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Relevantism, Material Detachment, and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

R. Routley
R. Routley*
Affiliation:
University of Victoria and Australian National University
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Extract

Relevantism, as a matter of definition, rejects classical logic as incorrect and adopts instead a relevant logic as encapsulating correct inference. It rejects classical logic on the grounds that the rule of Material Detachment, from A and not A or B to infer B, (that is, Disjunctive Syllogism considered as an inferential principle), sometimes leads from truth to falsity. Relevantism — although promoted by some relevant logicians (Routley and Routley), and an integral part of ultralogic (i.e. universal, all purpose, ultramodallogic; cf. [1], [8]) — has recently encountered heavy, but interesting, criticism from relevance logicians themselves (from Belnap, Dunn, and Meyer).

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , June 1984 , pp. 167 - 188
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1984

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References

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