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On Quine's Relativity of Ontology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Paul R. Teller
Paul R. Teller*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Chicago Circle
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Extract

Quine's essay, “Ontological Relativity” [2] has brought about not a little confusion and disagreement. What is Quine's doctrine, and what are his arguments for it? The following paragraphs search for an answer. First a word about my aims. I will avoid adding to the already extensive discussion of Quine's older thesis of the indeterminacy of translation. Instead, where connections between the old and new doctrines become apparent, I will focus on the connections themselves and their repercussions for ontological relativity.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , December 1973 , pp. 295 - 302
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1973

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References

[1] Levin, Michael E. “Length Relativity” Journal of Philosophy Vol. 68 (1971) pp. 164–174.10.2307/2025288CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Quine, W. V. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays New York (1969).10.7312/quin92204CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[3] Quine, W. V. “On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 67 (1970) pp. 178–183.10.2307/2023887CrossRefGoogle Scholar