Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-fbnjt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-19T03:21:37.805Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Why cognitivism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Yair Levy
Yair Levy*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
*
E-mail: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of ‘Practical Knowledge.’ In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one’s intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.

Keywords

Intentioncognitivism about intentionavowalspractical knowledge
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , 2018 , pp. 223 - 244
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Anscombe, E. 1957. Intention. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Bar-On, D. 2004. Speaking My Mind: Expression and Self-Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 10.1093/0199276285.001.0001Google Scholar
Bar-On, D., and Long, D.. 2001. “Avowals and First-Person Privilege.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 311–335. 10.1111/phpr.2001.62.issue-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bar-On, D., and Sias, J.. 2013. “Varieties of Expressivism.” Philosophy Compass 8: 699–713. 10.1111/phc3.12051Google Scholar
Bratman, M. 2009. “Intention, Belief, and Practical Rationality.” In Reasons for Action, edited by Sobel, D. and Wall, S., 13–36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511720185Google Scholar
Bratman, M. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 2013. Rationality Through Reasoning. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 10.1002/9781118609088Google Scholar
Broome, J. 2005. “Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?” Philosophical Issues 15: 321–337. 10.1111/phis.2005.15.issue-1Google Scholar
Brunero, J. 2009. “Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.” Philosophical Studies 146: 311–325. 10.1007/s11098-008-9267-4Google Scholar
Davidson, D. 1980. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Donnellan, K. 1963. “Knowing What I am Doing.” The Journal of Philosophy 60: 401–409. 10.2307/2022825CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Falvey, K. 2000. “Knowledge in Intention.” Philosophical Studies 99: 21–44. 10.1023/A:1018775307559CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Galton, A. 1984. The Logic of Aspect: An Axiomatic Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Green, M., and Williams, J., eds. 2007. Moore’s Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Ways of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Grice, H. P. 1971. “Intention and Uncertainty.” Proceedings of the British Academy 5: 263–279.Google Scholar
Harman, G. 1976. “Practical Reasoning.” Review of Metaphysics 29: 431–463.Google Scholar
Heal, J. 1994. “Moore’s Paradox: A Wittgensteinian Approach.” Mind 103: 5–24. 10.1093/mind/103.409.5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holton, R. 2008. “Partial Intention, Partial Belief.” Mind 117: 27–58. 10.1093/mind/fzn002CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kolodny, N. 2005. “Why Be Rational?” Mind 114: 509–563. 10.1093/mind/fzi509CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Langton, R. 2004. “Intention as Faith.” In Agency and Action, edited by Hyman, J. and Steward, H., 243–258. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511550843CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moran, R. 2004. “Anscombe on ‘Practical Knowledge’.” In Agency and Action, edited by Hyman, J. and Steward, H., 43–68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9780511550843CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Paul, S. 2009a. “Intention, Belief, and Wishful Thinking: Setiya on ‘Practical Knowledge’.” Ethics 119: 546–557. 10.1086/599312CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Paul, S. 2009b. “How We Know What We’re Doing.” Philosophers’ Imprint 9: 1–24.Google Scholar
Raz, J. 2005. “The Myth of Instrumental Reason.” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1: 1–28.Google Scholar
Ridge, M. 1998. “Humean Intentions.” American Philosophical Quarterly 35: 157–178.Google Scholar
Ross, J. 2009. “How to be a Cognitivist about Practical Reason.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4, edited by Shafer-Landau, R., 243–281. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Setiya, K. 2015. “Intention.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Zalta, E. N.. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/intention/Google Scholar
Setiya, K. 2011. “Knowledge of Intention.” In Essays on Anscombe’s ‘Intention’, edited by Ford, A., Hornsby, J. and Stoutland, F., 170–197. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Setiya, K. 2009. “Practical Knowledge Revisited.” Ethics 120: 128–137. 10.1086/606000Google Scholar
Setiya, K. 2008. “Practical Knowledge.” Ethics 118: 388–409. 10.1086/528781CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Setiya, K. 2007a. “Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason.” Ethics 117: 647–673.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Setiya, K. 2007b. Reasons without Rationalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Sinhababu, N. 2013. “The Desire-Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything.” Noûs 47: 680–696.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thompson, M. 2011. “Anscombe’s ‘Intention’ and Practical Knowledge.” In Essays on Anscombe’s ‘Intention’, edited by Ford, A., Hornsby, J. and Stoutland, F., 198–210. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Velleman, D. 2007. “What Good is a Will?” In Action in Context, edited by Leist, A. and Baumann, H., 193–215. Berlin: De Gruyter/Mouton.Google Scholar
Velleman, D. 1989. Practical Reflection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Wallace, R.J. 2001. “Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason.” Philosopher's Imprint 1: 1–26.Google Scholar
Wright, C. 1998. “Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy.” In Knowing Our Own Minds, edited by Wright, C., Smith, B. and Macdonald, C., 13–45. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar