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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
It has long been argued, and often admitted, that utilitarianism cannot account for distributive Justice. The purpose of this paper is to show that utilitarianism cannot make sense of the moral issues involved in having children. In particular, it cannot take account of the differences between infanticide, abortion, contraception and chastity. Importantly, the two difficulties stem from a common feature of utilitarianism, that since it is a sum-ranking decision procedure, it is structurally indifferent to who experiences utility. Children and Justice are two cases where it makes every difference how the utility total is distributed among people.
1 Sen, Amartya ‘Utilitarianism and Welfarism,’ Journal of Philosophy, 78 (1979) 463 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 For some suggestions, see Daniels, Norman ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics,’ Journal of Philosophy, 78 (1979) 256ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3 Hare, R.M. ‘Abortion and the Golden Rule,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1974-5) 207-24Google Scholar
4 Glover, Jonathan Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1978) chapter 11Google Scholar
5 Glover, 138-9
6 Kenny, A.J.P. ‘Happiness,’ in Feinberg, Joel ed., Moral Concepts (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1969) 51Google Scholar
7 Glover, chapter 7
8 Hare, 215
9 Glover, 138
10 Hare, 212
11 Glover, 122
12 There can be perfectionist reasons for acting which are not essentially personaffecting reasons (see Nagel, Tom ‘The Fragmentation of Value’ in his Mortal Questions [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979]Google Scholar) so the personaffecting thesis, though appealing, cannot be true of all reasons. It is worth remarking that classical utilitarianism, in that it asserts that the utility of a person's life is, other things equal, good reason to bring that person into existence, values utility independently and abstractly; the idea that it is better that there be more utility in the world is prior to the idea that it is better that people have more utility. Thus classical utilitarianism regards utility as a perfectionist value.
13 The example is similar to one of Derek Parfit's. See his ‘On Doing the Best for Our Children,’ Bayles, Michael ed., Ethics and Population (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman 1976) 100-3.Google Scholar
14 An example of an average-utility position on children is by Jan Narveson, in Mind, 76 (1967) 62 ff., especially pp. 66-7, but here the person-affecting principle is explicitly used. For a utilitarian attempt to patch up the difficulties, see Vetter, H. in Mind, 80 (1971) 301 ff.,CrossRefGoogle Scholar and in Inquiry, 24 (1969) 445ff.
15 Glover, 141
16 Williams, Bernard ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’ in Smart, J.J.C. and Williams, Bernard Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1969)Google Scholar chapter 5. These are the differences between Williams’ argument and mine. Williams’ argument applies even when the interests of actual persons are in the balance against the integrity of the agent, and so his argument, if it works, proves more than mine does. Also, in the situations he considers, he discounts the disutility of the agent's negative feelings about the matter, on the grounds that they are feelings that the decision would be wrong, and so they can only recommend that one view the matter from a utilitarian viewpoint; they cannot be consistently included in the sum. In the examples I consider, I do not discount the disutility of the agents’ negative feelings about the matter, for they are merely Judgements that the actions would be wrong for them to do. I take it that I have described cases where personal values conflict with impersonal values and that these are cases where personal values take priority.
17 I think that a similar argument can be mounted in the case of people who are sexually active, but are committed to not being parents. A similar argument can also be mounted for those who are already parents but do not want to have any more children, but these additional arguments would not carry as much intuitive force as the original example. We venerate some chaste people as saints- these are the last to be thought of as immoral, even if they did produce no children. It is worth noticing that we venerate people as saints because of what they are - what they have committed themselves to being - not for what they have brought about, and certainly not for all the utility that they have brought about.
18 Of course some may undertake a commitment to turn away from some aspects of their bodily existence; e.g. the chaste man. But it is not clear that these commitments could be thoroughgoing without involving madness.
19 In this case she would take it upon herself to provide a child for the childless couple. It would be her project, although for the benefit of others, and as it is her project, no problem of alienation arises.
20 I have benefitted from discussion with Hugh White, Dr. Joseph Raz, Steven Holtzman, and the audience at philosophical societies in Oxford.