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Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Daniel Whiting
Daniel Whiting*
Affiliation:
Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17 1BJ, UK
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Extract

According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for an expression to have a particular meaning or express a certain concept is for subjects to be disposed to make, or to treat as proper, certain inferential transitions involving that expression. Such a theory of meaning is holistic, since according to it the meaning or concept any given expression possesses or expresses depends on the inferential relations it stands in to other expressions.

It is widely recognised that this holism leads to two prima facie problems for IRS. First, since no two speakers share the same beliefs, they will inevitably be disposed to make, or treat as correct, different inferential transitions involving an expression. Hence, according to IRS, the same word in different mouths will possess a different meaning and be understood in different ways. It seems to follow that communication is impossible.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 38 , Issue 4 , December 2008 , pp. 575 - 599
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2008

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