Hostname: page-component-669899f699-tpknm Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-04-26T16:01:29.334Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Rationality with respect to people, places, and times

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Larry S. Temkin
Larry S. Temkin*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA
*
Email: ltemkin@rci.rutgers.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

There is a rich tradition within game theory, decision theory, economics, and philosophy correlating practical rationality with impartiality, and spatial and temporal neutrality. I argue that in some cases we should give priority to people over both times and places, and to times over places. I also show how three plausible dominance principles regarding people, places, and times conflict, so that we cannot accept all three. However, I argue that there are some cases where we should give priority to times over people, suggesting that there is impersonal value to the distribution of high quality life over different times.

Keywords

Practical rationalityimpersonal valuedecision theorytemporal neutralityimpartialitydominance principles
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 5-6: Special Issue: Belief, Action, and Rationality over Time , December 2015 , pp. 576 - 608
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Bostrom, Nick. 2011. “Infinite Ethics.”; Analysis and Metaphysics 10: 9–59.Google Scholar
Cain, James. 1995. “Infinite Utility: Insisting on Strong Monotonicity.”; Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73: 401–404.10.1080/0004840951234673110.1080/00048409512346731CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Campbell, Tim. 2015. “Personal Ontology and Bioethics.”; PhD diss., Rutgers University.Google Scholar
Kamm, Frances. 1993. Morality, Mortality Vol I: Death and Whom to Save from It. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lauwers, Luc. 1997. "Infinite Utility: Insisting on Strong Monotonicity." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 222–233.10.1080/00048409712347831CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lauwers, Luc, and Vallentyne, Peter. 2004. “Infinite Utilitarianism: More is Always Better.”; Economics and Philosophy 20 (2): 307–330.10.1017/S0266267104000227CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Machina, Mark. 2000. “Barrett and Arntzenius’s Infinite Decision Puzzle.”; Theory and Decision 49 (3): 291–295.10.1023/A:102650722433310.1023/A:1026507224333CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The View from Nowhere. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Parfit, Derek. 2011. On What Matters. 1 vol. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Ross, Jacob. 2006. “Rejecting Ethical Deflationism.”; Ethics 116: 742–768.10.1086/et.2006.116.issue-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scheffler, Samuel. 2013. Death and the Afterlife. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199982509.001.0001Google Scholar
Sidgwick, Henry. 1907. The Method of Ethics. 7th ed. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Temkin, Larry. 1993a. Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Temkin, Larry. 1993b. “Harmful Goods, Harmless Bads.”; In Value, Welfare, and Morality, edited by Frey, R. G. and Morris, Christopher, 290–324. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO978051162502210.1017/CBO9780511625022.015CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Temkin, Larry. 2000. “Equality, Priority, and the Levelling down Objection.”; In The Ideal of Equality, edited by Clayton, Matthew and Williams, Andrew, 126–161. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Temkin, Larry. 2003a. “Equality, Priority or What?”; Economics and Philosophy 19: 61–87.10.1017/S0266267103001020CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Temkin, Larry. 2003b. “Egalitarianism Defended.”; Ethics 113: 764–782.10.1086/et.2003.113.issue-4CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Temkin, Larry. 2003c. “Personal Versus Impersonal Principles: Reconsidering the Slogan.”; Theoria 69: 20–30.Google Scholar
Temkin, Larry. 2012. Rethinking the GoodMoral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.001.000110.1093/acprof:oso/9780199759446.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thoma, Johanna. 2015. “Larry Temkin: Rationality with Respect to People, Places and Times.”; Paper presented at the Belief, Action, and Rationality over Time Workshop, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, September 6.Google Scholar
Vallentyne, Peter. 1993. “Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility.”; Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 212–217.10.1080/00048409312345222Google Scholar
Vallentyne, Peter, and Kagan, Shelly. 1997. “Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory.”; The Journal of Philosophy 94 (1): 5–26.10.2307/2941011CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, Bernard. 1981a. “Persons, Character and Morality.”; Chap. 1 in Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139165860CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, Bernard. 1981b. “Internal and External Reasons.”; Chap. 8 in Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO978113916586010.1017/CBO9781139165860CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, Bernard. 1985. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar