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Locke on the Motivation to Suspend Desire

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 February 2021

Matthew A. Leisinger Open the ORCID record for Matthew A. Leisinger [Opens in a new window]
Matthew A. Leisinger*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada
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Abstract

This paper takes up two questions regarding Locke’s doctrine of suspension. First, what motivates suspension? Second, what are the conditions under which we are motivated to suspend? In response to the first question, I argue that suspension is motivated by the desire to avoid the possible future evils that might result from acting precipitately upon some desire without suspending. In response to the second question, I argue against the common assumption that the desire motivating suspension must be an agent’s most pressing desire.

Keywords

Lockesuspensiondesirewillhappiness
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 51 , Issue 1 , January 2021 , pp. 48 - 61
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Canadian Journal of Philosophy

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