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Luck egalitarians versus relational egalitarians: on the prospects of a pluralist account of egalitarian justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, University of Århus, Denmark and Department of Philosophy, University of Tromsø, Norway

Abstract

Pluralist egalitarians think that luck and relational egalitarianism each articulates a component in a pluralist account of egalitarian justice. However, this ecumenical view appears problematic in the light of Elizabeth Anderson’s claim that the divide arises because two incompatible views of justification are in play, which in turn generates derivative disagreements – e.g. about the proper currency of egalitarian justice. In support of pluralist egalitarianism I argue that two of Anderson’s derivative disagreements are not rooted in the disagreement over justification she identifies, and that the disagreement over justification cuts across standard disagreements between luck and relational egalitarian justice.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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