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Keeping track of what's right

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Laura Schroeter  and
François Schroeter
Laura Schroeter*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Arts, School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia
François Schroeter
Affiliation:
Faculty of Arts, School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, Australia
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In this paper, we argue that ordinary judgments about core normative topics purport to attribute stable, objective properties and relations. Our strategy is first to analyze the structures and practices characteristic of paradigmatically representational concepts such as concepts of objects and natural kinds. We identify three broad features that ground the representational purport of these concepts. We then argue that core normative concepts exhibit these same features.

Keywords

Conceptsnormative conceptsrepresentation
Type
Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 48 , Issue 3-4: Special issue: Representation and Evaluation , 2018 , pp. 489 - 509
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2018

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