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Knowledge despite falsehood

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Martin Montminy
Martin Montminy*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, 455 West Lindsey Street, Norman, OK73019-2006, USA
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S’s false belief that p is not essential to S’s cognition. S’s knowledge is instead due to S’s belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S (dispositionally) believes (and knows). S thus knows despite her false belief. The widely accepted and plausible principle that inferential knowledge requires known premises is unscathed.

Keywords

knowledge from falsehooduseful false beliefsevidential pathdefeaterepistemic closure
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 3-4 , August 2014 , pp. 463 - 475
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2014

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