues that patterns of media exposure have an effect: those with higher exposure to the media lead the opinion of others by about one week, they are more stable in their vote intentions, and they are more likely to vote on the basis of their trust in the leaders than on issue positions (in this case, the Free Trade Agreement) or party identification. However, there were few differences between those who relied on television as opposed to print for their information.

Résumé

Le présent article porte sur l'effet des médias au cours de la campagne électorale canadienne de 1988. L'article étudie les données sur l'opinion publique recueillies par l'Étude nationale et détermine si ceux qui témoignent de types d'exposition médiatique différents sont plus susceptibles de changer leur intention de vote au cours de la campagne, s'ils le font à différents moments, et s'ils se laissent influencer à différents degrés par leur évaluation des chefs, leur identification partisane ou leur opinion sur l'Accord de libre échange dans leur intention de vote. Cet article soutient que les médias ont eu un effet: le groupe à forte exposition médiatique mène généralement l'opinion du groupe à faible exposition par environ une semaine; ils sont les plus stables dans leur intention de vote; et ils sont plus susceptible de se fier aux chefs dans leur choix de vote. Pourtant, il y a peu de différences entre ceux qui se fient à la télévision et ceux qui se fient à la presse.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , March 1994 , pp. 81 - 97
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1994

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References

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35 For more detailed information, see ibid., Appendices.

36 Our focus is restricted to Liberal and Conservative voters. We subtract the Conservative vote share from the Liberal vote share. New Democratic party voters and undecided voters are excluded. We do so for the sake of simplicity. A comparison between Liberal and Conservative voters is the easiest possible; it is unclear what comparisons we could make if we included all voters. Moreover, as the election proceeded, most of the shifts occurred between the Liberals and the Conservatives; the NDP was relegated to its traditional constituency. In addition, during the postdebate period, the media clearly presented the election as a contest between the two traditional parties.

37 In earlier runs we controlled for various socio-economic and attitudinal variables. For example, in one run we restricted the analysis to those who were interested in politics, highly educated and had seen a leaders' debate. Even restricting the sample in this way, when we compared the high- and low-exposure groups, the differences identified above were still found.

38 One qualification should be made. The pattern of movement in 1988 was one in which many individuals changed their vote intention (or at least became undecided) in the middle periods of the campaign, but returned to their original vote intention by the end of the campaign. Those who said they would vote Conservative during the first wave, at some later point became undecided or switched parties and then later returned, and responded in the postcampaign wave that they had voted Conservative, would be labelled as “stable.” We are not able to capture this movement and indecision in our measures in this section. What went on between these two surveys is not considered, and it is for this reason that the results in this section must be looked at in conjunction with the results of the previous section.

39 Though the coefficients are highest for the comparative trustworthiness assessment, it is actually the least significant of the three.

40 See Schiller, Herbert (Culture Inc.: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression [New York: Oxford University Press, 1989])Google Scholar on the “televisionization” of all aspects of culture, including newspapers.

41 One might also suggest that the differences observed between exposure groups are due to their different socio-economic make-ups. It is for this reason that we controlled for political sophistication. In earlier runs we controlled for other socioeconomics variables. These runs produced similar results.

42 It must be remembered that opinion on the FTA and party identification were very closely related to the comparative leadership assessment, and it is impossible to distinguish completely these variables from each other. This is why, despite results that are not very robust, we are confident that the media did have an effect: as exposure to the media went up, voters were less likely to base their vote decisions on party identification and more likely to base them on the FTA and leaders. These were the two objects which became fused in the media. Because of the presence of the FTA, finding evidence for the priming of leadership may be more difficult in the 1988 election than in other elections. Nonetheless, that there was even some priming of leadership in an election described as a “referendum on free trade” suggests that we are on the right track and that future elections may demonstrate more clearly the priming of leadership.