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A new puzzle about belief and credence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Andrew Moon
Andrew Moon*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, USA
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Abstract

I present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent. The first is the view that S has a modal belief that p (e.g., S believes that probably-p) if and only if S has a corresponding credence that p. The second is the view that S believes that p only if S has some credence that p. The third is the view that, possibly, S believes that p without a modal belief that p. [Word Count: 85]

Keywords

Credal expressivismbeliefcredenceconfidenceepistemic modals
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 2 , March 2019 , pp. 272 - 291
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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