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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
1 I wish to thank Elaine Butler, Borghilde Donahoe, Kevin O'Brien, Douglas Simak, and Ronald Thibault for stimulating discussions of Honderich's book.
2 I draw on Hilary Putnam“s interpretation in “The ““Corroboration·· of Theories.” in Honderich, T. and Burnyeat, M.. eds.. Philosophy As It Is (Middlesex: Penguin Books 1979)Google Scholar
3 As Simak has suggested.
4 Simak has an apparently decisive objection to this constraint on regarding something as an omission. Suppose that you are sitting on a chaise longue, sipping a mint julep. You are next to a pool where someone is drowning. Honderich's constraint would absolve you of omitting to save the drowning person, since the energy-expenditure would be greater than the little involved in what you are doing.
5 In Honderich and Burnyeat.
6 It was Urmson, J.O. of course, in ‘Saints and Heroes,’ who drew our attention to the supererogatory element of morality. I was dismayed that Honderich dismissed Urmson's views as ‘hopeless.’ Urmson's essay is reprinted in Melden, A. I.. ed.. Essays in Moral PltilosopiJy (Seattle. WA: University of Washington Press 1958), 198–210.Google Scholar
7 I am indebted to Simak for drawing my attention to this passage, and for discussion of the issue.
8 Hume, David E11quiries (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1902), 293Google Scholar
9 The Journal of Philosophy. 79 (1982) 419-39
10 Burke, Edmund Reflections on the Revolution in France (Middlesex: Pelican Books 1969). 135Google Scholar
11 The example is O’Brien’s.
12 Such an interpretation of Rawls. as an apologist for the status quo. seems to me quite mistaken. Honderich is led to it by the following five construals of Rawls’ theory.
1. It assumes that our societies are ‘decently on the way to realizing’ his principles of justice; that ‘our institutions of law are tolerably just'; that ‘all of the institutions of our societies are either just or else decently on the way to it’ (139, 122).
2. In view of 1. we have a natural duty to comply with and do our share in ‘the just or nearly just institutions which are thought already to exist in our societies’ (121).
3. It forbids infringement of liberties for the sake of relieving distress suffered by the worst-off (135).
4. The difference principle's emphasis on justified inequalities ‘may encourage those who in fact favour inequality that is against the interests of the worst-off’ (136).
5. Since it promises ‘only an equal opportunity to benefit from the society's resources,’ it cannot deal with the point ‘that some individuals must have greater shares if they are to avoid distresses which other individuals can easily avoid without having such shares’ (136).
None of these interpretive points is convincing. Regarding 1: Honderich's only gesture towards supporting it is a reference to Rawls’ essay The Justification of Civil Disobedience,’ where. according to Honderich, Rawls ‘appears to be dealing with actual societies’ (215). But as I understand that essay it assumes that the constitutional democracy in question is well on the way to realizing Rawls’ principles of justice, and does not assume that, but leaves as an open question whether, our societies satisfy the assumption. And though Rawls does apparently commit himself to the view that reasonably affluent societies like ours can. and should, realize the principles of justice, neither in the essay nor in A Theory of Justice do I find him defending the very different proposition that our societies are realizing them, or are decently on the way to doing so. Regarding 2: This interpretation fails because 1 fails, and 2 entails 1. Regarding 3: This seemingly ignores Rawls’ provision of a general conception of justice, which permits infringement of liberties when the worst-off suffer in the manner that Honderich has in mind. Regarding 4: Rawls emphasizes that inequalities must be justified from the point of view of the worst-off. in a context free from coercion or misinformation. It is hard to see how, on this understanding of the difference principle, it could encourage those who favor inequalities that are against the interests of the worst off. Regarding 5: The principle of fair equality of opportunity is much stronger than Honderich implies. It states that those with the same natural assets and motivation should have equal chances to enjoy benefits attached to offices and positions in society. Note that some individuals could have greater shares (of educational funding, for example) if they had to overcome social or economic obstacles to the working of the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Note too that Rawls endorses a principle of redress for such things as physical or mental handicaps, attaching some weight to it as a special application of the difference principle's function of reducing undeserved inequalities.
13 Honderich views Wolff's conception of authority, the anarchist's foe. as a straw man. It demands more than anyone would propose on behalf of a state and its laws, viz. that a citizen be an unreflectively obedient man. ‘a man who is wholly law-abiding and who says that he lives as he does only because the law so directs him’ (108). Honderich rightly lampoons this creature and the ‘authority’ that demands him. He asks: Surely one can be reflectively obedient, in the manner of the democrat? Of course one can. But it seems to me that there can be no real issue between Wolff and Honderich on this question. Wolff does not need to deny that ‘some recommendation’ attaches to supporting democratic policies, nor need he construe authority as demanding that we be unreflectively obedient men. Let such a man be a UOM. Then Wolff queries the authority that demands, not that we be UOMs. but that there should be something UOMish about our compliance, however reflective we are on top of that. Wolff goes on to propose that this UOMishness distinguishes obedience from mere compliance-for-goodreasons. but the distinction isn't essential. Let it be said. if one wishes, that Honderich's democrat. with his ‘various reasons’ for supporting state policies. ‘obeys’ those policies. The crucial question is whether there is something UOMish about his obedience. On one hand. it seems clear that Honderich's consequentialism would counsel disobedience if this produced the best state of affairs. On the other hand. there is an unclarity in Honderich's description of his democrat, whose ‘central idea is that supporting the policy is supporting the system’ (112). If his idea is that breaking the law would undermine the system. I do not think that Wolff would quarrel with this democrat's reasoning, though he might question the need for a system of government of any kind, or question the claim that the democracy is the best one available. The quarrel is rather with a certain kind of ‘double accounting’ as Wolff calls it, which weighs in some such thing as a prima facie obligation alongside whatever recommends the state's policies. If the obligation is anything, it derives its force from something that recommends those policies, rather than being a thing that might be added to, and thus increase, the recommendation. (The discussion of prima facie obligation and double-accounting occurs in Wolff's reply to Reiman in the appendix to the second edition of In Defense of Anarchism.) It is far from obvious that this conception of a state's authority is a straw man. Indeed it may be the conception that Honderich commits himself to when he speaks of an ideal democracy and the democrat's central idea that supporting the policy is supporting the system. If one could reasonably expect that breaking the law would do good and not undermine the system, it would seem UOMish not to break it. If ‘supporting the system’ is to be clarified in this say, there is a real (and puzzling) quarrel with Wolff.
14 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979
15 Oxford: Oxford University Press 1962