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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
It is a remarkable fact that in the past ten years the Philosophical Index shows a mere handful of entries under the heading ‘poverty.’ This is remarkable because of the widespread interest found in the population in general and among philosophers in particular in the identification, analysis, and solution of moral and social problems, and the cultural consensus that poverty is just such a problem. Perhaps the lack of philosophical attention reflects the assumption that there is no conceptual problem with ‘poverty': we all know pretty much what it is, we simply disagree about the principles which can legitmately be implemented to eliminate it. There is some evidence for this in the fact that literature on distributive justice abounds even where the literature on poverty is scarce, and discussions of related issues, such as famine, population ethics, etc., take for granted that the concept of poverty is not problematic.
1 Gendron, Bernard Technology and the Human Condition (New York: St. Martin's Press 1977)Google Scholar
2 For instance, the measure used by the U.S. Social Security Administration.
3 The importation of considerations of production may appear to change the ‘ground rules’ for discussions of poverty, but, as we shall see, the rules are changed not arbitrarily, but because of the nature of the problem.
4 Of course purely parasitical cultures, if any could exist, might be an exception to this generalization, but in those cases the proper population over which to define social poverty will consist of the non-productive parasite plus its productive host, in which case these considerations will apply.
5 Hazlitt, Henry The Conquest of Poverty (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House 1973)Google Scholar, is an example.
6 Mill, John Stuart Principles of Political Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1965)Google Scholar Bk. 1, Ch. 12
7 ‘Capital consumption’ refers to that portion of productive output which must be absorbed in the building, replacement, and repair of tools, equipment, and the non-human means of production in general. Although many exceptions can be noted, as a rule the increase of capital consumption will lead to a decrease of socially necessary labor time.
8 The main objection to the introduction of D is the claim that it is either desirable or necessary for every productive unit to achieve a style of productive life in which there is no problem of ‘diminishing returns’ (e.g., by means of recycling). Space considerations preclude a full discussion of this objection, but it is fair to say that even if correct, there remains a conceptual distinction between C and D, and that in the foreseeable future practical account has to be taken of it.
9 See, for instance, Mencher, Samuel ‘The Problem of Measuring Poverty,’ British Journal of Sociology, 18 (1967) 1–12.CrossRefGoogle Scholar I emphasize current thinking in social science, and indeed primarily Western or capitalist thinking, because other traditions, such as the Marxist tradition, are not restricted in this way.
10 Orshansky, Mollie ‘Counting the Poor: Another Look at the Poverty Profile,’ Social Security Bulletin 28 (1965)Google Scholar
11 Friedman, Rose Poverty Definition and Perspective (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, February, 1965)Google Scholar
12 Oster, Sharon M. Lake, Elizabeth E. and Oksman, Conchita Gene The Definition and Measurement of Poverty, Volume 1: A Review, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 1978)Google Scholar Ch. 2
13 Oster, etal., 8
14 In Technology and the Human Condition, 212-24
15 Some of the recent literature on ‘triage’ or ‘lifeboat ethics’ makes the point that only through ‘massive diebacks’ of populations will many cultures be able to achieve viability. While these claims are factually nonsense the theoretical points occasionally made are valid.
16 For instance, Mermelstein, David in Economics: Mainstream Readings and Radical Critiques, (New York: Random House 1970) 270Google Scholar
17 Gendron, 221
18 For instance, Nozick, Robert Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1974)Google Scholar
19 If I understand Nozick correctly, this priority would not be acceptable to him. I think this is a fatal weakness in his position.
20 There are several ways of defining ‘minimum inequality.’ It is not essential in this context to opt for one or another of them.
21 It is worth noting that this upward drift in the poverty demarcation line is not the result of imposing egalitarian values on the definition of poverty but is, rather, due to the empirical fact that higher consumption is a necessary condition for higher production. Economists who deny this, and who argue that lower wages increase productivity have in mind, at best, situations in which a fixed mode of production is operative. But we have already seen that a society requires a continual revolution or at least evolution in its productive methods. Such changes can be assimilated by the working population only through increased consumption in the form of education, leisure, recreation, facilities for privacy, etc.
22 A shorter version of this paper was read at the Western Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, April, 1979.