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The Limits of Neutrality: Toward a Weakly Substantive Account of Autonomy1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Sigurdur Kristinsson
Sigurdur Kristinsson*
Affiliation:
University of Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis, MO63121-4499, USA
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Extract

Leading accounts of personal autonomy are content-neutral: they insist that there are no a priori constraints on the content of the desires or values that might motivate an autonomous action. In Gerald Dworkin's provocative words, ‘the autonomous person can be a tyrant or a slave, a saint or sinner, a rugged individualist or champion of fraternity, a leader or follower.’ ‘There is nothing in the idea of autonomy that precludes a person from saying, “I want to be the kind of person who acts at the command of others. I define myself as a slave and endorse those attitudes and preferences. My autonomy consists in being a slave.” ’ John Christman similarly claims that ‘any desire, no matter how evil, self-sacrificing, or slavish it might be’ could be autonomously formed. The same seems to apply to Harry Frankfurt's view, that actions are autonomous if they stem from second-order volitions that reflect what the agent cares about; it puts no constraints on the content of what a person might care about. All of these accounts hold that the mere content of a desire or value is never sufficient to rule out that it might be autonomously acted on by someone.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 30 , Issue 2 , June 2000 , pp. 257 - 286
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2000

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References

2 Dworkin, Gerald The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988), 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Ibid., 129

4 Christman, John ‘Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom,’ Ethics 101 (1991), 359CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 See, for example, Frankfurt, Harry ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971) 5–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Identification and Wholeheartedness,’ in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions, Shoeman, F. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987)Google Scholar; ‘The Importance of What We Care About,’ in Frankfurt, H. The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘Rationality and the Unthinkable,’ in Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About; ‘The Faintest Passion,’ The Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (1992) 5–16Google Scholar; ‘On the Necessity of Ideals,’ in The Moral Self, Noam, G. and Wren, T. eds. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1993)Google Scholar; and ‘Autonomy, Necessity and Love,’ in Vernuftsbegriffe in der Moderne, Fulda, H.F. and Horstmann, R. eds. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta 1994)Google Scholar.

6 Richard Double goes even further in the direction of neutrality, arguing that not only could any desire pass the relevant procedural tests, but also that the tests themselves should be relative to the individual's characteristic ‘style’ of managing decisions. He thus criticizes Dworkin's account for taking critical reflection to be the appropriate procedure for all agents, not just the reflective types (see Double, Richard ‘Two Types of Autonomy Accounts,’ Canadian journal of Philosophy 22 (1992) 65–80)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In a similar vein, Robert Noggle argues that since a liberal democracy should be neutral between different conceptions of the good, it shouldn't discriminate against those who don't value critical reflection, or choose not to engage in it (see Noggle, Robert ‘The Public Conception of Autonomy and Critical Self-reflection,’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 [1997] 495–515)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Noggle's argument echoes Dworkin's assertion, that ideological neutrality should be a theoretical constraint on any conception of autonomy (see Dworkin, The Theory and Practice, 8)Google Scholar. By contrast, George Sher argues against liberal neutrality based on his defense of a non-neutral conception of autonomy (see Sher, George Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997),CrossRefGoogle Scholar especially chapters 2, 3, and 4). My arguments in this paper do not presuppose any particular stance on liberal neutrality, nor do I try to derive such a stance from them. My aim is to come to an understanding of the concept of autonomy itself, letting the ideological chips fall where they may.

7 Irving Thalberg claims, for example, that people who are self-effacing, unassertive, and unmotivated to choose for. themselves are less autonomous than those who ‘exercise personal initiative, and control over [their] own affairs’ (Thalberg, Irving ‘Socialization and Autonomous Behavior,’ Tulane Studies in Philosophy 28 [1979], 34–5)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Robert Young similarly states that those who ‘prefer to be told how to live … forsake autonomy and the self-esteem and dignity that go with it’ (Young, Robert ‘Autonomy and the “Inner Self,”’ in The Inner Citadel: Essays of Individual Autonomy, Christman, J. ed. [New York: Oxford University Press 1989], 83)Google Scholar.

8 See Elinor Burkett, ‘God Created Me To Be a Slave: Mauritania's 90,000 slaves don't rebel. They don't even protest their lot. That's what 500 years of bondage will do’ (New York Times Magazine, 12 October 1997, 56-60).

9 Douglass, Frederick Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass an American Slave Written by Himself, ed. Quarles, Benjamin ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 1960), 67Google Scholar

10 The Hindu, 24 April 1994, quoted in Martha Nussbaum, ‘The Feminist Critique of Liberalism,’ The Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas (1997), 1-2. My italics.

11 I am assuming that any analysis of the concept of autonomy must cohere with basic reasons for taking autonomy to be morally important, e.g. that the capacity for autonomy is a ground for respect, and that valuable activities or ends are more valuable to individuals if autonomously chosen.

12 Patient autonomy, for example, consists in striking an informed balance between the various goals or values that are at stake in choosing among treatment options. A patient certainly forsakes this autonomy by heeding the admonition of the 1847 AMA Code of Ethics, that patients’ ‘obedience to the prescriptions of [their] physician should be prompt and implicit. [They] should never permit [their] own crude opinions … to influence [their] attention to [their physicians]’ (quoted in Katz, Jay ‘Informed Consent - Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?’ in Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 5th edition, Arras, J. and Steinbock, B. eds. [Mountain View, CA: Mayfield 1999], 87)Google Scholar. Patients who take this attitude do not make autonomous choices regarding their own health care. Even if they are neither coerced nor manipulated into accepting a given treatment, they do not autonomously consent to any particular form of treatment either. At most, they consent to keeping their autonomous agency outside the selection of treatment. In other words, they refuse to be autonomous patients. Moreover, that refusal, i.e. their decision to leave the choice to the physician, is hardly autonomous either, as long as they don't permit their opinions to influence their ‘attention’ to him. The code seems to imply that a good patient obeys blindly, without evaluating even the trustworthiness of the physician.

13 Cf. David Shapiro's discussion of consciously permitted automatized reaction in Shapiro, David Autonomy and Rigid Character (New York: Basic Books 1981), 19–20Google Scholar.

14 In his interpretation of the story of Abraham and Isaac, Norman Kretzmann suggests that even though Abraham was prepared to obey God's command, he was also convinced that killing his son would be horribly wrong, even as a sacrifice to God (see Kretzmann, Norman ‘Abraham, Isaac, and Euthyphro: God and the Basis of Morality,’ in Hamartia, Stump, Donald ed. [Lewiston, NY: Edward Mellen Press 1983], 30)Google Scholar. On Kretzmann's interpretation, Abraham's obedience was unconditional, yet not blind. His own evaluation, according to which following the command would be wrong, seems consistent with his determination to obey anyway — his commitment to obey God simply overrides his commitment to abide by his own understanding of right and wrong. However, if his commitment to obey is thus non-responsive to his substantive moral beliefs, and also to his reasons in general, acting on it hardly expresses his autonomy.

15 As Arthur Kuflik points out, a person who gave up this higher order control would no longer function as a morally autonomous agent, and the same seems to apply to personal autonomy. Kuflik argues, moreover, that a person is not morally permitted to alienate his autonomy in this sense. (See Kuflik, Arthur ‘The Inalienability of Autonomy,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 [1984] 271–98.)Google Scholar Thomas Hill similarly argues that servile deference violates a moral duty of self-respect. (See Hill, Thomas Jr. ‘Servility and Self-Respect,’ The Monist 57 [1973] 87–104.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar These Kantian theses presuppose the point I am defending here, that uncritical deference is incompatible with the exercise of the capacity for autonomy.

16 See Railton, Peter ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984) 134–71Google Scholar

17 Examples include Christman, John ‘Autonomy and Personal History,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991) 1–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jon Elster, ‘Sour Grapes- Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants,’ in The Inner Citadel John Christman, ed.; Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice, chs. 1-2; and Richard Double, ‘Two Types of Autonomy Accounts.’

18 Examples include Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ ‘Identification and Wholeheartedness,’ and ‘The Faintest Passion’; and Ekstrom, Laura Waddell ‘A Coherence Theory of Autonomy,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993) 599–616CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Christman, John ‘Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom,’ ‘Autonomy and Personal History,’ and ‘Defending Historical Autonomy: A Reply to Professor Mele,’ Canadian journal of Philosophy 23 (1993) 281–90CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 Another problem with Christman's test is that it fails to account for different ways of corning to have the beliefs and desires which would inform the hypothetical reflection on the history of one's desires. If those beliefs and desires are formed adaptively, for example, their authority may be called into question. A similar argument against ‘internalist’ accounts of autonomy is made by Dimock, Susan in ‘Personal Autonomy, Freedom of Action, and Coercion,’ in A Question of Values: New Canadian Perspectives in Ethics and Political Philosophy, Isaacs, Brennan and Milde, eds. (Amsterdam: Radopi 1997)Google Scholar.

21 See Jon Elster, ‘Sour Grapes - Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants,’ in J. Christman, ed., The Inner Citadel 170-6.

22 This line of thought is for example suggested by Elster's discussion of the desire for submission to authority in Classical Antiquity. According to Elster, such desires are adaptive if they were caused by a restricted feasibility set. He contrasts this with the case where a person deliberately restricts her feasibility set and thereby restricts her choices. That restriction results from one's preferences, whereas adaptive preferences are caused by a previous restriction. See Elster, ‘Sour Grapes,’ 173.Google Scholar

23 Dworkin, The Theory and Practice, 18; see also 15-18, and 161.Google Scholar

24 Ibid., 29

25 It could be objected that the fact that she reflects at all implies a commitment to be ultimately guided by her own sense of what is important or worthwhile. This may be true. However, the self-government this amounts to seems to have little moral significance, since the only part of Fatma's sense of values that comes into play in her reflections is her submissive self-conception, which tells her to ignore her own sense of values in all other respects.

26 ‘[Autonomy) is a feature that evaluates a whole way of living one's life and can only be assessed over extended portions of a person's life’ (Dworkin, The Theory and Practice, 16Google Scholar).

27 Whether Frankfurt's account is structural or procedural is a matter of exegesis. It is procedural if it takes identification with a desire to be an act or a process. It is structural if it takes identification to consist in the fact that the agent has an approving higher order desire, and no conflicting higher-order desires. I favor the latter interpretation.

28 Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ 17Google Scholar

29 See Frankfurt, ‘Identification and Wholeheartedness,’ 33Google Scholar, 44, and ‘The Faintest Passion,’ 12-14.

30 Frankfurt, ‘The Faintest Passion,’ 14Google Scholar

31 Ibid.

32 For Frankfurt's views on the relationship between love and autonomy, see Frankfurt, ‘Autonomy, Necessity and Love’ and ‘Duty and Love,’ Philosophical Explorations 1 (1998) 4–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

33 Frankfurt, ‘The Faintest Passion,’ 12Google Scholar

34 This distinguishes Fatma from Abraham, given that the reason for his unconditional obedience was his understanding that, since God's judgment is infallible, following his commands must be the thing to do, even in cases where it seems clear to Abraham himself that it isn't. To the extent that such reasoning connects Abraham's obedience with his sense of values, he may be described as someone who has autonomously decided not to act autonomously in cases where his own judgment conflicts with God's command.

35 A defender of Frankfurt might at this point bite the bullet, and assert that a person's sense of what is important and reasonable is constituted by her wholehearted highest-order desires. Evaluating this proposal comes down to assessing the role of practical reasoning in having a sense of values and guiding oneself according to it. Since Fatma might conceivably arrive at wholehearted highest-order volitions without any practical reasoning, the proposal implies that its role is merely instrumental. This competes with the view that some practical reasoning is essential to both having and consulting a sense of what is important and reasonable. I favor the latter, partly because it seems to offer a better explanation of our intuitions about genuine self-effacement.

36 Watson, Gary ‘Free Agency,’ Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975) 205–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37 For Christman, this is exemplified by the person who would approve of the development of his desire to have desires, the development of which he doesn't approve of. For Elster, it will be the person who non-adaptively prefers to have adaptive preferences. For Dworkin, it will be the person whose second-order reflection results in a desire not to engage in second-order reflection. And for Frankfurt, it will be the person who is non-ambivalent about his identification with the desire to lead a life of ambivalence. The only way for these accounts to be entirely content-neutral would be to insist that the person acts autonomously as long as the deviation from procedural/ structural autonomy is sanctioned by an autonomously formed/structured preference. But this would seem ill-advised. Each of these accounts incorporates a certain picture of what it is like- for all agents- to choose and act autonomously, and it would be odd to allow that a person might act autonomously while not conforming to that picture. Even if it were possible to decide autonomously to undergo lobotomy, the lobotomy would nevertheless destroy one's autonomy. For the contrary view, see Christman, ‘Liberalism and Positive Freedom,’ 347Google Scholar. Christman suggests that as long as autonomy-inhibiting factors have been autonomously chosen, one acts autonomously while under their influence.

38 I'm indebted to Robert Audi's account of acting for a reason. See Audi, Robert ‘Acting for Reasons,’ The Philosophical Review 95 (1986) 511–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Audi argues that without such responsiveness, the person doesn't even act for a reason (ibid., 534).

40 See Fischer, John M. ‘Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility,’ in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, Schoeman, F. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987)Google Scholar; and Fischer, John M. and Ravizza, Mark Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. chs. 2 and 3.

41 Here we can ignore the possibility of M necessarily commanding only behavior that is independently acceptable from the point of view of S's character.

42 Conditional and unconditional obedience may be predicated of a person's character, but also of more specific kinds of action-producing mechanisms. The kind of mechanism issuing in S's button-pushing action is conditionally obedient to M only if there exists a possible world in which that mechanism operates, M gives the order, and S doesn't push the button. This mechanism could be unconditionally obedient to M even if S's character as a whole was not. A possible world may exist, in which S's character stays the same, M gives the order, and S disobeys as a result of some other mechanism. That is, S's character may contain not only action-producing mechanisms of certain kinds, but also further mechanisms for determining which kind of action-producing mechanism operates. Since we are now only considering people with an unconditionally obedient character, such as Fatma, we may assume that no sub-character mechanisms would turn off the unconditionally obedient mechanism, under any circumstances.

43 Fisher and Ravizza argue persuasively that weak responsiveness is too weak a condition. The condition they suggest instead is moderate reasons-responsiveness, which entails the existence of an appropriate range of possible worlds in which the agent has sufficient reasons to do otherwise and does so, holding the actual mechanism fixed (see Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, ch. 3).

44 This argument is inconsistent with certain versions of internalism about practical rationality, according to which a consideration counts as a reason for an agent only if it is possible for it to engage her motives. However, I believe this is more of a problem for these positions than it is for the argument.

45 See Milgram, Stanley Obedience to Authority (New York: Harper and Row 1974)Google Scholar.

46 This example was suggested to me in conversation by Eleonore Stump.

47 This characterization leaves many questions open. For present purposes, however, the important idea is that a person doesn't have a sense of values in virtue of making a single evaluative judgment (e.g. that one ought to obey unconditionally), or having a single emotion (e.g. pride in obedience or shame for disobedience). A person's sense of values must be grounded in her self or character. This includes a multitude of elements, which together exhibit a certain degree of rationality, and contain commitments beyond immediately experienced desires and beliefs. A single judgment that is at odds with that system as a whole doesn't represent the person's sense of values, even though it may lead to a process of reflection whereby coherence is achieved. A view close to this is argued for by Helm, Bennett see ‘The Significance of Emotions,’ American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994) 319–31Google Scholar; ‘Freedom of the Heart,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996) 71-87; and ‘Integration and Fragmentation of the Self,’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1996) 43-62. See also Ekstrom, ‘A Coherence Theory of Autonomy.’

48 See Frankfurt, ‘The Faintest Passion,’ 14–15Google Scholar.

49 For a helpful account of these sources of identity, see Helm, ‘Integration and Fragmentation of the Self’ and ‘The Significance of Emotions.’

50 See, for example, Velleman, David ‘What Happens When Someone Acts?’ in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, Fischer, J.M. and Ravizza, M. eds. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1993)Google Scholar, and David Velleman, Introduction to The Possibility of Practical Reason (a forthcoming collection of essays).

51 See my ‘Self-Based Reasons,’ in manuscript.