No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
In a recent paper, Peter March proposes to sort out the traditional sorites paradox by distinguishing two senses of ‘resemble.’ The paradox is generated in this way: we have the inference
(a) A is the same colour as B
(b) B is the same colour as C
Hence,
(c) A is the same colour as C
while also having
(d) A is not the same colour as C
1 March, P. ‘Sorting Out Sorites,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1984), 445–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Cf.Wilson, F. ‘The Role of a Principle of Acquaintance in Ontology,’ The Modern Schoolman, 47 (1969), 37–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also ‘Acquaintance, Ontology and Knowledge,’ The New Scholasticism 54 (1970), 1-48; and ‘Effability, Ontology and Method,’ Philosophy Research Archives 9 (1983), 419-70.
3 Cf.Campbell, N.R. The Foundations of Science (New York: Dover 1957), Ch. XVIGoogle Scholar.
4 Cf.Goodman, N. The Structure of Appearance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1951), 222ffGoogle Scholar. For a discussion of Goodman on matching, see Hausman, A. ‘Goodman's Ontology,’ Ch. VIGoogle Scholar, in Hausman, A. and Wilson, F. Carnap and Goodman: Two Formalists (The Hague: Nijhoff 1967)Google Scholar.
5 Cf.Carnap, R. Introduction to Symbolic Logic (New York: Dover 1956), 136ffGoogle Scholar.
6 Butchvarov, P. Resemblance and Identity (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press 1966), 115ffGoogle Scholar.
7 Grossman, R. Ontological Reduction (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press 1973), 186ffGoogle Scholar.