Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-s2hrs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-19T20:29:24.884Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

On Moore’s Notion of Proof

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 October 2019

Michael De
Michael De*
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
*
Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Much has been said about Moore’s proof of the external world, but the notion of proof that Moore employs has been largely overlooked. I suspect that most have either found nothing wrong with it, or they have thought it somehow irrelevant to whether the proof serves its antiskeptical purpose. I show, however, that Moore’s notion of proof is highly problematic. For instance, it trivializes in the sense that any known proposition is provable. This undermines Moore’s proof as he conceives it since it introduces a skeptical regress that he goes at length to resist. I go on to consider various revisions of Moore’s notion of proof and finally settle on one that I think is adequate for Moore’s purposes and faithful to what he says concerning immediate knowledge.

Keywords

Mooreskepticismproofimmediate knowledgeexternal world
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , April 2020 , pp. 313 - 321
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Greco, J. (2002). How to Reid Moore. The Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209): 544–63.Google Scholar
Lycan, W. G. (2001). Moore against the New Skeptics. Philosophical Studies 103: 35–53.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. (1939). Proof of an External World. In G. E. Moore: Selected Writings, edited by Baldwin, T., 147–70. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. (1953). Four Forms of Scepticism. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Moore, G. E. (1953). Some Main Problems of Philosophy. Leicester, UK: Blackfriars Press Limited.Google Scholar
Russell, B. (1927). An Outline of Philosophy. London: George Allen and Unwin.Google Scholar
Sosa, E. (2007). Moore’s Proof. In Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, edited by Nuccetelli, S. and Seay, G., 49–61. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Weatherall, J. O. (2017). On G. E. Moore’s “Proof of an External World.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98: 219–50.Google Scholar