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Not quite neo-sentimentalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Tristram Oliver-Skuse Open the ORCID record for Tristram Oliver-Skuse [Opens in a new window]
Tristram Oliver-Skuse*
Affiliation:
THUMOS, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The view that some evaluative concepts are identical to some affective concepts naturally falls out of neo-sentimentalism, but it is unstable. This paper argues for a view of evaluative concepts that is neo-sentimentalist in spirit but which eschews the identity claim. If we adopt a Peacockean view of concepts, then we should think of some evaluative concepts as having possession conditions that are affective in some way. I argue that the best version of this thought claims that possessing those concepts requires being rationally compelled to form evaluative beliefs in response to certain emotions.

Keywords

Neo-sentimentalismemotionsconceptsrepresentation
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 6 , December 2018 , pp. 877 - 899
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017

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Footnotes

The first version of this paper was written while Tristram Oliver-Skuse was a postdoctoral fellow at the Thumos Research Group at the University of Geneva.

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