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Constitutional Design and Australian Exceptionalism in the Adoption of National Bills of Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2014

Bruce Stone  and
Nicholas Barry
Bruce Stone*
Affiliation:
University of Western Australia
Nicholas Barry*
Affiliation:
La Trobe University
*
Political Science and International Relations, M257, School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, University of Western Australia, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, Western Australia, 6009, Email: [email protected]
Department of Politics, Philosophy and Legal Studies, School of Social Sciences and Communications, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, 3086, Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Why has Australia not followed Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom in adopting a formal bill of rights at the national level? We argue that the Australian Constitution has made the difference. The Constitution has underpinned a comparatively strong parliamentary check on the executive, weakening the rationale for a bill of rights and impeding legislative initiatives towards this end; thwarted the drive for a constitutional bill of rights; and helped delegitimize statutory approaches to a bill of rights in general and the “dialogue model” in particular. The article ultimately questions the notion that a common approach to rights protection can apply across Westminster democracies.

Résumé

Pourquoi l'Australie n'a-t-elle pas suivi le Canada, la Nouvelle Zélande et le Royaume Uni qui ont tous adopté une déclaration des droits formelle au niveau national? Nous proposons que la différence est due à la Constitution australienne. La Constitution a sous-tendu l'exercice d'un contrôle parlementaire comparativement fort sur l'exécutif, affaiblissant le raisonnement pour une déclaration des droits et empêchant des initiatives législatives vers cette fin. La Constitution a non seulement contrecarré la poussée pour une déclaration constitutionnelle de droits mais aussi aidé à délégitimer des approches statutaires vers une déclaration de droits de façon générale et “le modèle dialogue” en particulier. L'article met en fin de compte en doute la notion qu'une approche commune à la protection des droits puisse s'appliquer dans toutes les démocraties de Westminster.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 47 , Issue 4 , December 2014 , pp. 767 - 785
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 2014 

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