Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
According Leibniz's thesis of universal expression, each substance expresses the whole world, i.e. all other substances, from its particular, unique viewpoint, or, in other words, the complete individual notion of a substance — the comprehensive notion which includes, in internal terms, everything truly attributable to a substance — is such a universal expression of, or ‘involves,’ every other substance, or, as Leibniz also frequently states, from any given complete individual notion one can ‘deduce’ or ‘infer’ or ‘demonstrate,’ or from it ‘follows,’ or it ‘leads to,’ (all truths about) the whole world. On the other hand, in Leibniz's view each (created) substance is internally individuated, self-sufficient and independent of other (created) substances, and the complete individual notion of a substance is such that it respects this requirement. Leibniz also says, with an apparent intention of pronouncing his doctrines of expression and self-sufficiency at the same time, that each substance is ‘as if a world apart,’ or like a ‘multiplication’ or ‘concentration’ of the world.