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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
Answering the question, ‘Who is a rational agent?’ is of utmost importance for all moral theories which conceive of the rational agent as their basic moral unit (I call these theories ‘the rational theories of morality’). Surprisingly enough, these theories do not pay much attention to this question, and assume, without offering detailed discussions, certain characterizations of the rational agent. In this paper, I examine what kind of attribute ‘rational’ is. In light of this examination I claim that the rational moral theories are based on a mistaken characterization of the rational agent.
* I am grateful to Alan Donagan and Alan Gewirth for very helpful discussions; that is not to say that they wholly agree with my opinions, or with the depictions of their views.
1 Donagan, A. The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1977);CrossRefGoogle Scholar Gewirth, A. Reason and Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1978)Google Scholar
2 This is Aristotle's characterization of a substance (see, e.g., Categories, 3b32-4a9).
3 I use the term ‘activity’ in a very broad sense which includes biological activities such as getting taller or fatter.
4 There can be a disagreement concerning the natural borderlines of a certain status attribute (e.g., when human life begins and ends). but once the disagree· ment is settled all members have an equal degree of membership.
5 In contrast to a status-attribute, the determination of an attainment-attribute's borderlines is not so important. This is so because there are no such clear-cut borderlines, and because an attainment-attribute is mainly an evaluative at· tribute which usually does not imply certain privileges as a status-attribute usual· ly does.
6 Donogan, 66, emphasis added
7 Gewirth, 135, 44. Despite these quotations, Donagan and Gewirth may object to the claim that their theories conceive of the rational agent as their basic moral unit. Indeed, Donagan does not stress the rational feature too much, and Gewirth's depiction of an agent is broader than that of a rational person (his agent is also a purposive person who is free). Consequently, my criticism of an extreme type of rational moral theory (which is probably not defendable) does not always have an adverse impact on their theories. However, in both Donagan's and Gewirth's theories, the agent's rationality remains an essential feature; I will show that both their formulations and the importance they render to this feature should be criticized.
8 Donagan does not refer at length to this issue, and the argument above is more a construction of what his theory assumes than what he actually states.
9 Donagan, 83
10 Ibid., 82
11 Ibid., 235
12 Actually, we may distinguish a few more senses. Thus, K. Baier suggests four meanings of ‘rationality': ‘a capacity (rationality). an ability (full rationality), a standard of performance (complete or perfect rationality). and a tendency to perform the tasks of Reason when that is called for (the opposite of a rationality)' ('The Social Source of Reason,’ Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 51 [1977-78) 707-33.) It is extremely important that every rational moral theory will be clear about the meaning it refers to when it conceives of the rational agent to be its basic moral unit; each meaning has its own difficulties.
13 Gewirth, 122
14 Ibid., 22, 89-90
15 Gewirth apparently holds this view; see, e.g., pp. 46, 363. Similarly, Baier distinguishes between full and complete rationality. Full rationality (Baier argues) is a property of every normal adult, while complete rationality is the property of always exercising this ability at least up to a certain minimal standard; ir· rational behavior falls below this minimal standard ('The Source of Reason,' 713). Later on I will deal with a somewhat different attitude which does not speak about minimal standard threshold, but about minimal typical characterizations which do not have definite borderlines; that attitude concedes that ‘rational’ is an attainment·attribute.
16 Therefore, Seneca says: ‘There is no great genius without some touch of madness.'
17 One may claim, at least theoretically, that this is also the case regarding the differences in rationality between human beings and animals.
18 This version coincides with main assertions of Gewirth's theory; see, e.g., p. 46.
19 Gewirth himself indicates the importance of the first two features, and Donagan stresses the importance of the last one.
20 Donogan, 171
21 Ibid., 82, 83
22 Ibid., 89
23 Ibid., 240; emphasis added
24 Gewirth, 141. Donagan's claim that moral respect ‘has no degrees’ seems to oppose that principle.
25 Indeed, one may claim that the invention of certain drugs may remove the ef· fects of senility (as matter of fact scientists do attempt to develop such effective drugs, but primarily for preventing senility, and not for abolishing existing senility). However, even if such drugs are developed, it seems that our present moral attitude toward the senile elders should not be determined merely by a probable invention of some drugs; it should be determined by more basic moral considerations.
26 Thus, e.g., E. Vurpillot writes: ‘A number of investigations have demonstrated marked similarities between the development of the child of preschool age and the involution of the elderly person. The behavioural analogy between the very young and the very old would be explained by an analogy in terms of neural structures’ (The Visual World of the Child [New York: International Universities Press 1976] 333).