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Rethinking the Asymmetry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Richard Yetter Chappell Open the ORCID record for Richard Yetter Chappell [Opens in a new window]
Richard Yetter Chappell*
Affiliation:
University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD, UK.
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Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

According to the Asymmetry, we’ve strong moral reason to prevent miserable lives from coming into existence, but no moral reason to bring happy lives into existence. This procreative asymmetry is often thought to be part of commonsense morality, however theoretically puzzling it might prove to be. I argue that this is a mistake. The Asymmetry is merely prima facie intuitive, and loses its appeal on further reflection. Mature commonsense morality recognizes no fundamental procreative asymmetry. It may recognize some superficially similar theses, but we will see that they derive from more familiar principles, and are compatible with there being moral reason to bring happy lives into existence.

Keywords

Asymmetrypopulation ethicspartialitydemandingnessvariabilismactualism
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 2-3: Special issue: Ethics and Future Generations , 2017 , pp. 167 - 177
Copyright
Copyright © Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2016

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