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Ramseyan humility: the response from revelation and panpsychism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Raamy Majeed
Raamy Majeed*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

David Lewis argues for Ramseyan humility, the thesis that we can’t identify the fundamental properties that occupy the nomological roles at our world. Lewis, however, remarks that there is a potential exception to this, which involves assuming two views concerning qualia (i) panphenomenalism (contemporary panpsychism): all instantiated fundamental properties are qualia and (ii) the identification thesis (revelation): we can know the identities of our qualia simply by being acquainted with them. This paper aims to provide an exposition, as well as an assessment, of this response to the humility thesis.

Keywords

Ramseyan Humilitytranscendental idealismpanpsychismrevelationqualiaphenomenal consciousness
Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , 2017 , pp. 75 - 96
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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