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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2020
I want to deal in this essay with the group of philosophers that G.E.M. Anscombe includes under the term ‘modern moral philosophy’ in her essay by that name. The stars of this group are Hobbes, Hume, Adam Smith, Mill, Sidgwick, Moore. I mean to include as well generally the last hundred years of emotivists, utilitarians, and those theorists who have emphasized universalizability in its various versions. For reasons which I hope will soon become clear, I will refer to this broad group as the ‘atomistic tradition.’ I will be assuming, though not often saying, that the most forthright and thorough spokesman of the tradition is David Hume who, in his purely skeptical moments, was so atomistic and extensionalist that he even denied personal identity over time. Anything less than that is not purely atomistic.
1 Anscombe, G.E.M. ‘Modern Moral Philosophy,’ in Thomson, J.J. and Dworkin, G. eds., Ethics (New York: Harper & Row 1968), 208Google Scholar
2 Sidgwick, Henry Methods of Ethics (New York: Dover Publications 1966) 7Google Scholar
3 I pass over the controversy about whether egoism is itself a system of morality. If it is, a change in my wording will make sufficient repairs for that case. I do take it at least to be a normative view.
4 David, Hume A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, L.A. (London: Oxford University Press), 252Google Scholar
5 Sidgwick, 381
6 Ibid., 382
7 Ibid., 498, italics added
8 Hare, R.M. Freedom and Reason (New York: Oxford University Press 1965), 145-56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Hare wants to include ideals as part of morality. See especially pp. 151-3. What I have called morality he calls ‘utilitarian morality’ and what I later associate with self-regard he calls ‘idealist morality.’ This indicates once again that he wants to distinguish between ideals and interests.
9 See Henry B. Veatch, ‘Book Review of Reason and Morality by Alan Gewirth,' Ethics, (1978-79) 401-14, esp. 412, for a recent suggestion of this point.
10 Lewis, Helen Block Shame and Guilt in Neurosis (New York: International Universities Press, Inc. 1974), 28Google Scholar
11 Lewis, 43
12 Ibid., 498