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Responsibility of Persons for Their Emotions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 1976

Edward Sankowski
Edward Sankowski*
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
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Extract

We sometimes blame persons, and we sometimes give them credit for the emotions they feel. We could, for example, speak of feeling hatred, resentment or envy as “reprehensible” in suitable circumstances, or say “He's to blame for feeling that way.” We could speak of feeling sympathy, affection or indignation as “commendable” in suitable circumstances, or say “He deserves credit for feeling that way.” And it is not just that we are assessing such emotion as somehow good or bad — in addition we may reproach or censure a person for the emotions he feels, or we may regard it as a credit to him that he feels as he does. In short, we apportion or impute responsibility to persons sometimes for the emotions they feel, and one important indication of this fact is in the sorts of judgments we can make about emotions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , December 1977 , pp. 829 - 840
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1977

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References

1 Note that even though it is convenient to talk about “the feeling of particular emotions, taken by itself,” as opposed to the behavior expressive of the feeling, it would be wrong to think one could understand an emotion-concept without understanding what sorts of behavior are characteristically expressive of the emotion in question.

2 Sartre is an obvious example of a philosopher who, in consequence of a pronounced expansion of what is usually regarded as the scope of human freedom, commits himself to the view that persons can be responsible for their emotions. Indeed, the Sartre of the Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions and Being and Nothingness, among other works, holds that emotions are always a manifestation of freedom. Sartre, at least in this phase of his thought, has far too unqualified a conception of freedom and responsibility, if these terms are interpreted, as it seems they should be, in any sense that has recognizable moral implications.By contrast, Taylor, Richard (in Good and Evil, Macmillan, New York, Collier-Macmillan, Toronto-London, 1970)Google Scholar seems to commit himself to the view that persons can never be apportioned responsibility for their emotions—although admittedly somewhat equivocally. Any reasonable view would steer a middle course between the extremes of Sartre and Taylor as these authors are interpreted here.

3 I use “assess” here in a technical way, to include many sorts of evaluation of emotion as good or bad, but to exclude evaluations which impute responsibility. On this usage, deeming someone responsible for an emotion presupposes an assessment of the emotion but is not itself an assessment of the emotion.

4 See, for example, Richard Taylor, op. cit., p. 241.

5 See Peters, R. S. “Emotions and the Category of Passivity,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 62, pp. 117-134,Google Scholar and “The Education of the Emotions,” in Arnold, Magda ed., Feelings and Emotions: The Loyola Symposium, Academic Press, New York, 1970, pp. 187-203.Google Scholar The exact nature of Peters’ commitment on the issue of the present essay is unclear. It is surely true, however, that some philosophers would be attracted to Peters’ views on emotions and would for that reason endorse the sort of position ascribed to a hypothetical objector in the present essay.

6 Cf. On Liberty, Chapter IV, “Of the Limits to the Authority of Society Over the Individual.”