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Propositions, attitudinal objects, and the distinction between actions and products

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Friederike Moltmann
Friederike Moltmann*
Affiliation:
Research Director Centre, Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie, des Sciences et des Techniques (IHPST), 13 rue du Four, 75006Paris, France
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Propositions as mind-independent abstract objects raise serious problems such as their cognitive accessibility and their ability to carry essential truth conditions, as a number of philosophers have recently pointed out. This paper argues that ‘attitudinal objects’ or kinds of them should replace propositions as truth bearers and as the (shared) objects of propositional attitudes. Attitudinal objects, entities like judgments, beliefs, and claims, are not states or actions, but rather their (spatio-temporally coincident) products, following the distinction between actions and products introduced by Twardowski (1912). The paper argues that the action–product distinction is not tied to particular terms in a particular language, but is to be understood as the more general distinction between an action and the (abstract or physically realized) artifact that it creates. It thus includes the distinction between the passing of a law and the law itself and an act of artistic creation and the created work of art.

Keywords

Propositionsartifactsattitudinal objectsaction-product distinction
Type
Theoretical Alternatives to Propositions
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 43 , Issue 5-6: Special issue: Essays on the Nature of Propositions , December 2013 , pp. 679 - 701
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2013

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