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Plurals and modals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Øystein Linnebo
Øystein Linnebo*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy IFIKK, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway.
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Consider one of several things. Is the one thing necessarily one of the several? This key question in the modal logic of plurals is clarified. Some defenses of an affirmative answer are developed and compared. Various remarks are made about the broader philosophical significance of the question.

Keywords

Plural logicmodalityextensionalityset theoryTimothy Williamson
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 4-5: Special Issue: Williamson on Modality , August 2016 , pp. 654 - 676
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2016

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