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The Moral Status of Pity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Eamonn Callan
Eamonn Callan*
Affiliation:
Department of Educational Foundations, University of Alberta, EdmontonAB, CanadaT6G 2G5
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Extract

Pity is an emotion which is intimately connected with virtue. If I were impervious to anger I could still be a paragon of rectitude. My emotional peculiarity might even be explained by moral saintliness. If I had a pitiless heart my entire life would surely be an abject moral failure. The imputation of an inability to pity strikes us as a damning moral criticism; it is one we are likely to make, for example, against those who commit acts of extreme cruelty. Yet pity is hardly ever welcomed by its recipients, and for that reason it differs in a puzzling way from other emotions which are closely associated with virtue, such as gratitude or compassion. The prospect of becoming an object of pity is alarming, and not merely because we fear the misfortune that would evoke pity in others; it is alarming in part because we suspect that being on the receiving end of that emotion could seriously aggravate our plight. We also regard an aversion to being pitied as commendable, perhaps even morally commendable. There is something shameful in wanting to be pitied, just as there is in the indulgence of self-pity. The aged and the physically disabled do not want our pity, as a rule, and we think better of them for not wanting it. Finally, we know that those who give pity are frequently guilty of serious wrongdoing. A pitiless heart may be a terrible thing, but a fondness for dispensing pity is scarcely any better.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 18 , Issue 1 , March 1988 , pp. 1 - 12
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1988

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References

1 The concept of autonomy which is relevant here requires a very full elucidation, but a couple of brief remarks will be helpful. First, autonomy requires certain psychological characteristics. At least a modest level of rationality is presupposed so that one can independently evaluate the advice or commands of others, the mores of one's culture, and the like. The inner strength to act on one's judgment is also necessary. Very young children, for example, lack autonomy because they fall below the minimal standard on the psychological criterion of autonomy. But one also has to be socially situated in such a way that one can meaningfully exercise one's own judgment in shaping one's life. I might possess the psychological characteristics of autonomy but if I were on the rack I would be divested of autonomy.

2 Blum, See Lawrence ‘Compassion,’ in Rorty, Amelie ed., Explaining Emotions (Berkeley: University of California Press 1980), 511–12Google Scholar. However, Blum's way of distinguishing these emotions is not quite the same as mine. Andreas Teuber also emphasizes the egalitarian character of compassion, though he does not attempt to distinguish it from pity in this or any other respect. Teuber, See Andreas ‘Simone Weil: Equality as Compassion,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (1982), 221–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 See Beehler, Rodger Moral Life (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1978)Google Scholar; Noddings, Nell Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of California Press 1984)Google Scholar.

4 Vlastos, Gregory ‘Justice and Equality,’ in Brandt, Richard ed., Social Justice (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1962), 44–7Google Scholar

5 Kant, Immanuel Groundwork to the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Paton, H.J. (New York: Harper & Row 1964) 66Google Scholar

6 Kant, Immanuel Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Beck, Lewis White (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1949) 253Google Scholar

7 The comments of Allen Pearson and the anonymous referees for the Canadian Journal of Philosophy helped me to improve an earlier version of this paper.